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Under the terms of reference drafted by ETNO, CRIDS is responsible for the translation of ETNO's 
proposals for the reform of the electronic communications regulatory framework into clear and 
legally sound proposals that can be presented to the European Commission and the other EU 
institutions. The present legal opinion does therefore not constitute a position from the CRIDS or 





1. Executive Summary 
 
The Political Guidelines of the Juncker Commission of July 20141 have identified the better use of 
the opportunities offered by digital technologies as a priority objective for promoting growth. The 
mission letter to Commissioner Oettinger reaffirmed these priorities and called for the setting of 
long-term strategic goals to offer legal certainty to the telecoms sector and create the right 
regulatory environment to foster investment and innovative businesses.2 
 
The Digital Single Market Strategy (hereinafter “DSM”) adopted in spring 2015 focuses on ensuring 
access and connectivity throughout the EU through new legislative and non-legislative initiatives 
complementing the regulatory framework. The goal is to bring the Digital Single Market to the level 
of ambition needed to respond to the existing challenges. The review of the framework itself 
constitutes a key building block within the strategy.3 ETNO deems it essential that the new 
regulatory framework reflects technology, market and legislative evolutions, which took place since 
2002: 
- The current policy challenge has moved from the opening of existing infrastructures to the 
deployment of new infrastructures; 
- There is growing competition at network level and even more among digital services; 
- Most infrastructure and services markets are competitive, partly as a result of the presence 
of regulation; 
- Substitutability between electronic communications services and OTT services is increasing; 
- Horizontal law, in particular consumer protection, has been strengthened. 
 
Based on its reply to the 2015 public consultation on the review of the Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications, ETNO, with the legal expertise of the CRIDS, has proposed the following 
amendments to the Regulatory Framework. ETNO sees them as necessary to make the new rules fit 
for the ambition of the DSM, taking into account the market and technical evolutions under way. 
 
Clarifying regulatory objectives and principles 
 
ETNO believes that the objectives and principles of the Regulatory Framework should be adapted to 
the current challenges of the sector. In particular, they should be aligned with the need for 
substantial infrastructure upgrade and deployment, the necessity of ensuring a regulatory level 
playing field between digital services, and the requirement to rely on horizontal legislation such as 
competition law or consumer protection law as well as commercial negotiations before imposing 
sector-specific obligations.4 Regulation should promote the long-term interest of end-users and the 
competitiveness of the industry. 
 
Modernising access regulation and simplifying the market analysis process  
 
Currently, the market analysis process involves the identification of non-competitive markets, the 
designation of operators with significant market power and the definition of proportionate access 
obligations. This procedure is complex, extraordinarily burdensome and no longer adapted to the 
                                                 
1 Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, 15 July 2014. 
2 Mission letter to Günther Oettinger, Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, 1 Nov. 2014, p. 3 et seq. 
3 COM(2015) 192, 6.5.2015, p. 9 et seq. 
4 See recital in the preamble to Directive 2009/140 reminding that ‘The aim is progressively to reduce ex-ante sector-specific 
rules as competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition 
law only. Considering that the markets for electronic communications have shown strong competitive dynamics in recent 





current challenges of the sector. ETNO therefore proposes to move from the current market review 
process to the regulation of “key network inputs” in order to focus regulation on cases where access 
is indispensable to allow effective competition at retail level. The approach should be further 
simplified by requiring regulators to identify in each relevant geographic area, starting from the 
smallest possible definition, the single key network input to which the provision of access is the most 
appropriate to ensure competition and consumer choice in the corresponding retail market. Review 
periods of mandated access should be longer than today, with a possibility for anticipated revision 
in case substantial technical or market changes indicate that the conditions for applying regulation 
are no longer present. 
 
Where regulators decide mandating access to a key network input, they should perform an impact 
assessment to compare the positive impact expected from the remedy on the long-term consumer 
welfare, the absence of negative impact of the envisaged remedy on investment and its contribution 
to incentives to invest in infrastructure. In principle, operators should negotiate on a commercial 
basis, the conditions for access to the key network input, subject to regulatory oversight by NRAs. 
The EU should enhance legal predictability and proportionality of the Regulatory Framework taking 
into account the much more dynamic market environment, by removing cost-orientation, 
accounting separation and functional separation from the regulatory toolbox of the national 
regulatory authorities. Applying an economic replicability test should in principle suffice to avoid 
exclusionary behaviour by the undertakings controlling key network input.  
 
Streamlining the interconnection obligations 
 
Operators of public networks should be granted the right and the obligation to interconnect for 
providing interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality based on numbers. 
Network interconnection is indispensable, among other, to guarantee end-to-end quality 
throughout the European Union, interoperability of the services concerned as well as reliable 
emergency services. Where regulatory intervention is required, interconnection conditions should 
apply symmetrically, as recommended by the Commission since several years.5 Fixed and mobile 
communications services have different characteristics that could justify different terms and 
conditions. 
 
Protecting digital consumers 
 
To be effective and efficient, consumer protection should also adapt to technology and market 
evolutions. ETNO proposes to re-organise the current sector-specific consumer protection rules 
included in the Universal Service Directive and in the ePrivacy Directive in the following way: 
- Some rules, such as rules on quality of services and access to emergency calls, number 
portability, electronic directories, should be linked to the provision of interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality based on certain telephone numbers; 
- Other rules, for example as regards the transparency of contractual terms, should be repealed 
as they are already covered by horizontal consumer law, in particular the Consumer Rights 
Directive which was adopted after the last revision of the electronic communications 
regulatory framework, or by the recently adopted Open Internet Regulation; 
- Rules that were specifically designed for the liberalisation of the traditional public access 
telephony 18 years ago are outdated and should also be repealed; 
- Selected rules currently only applied to telecoms should be moved to laws that cover all 
services in the digital market, if they are still considered relevant. 
 
                                                 
5 Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the 




Focusing the universal service on what matters today, the broadband internet  
 
The current scope of universal service is centred on voice telephone network access and services. 
However, a connection to the fixed telephony network is no longer indispensable to avoid social 
exclusion, among others because mobile penetration has overtaken fixed penetration. On the other 
hand, broadband internet access has become the tool to participate in social life via e-mail, access 
to public information, messaging and calls – often at no additional cost –, e-government, e-banking 
etc., all applications to which access becomes important to avoid social exclusion. The Universal 
Service Directive should ensure the availability of an affordable basic internet access service as a 
safety net for all EU citizens and focus on this objective. Where private operators cannot provide 
this basic internet access at market conditions, Member States should make public funding available. 
 
Protecting disabled users 
 
It is of utmost importance that citizens with special needs, notably citizens with disabilities, can 
communicate at the same level as all citizens. The obligations of the Universal Service Directive in 
favour of disabled users, originally designed for the fixed telephone service, should be thoroughly 
rethought within an overall and horizontal perspective. Future obligations in favour of disabled 
user’s basic services should apply also to service providers beyond traditional telecommunications 
network operators. The draft directive on accessibility6 would seem the most appropriate legal 







The amendments proposed by ETNO in this report will allow the European Union to progress 
towards the objective already set out in the 2002 Framework: to progressive phase out regulated 
intervention in favour of commercial agreements and move from ex-ante sector-specific regulation 
to competition law. 
 
The main amendments are summarised in the Table below. 
 
                                                 
6 Proposal for a Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
as regards the accessibility requirements for products and services (COM/2015/615) of  2 December 2015. This proposal 









With the Digital Single Market Strategy adopted on May 2015,7 the European Commission (“the 
Commission”) launched the most important and comprehensive review of the EU rules applicable to 
the digital economy since the Nineties, when the telecom sector was liberalised and the Internet was 
still in its infancy. 
 
The Commission announced proposals to review the EU electronic communications regulatory 
framework focusing on: 
- A consistent single market approach to spectrum policy and management; 
- Delivering the conditions for a true single market by tackling regulatory fragmentation to allow 
economies of scale for efficient network operators and service providers and effective 
protection of consumers; 
- Ensuring a level playing field for market players and consistent application of the rules8; 
- incentivising investment in high speed broadband networks (including a review of the 
Universal Service Directive), and 
- A more effective regulatory institutional framework. 
 
The European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) is the trade association 
that represents the main European electronic communications network operators. ETNO members are 
Pan-European operators that also hold new entrant positions outside their national markets. ETNO 
brings together the main investors in innovative and high-quality e-communications platforms and 
services, representing 60% of total sector investment. The Association has always advocated for 
ambitious changes to the current framework, leading to more innovation and investments in state-of-
the-art next-generation fixed and mobile infrastructures. ETNO members consider an ambitious review 
of the access regulation regime particularly important. 
 
ETNO closely contributes to shaping the best regulatory and commercial environment for its members 
to continue rolling out innovative and high quality services and platforms for the benefit of European 
consumers and businesses. ETNO therefore advocates that the Commission would take the 
opportunity of the review to streamline the current rules and procedures. ETNO pleads that the 
Framework would be amended to guarantee an adequate return on investment in NGA networks and 
to ensure a level playing field between competing infrastructures. Moreover, ex-ante regulation should 
be removed as much as possible in favour of a greater reliance on ex-post regulatory oversight. In 
parallel, ETNO requests that the evidence base of the so-called Article 7 procedure would be 
strengthened with ex-ante assessment of the impact on investment incentives and innovation of any 
new regulated access product.   
 
Regarding electronic communications services, ETNO underlines the strong need of modifying the 
objectives of the framework. The overarching objectives should be fostering European 
competitiveness, investment and long-term consumer welfare. Moreover, ETNO calls for the 
                                                 
7 COM(2015) 192. 
8 The EU regulatory framework on electronic communications services and networks emerged in the context of full 
liberalisation in the 1990s. At that time voice communications were the focus of attention and distinct from online services. 
The framework contains provisions for the regulation of both networks and electronic communications services. Services 
such as so-called over-the–top services (OTTs), providing communications (voice, messaging) and/or other services, do not 
usually fall within the scope of the current EU regulatory framework's rules on ECS or those on network regulation because 
these services do not themselves include conveyance of signals. Therefore, the regulatory regimes, which are currently 
applied to OTTs or comparable services, on the one hand, and electronic communications service and networks, on the other 




Commission to take into account the convergence in services and repeal outdated rules as well as 
provisions that are overlapped by horizontal consumer protection rules. Specific rules should be 
maintained for interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality based on numbers and 
applied selectively, in a proportionate way, to the extent they are necessary to preserve highly valued 
established standards that end-users rely on.  
 
ETNO also asks for amendments to the current Framework, in particular as regards universal service 
and end-users' protection obligations, to ensure that consumer protection standards for EU citizens 
are consistent, proportionate and effective across the digital market, and applied to the various players 
in the value chain.  
 
ETNO has submitted its reform proposals to the EU Commission on 7 December 2015 in reply to the 
Commission’s Public consultation on the evaluation and the review of the regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services9.  The report commissioned by ETNO to Plum 
Consulting10 further explains the rationale of ETNOs proposals.  
 
On 6 January 2016, ETNO sought external legal advice order to support its advocacy efforts. More 
specifically, this legal advice was to consist in a legal opinion in which the contracted advisers translate 
ETNO policy messages on the framework review into concrete amendment proposals to the main legal 
instruments that form the regulatory framework currently in force. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-evaluation-and-review-regulatory-
framework-electronic-communications 




3. Explanatory memorandum 
3.1. Context 
3.1.1. Current rules 
 
The original regulatory framework for electronic communications (RFEC) comprising five Directives 
was adopted in 2002: 
 
- Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive)11. 
- Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive)12 which lists among other the regulatory remedies 
available to NRAs to tackle the “competition distortion” resulting from the existence of 
Significant Market Power (SMP). 
- Directive 2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), which provides a minimal harmonization of 
national Authorisation procedures for providers of electronic communications networks or 
services, and in particular for the granting of spectrum rights of use. 
- Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive) which defines the minimum services that 
must be available to users at a reasonable price throughout the EU and other consumer rights. 
- Directive 2002/58/EC (electronic communications privacy Directive) which requires Member 
States to ensure a wide range of privacy rights in the framework of the provision of electronic 
communications services (e.g. relating to cookies). 
 
These rules have subsequently been supplemented by a number of additional legislative 
instruments specific to the electronic communications sector, such as the BEREC Regulation13, the 
Roaming Regulation14
 
the broadband Cost-Reduction Directive and the Open Internet Regulation15 
as well as several Commission decisions, such as Decision 243/2012 of 14 March 2012 establishing 
a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (RSPP)16.
 
 
All of the directives that make up the RFEC contain provisions aiming to ensure a regular review of 
their functioning, and the Commission has regularly published observations on the performance 
of the individual instruments in its application reports on the framework that have been submitted 
to the co-legislators. 
In 2006, based on its 11th implementation report17, the Commission initiated18 a review process with 
the aim of ensuring an effective, future-proof framework.
 
This review led to the adoption of two 
                                                 
11 Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services (Framework Directive), OJ 2002, L108/33, as amended; Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ 2002, L108/51; 
Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating 
to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. 
12 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1422102767946&uri=CELEX:02002L0019-20091219 
13 OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1. 
14 OJ L 171, 29,6,2007, p. 32, as amended by Regulation (EC) 544/2009, OJ L 167, 29.6.2009, p. 12. 
15 Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and 
Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, 
p. 1–18 
16 OJ L 81, 21.3.2012, p. 7. 
17 COM(2006) 68, 20.2.2006. 




amending directives in 200919. Member States had to transpose these amendments into their 
domestic legal orders by 26 May 2011. Substantively, the review included both measures to improve 
the framework in its institutional and procedural aspects and to address a number of substantive 
developments and issues having arisen from its application and in the light of technological and 
market developments. The impact of the reformed rules was reflected in the implementation 
reports covering the years 2012, 201320 and 201421. 
 
The Political Guidelines of the new Commission published in July 201422 have identified the better 
use of the opportunities offered by digital technologies as a priority objective for promoting growth. 
To this end, the Guidelines envisage breaking down national silos in the regulation of electronic 
communications and in the management of spectrum resources, as part of a more ambitious reform 
of the regulatory framework for electronic communications. The mission letter to Commissioner 
Oettinger reaffirmed these priorities and called for the setting of long-term strategic goals to offer 
legal certainty to the sector and create the right regulatory environment to foster investment and 
innovative businesses23. 
 
The Digital Single Market strategy adopted in spring 201524 focuses on fostering connectivity 
throughout the EU through new legislative and non-legislative initiatives complementing the 
regulatory framework. The aim is to bring the Digital Single Market up to the level of ambition 
needed to respond to the existing challenges. The review of the framework itself constitutes a key 
building block within the strategy25, for which proposals are to be set forth in the course of 201626. 
 
In accordance with the Commission Work Programme for 201527, this review is preceded by a 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) evaluation aimed at assessing whether the 
current regulatory framework is 'fit for purpose'. 
 
A key element of the evaluation exercise was an online questionnaire ‘Public consultation on the 
evaluation and the review of the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services’ published on 11 September 201528. The purpose of this questionnaire was twofold. Firstly, 
it aimed to gather input to assess the telecoms regulatory framework against the evaluation criteria 
of the Better Regulation Guidelines29. Secondly, the questionnaire was designed to seek 
stakeholders’ views on issues that may need to be reviewed with a view to reforming the regulatory 
framework in light of market and technological developments, with the objective of achieving the 
ambitions laid out in the Digital Single Market Strategy. 
                                                 
19 Directive 2009/136/EC (Citizens' Rights Directive), OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 11 and Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation 
Directive), OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37. 
20 SWD(2014) 249 final, 14.7.2014 (18th monitoring report on the electronic communications market and regulations, 
covering in particular key market and regulatory developments in 2012 and 2013), available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=6473 
21 SWD(2015) 126 final of 19.6.2015 (19th monitoring report on the electronic communications market and regulations, 
covering in particular key market and regulatory developments in 2014), available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=9990 
22 A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, Opening Statement in the European 
Parliament, Plenary Session by Jean-Claude Juncker, President-elect of the European Commission, 15.7.2014. 
23 Mission letter to Günther Oettinger, Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, 1.11.2014, p. 3 et seq. 
24 COM(2015) 192, 6.5.2015. 
25 COM(2015) 192, 6.5.2015, p. 9 et seq. 
26 COM(2015) 192, 6.5.2015, p. 20. 
27 COM(2014) 910 final, 16.12.2014, ANNEX 3, Commission Work Programme 2015 - A New Start. 
28 The consultation lasted until 7 December 2015. The questionnaire was available on : https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/news/public-consultation-evaluation-and-review-regulatory-framework-electronic-communications 
29 Effectiveness (Have the objectives been met?), Efficiency (Were the costs involved reasonable?), Coherence (Does the 
policy complement other actions or are there contradictions?) Relevance (Is EU action still necessary?) and EU added value 





3.1.2. Legislative and market evolutions 
 
The underlying idea of the universal service concept is that certain facilities should be treated like 
public utilities in order to ensure a ‘safety net’ in favour of the more vulnerable citizens without regard 
to their income and location. 
 
The 2002 EU framework sought to restrict the scope of the universal service in order not to hamper 
investment incentives and competition. The continued extension of the universal service seems to 
ignore that investments have to be made in the networks that carry internet traffic by the commercial 
entities deploying the concerned networks and that these entities expect a return on their investment. 
 
Today the balance seems to have shifted too much in the direction of the public utility concept, 
neglecting the underlying economics of network roll out and innovation. 
 
The existing regulatory practices, originally designed to protect access seekers from a powerful 
regulated access provider, have started to raise sector costs, delay investment by regulated access 
providers, and weaken the competitive process in a significant number of cases30. 
 
- The relatively low level of regulated prices for copper loops has depressed retail prices for both 
basic and high-speed broadband in the EU. This, in turn, means low revenues from fixed 
network services in the EU relative to the US – a problem which has worsened as broadband 
revenues have grown in importance relative to voice telephony revenues.  These lower fixed 
revenues in the EU have led to lower levels of investment in fixed services. As Figure 2 shows, 
EU operators are investing the same proportion of their fixed revenues in fixed services as their 
US counterparts. But these fixed revenues are only half as large31. 
 
- The return on investment and cash flow generated by ETNO members are substantially lower 
than those generated by other, unregulated, operators in the EU as Figure 3 illustrates. A major 
factor here is that regulation redistributes risk and returns between the access provider and 
the access seekers. These differences in investment incentives for regulated and unregulated 
operators have a substantial impact on overall investment levels. Over the past six years 
investment by regulated operators32 in fixed networks has constituted between 60% and 65% 
of total investment in the fixed sector. 
 
- Qualitative case studies33 suggest that access regulation has a significant impact on investment 




                                                 
30 See PLUM, Fostering investment and competition in the broadband access markets of Europe, February 2016. 
31 Economic literature on the impact of cash flows on investment, which draws on both econometric analysis of outcomes 
(See for example Financial Constraints, Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings, David J. Denis and Valeriy Sibilkov. 
December 2011, The Review of Financial Studies, 23(1)) and surveys of chief financial officers (See for example The real effects 
of financial constraints: evidence from a financial crisis, Murillo Campello, John Graham and Campbell R Harvey, December 
2009. NBER Working Paper 15552) finds that reduced revenues and reduced cash flows tend to reduce investment. 
32 As measured by investment by ETNO members.  See Annual economic Report 2014, IDATE for ETNO, December 2014. In 
2014, the ETNO members accounted for almost 60% of the total sector investment, what represented a significant €26.6bn 
investment effort. The remaining part, €20.4bn, was mainly delivered by cable companies (See Annual economic Report 2015, 
IDATE for ETNO, December 2015). 












- “In the Netherlands regulation designed to give access seekers first mover advantage 
stopped KPN from investing further in fibre in business areas; 
- Regulatory processes have delayed the introduction of higher speed broadband 
services (through use of vectoring) in Germany; 
- In France Orange slowed down its investments in FTTH between 2008 and 2011 while 
government and regulatory policies on NGA were uncertain; 
- Delays in regulatory decision-making in Malta delayed the deployment of FTTH by 
almost three years”. 
 
At the same time, PLUM has identified “examples of how the relaxation of ex-ante 
regulation has led to greater investment in NGA: 
- In Sweden and the UK, removal of cost oriented regulation and a move to economic 
replicability tests has led to increased investment in NGA broadband; 
- In Spain and Portugal, the move to relatively light regulation of WBA products in 
return for open duct access has led to substantial deployment of FTTH. In Spain 
                                                 
34 The notes in the table refer to: 18: access seekers only, Cable operators are excluded; 19: EU5 and 20: Liberty Global and 
21 these data were not available in the 2015 report. 




differentiation of regulation by bandwidth allowed relaxation of regulation while in 
Portugal differentiation by geography supported relaxation of regulation; 
- The use of symmetric regulation, which avoids cost oriented price controls, has led 
to strong infrastructure-based competition in the supply of next generation 
broadband in the urban areas of France”. 
 
Existing regulation has supported service-based competition and protected consumers from abuse of 
market power. However, existing regulation was designed for an era in which copper was present and 
could be upgraded at comparatively low cost to provide broadband. We are now in an era of transition 
- from copper to fibre, and from service-based competition to increased infrastructure-based 
competition. With this transition comes a need for more substantial investment. The regulatory 
challenge is now fundamentally different.  
 
The scope and extent of ex-ante regulation can then be reduced as commercial agreements develop, 
with the role of the regulator moving from a body which specifies access conditions, to one, which 
monitors and adjudicates, offering guidance and intervening in disputes as a last resort. 
 
3.1.3. The new regulatory context  
The Better Regulation Guidelines 
 
On 19 May 2015, the European Commission published a very comprehensive, ambitious and innovative 
Better Regulation package, which contains new guidelines on various phases of the policy cycle. The 
package also sets out the rules and the functioning of entirely new consultation platforms and of a 
new body in charge of regulatory scrutiny. 
 
Through its Better Regulation agenda, the European Commission has committed among other to 
design, deliver and support the implementation of interventions of the highest possible quality, 
including the monitoring and evaluation of existing policies and legislation. 
 
In the section concerning the impact assessment, the Guidelines provide a methodology to assess the 
proportionality of EU intervention.  The following questions are set forward for proportionality 
assessments:  
- What is the problem and why is it a problem? 
- Why should the EU act? 
- What should be achieved? 
- What are the various options to achieve the objectives? 
- What are their economic, social and environmental impacts and who will be affected? 
- How do the different options compare in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency (benefits 
and costs)? 
 
It is useful to note that the guidelines refer to economic and social impact and do not limit the 




consumer welfare36 and producer welfare. Consumer welfare – on which the Commission centres its 
merger control assessments - is important, but it is not the whole story37. 
 
The Better Regulation Guidelines constitute ‘soft law’, which is not directly binding. However, the basic 
thrust of the guidelines reflects the principle of proportionality that is binding. The Case law of the EU 
Court of Justice stated nearly half a century ago "the individual should not have his freedom of action 
limited beyond the degree necessary in the public interest"38. Protocol no. 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to the TEU and the TFEU that requires “constant respect” 
for the principle of proportionality. The proportionality principle applies to all levels of EU Legislation 
and quasi-legislation:  
- Across the Directives;  
- Not only to those Articles with explicit or implicit reference to proportionality; 
- To Delegated Acts from the Commission; 
- To Technical Standards, Guidelines and Recommendations; 
- To Implementing legislation and obligations imposed at Member State level; and 
- When the Commission exercises its supervisory powers under the Article 7 procedure. 
 
Are all obligations under the current Framework still compliant to the principle of proportionality?  
 
The current regulatory framework was strongly inspired by competition lawyers. It is centred on 
market definitions and market assessments.  
 
An objective that ETNO considers a priority, fostering investment in electronic communications 
networks, is hardly mentioned by the Framework Directive. This reflects the technical-economic 
context in which these measures were adopted. In 1998, in Western Europe the copper networks 
rolled out from 1950 until the 1970s had reached a quasi-universal coverage and were already 
depreciated to a large extent. The aim of the EU telecom liberalization was to provide interconnection 
and access to this existing infrastructure.  
 
In fact, the 2002 Framework codified the measures adopted to liberalize the telecommunications 
sector in the 1990s, retaining their main aim: fostering market entry and the duty to “safeguard 
competition”. Similar references were already made in the 1990 directives: for instance, Article 9(5) of 
Directive 97/33 (Interconnection Directive) provides that one of the NRAs’ missions is the promotion 
of competition. This generally formulated mission is specified under the 2002 Framework by means of 
two Commission Recommendations. The first, the Recommendation on relevant markets, identifies 
markets that the Commission considers potentially problematic from the point of view of competition. 
The second, the SMP Guidelines, provide NRAs with a theoretical methodology to prove the absence 
of effective competition, which the Framework Directive equates to the existence of market 
dominance.  
 
                                                 
36 Consumer welfare refers to the individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services. It is typically 
measured using the concept of consumer surplus, i.e. the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a product 
and what he actually has to pay. When measured over all consumers, consumers' surplus is a measure of aggregate consumer 
welfare. See http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177 
37  “In anti-trust economics, there is some debate over the appropriate welfare measure to be applied. Some argue that lost 
consumer surplus (i.e. including both deadweight loss and producers' surplus) should be considered on the grounds that a 
transfer from consumers to firms does not improve social welfare. Others argue that this represents a value judgment and all 
decisions should be based only on the deadweight welfare loss (allocative efficiency), with judgments regarding transfers of 
income left to the political process. Still others argue that producers' surplus should be considered because much of it is 
dissipated in the quest for monopoly profits” http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3187 
38 As formulated by the advocate general Dutheillet de Lamothe in his opinion of 2 December 1970 in Case 11/7 0, 




The Directives were reformed in 2009, although without affecting their main thrust. The key provisions 
of the Framework remain Articles 14 and 15 Framework Directive, requiring NRAs to impose ex-
ante remedies on dominant undertakings to ensure effective competition.  
 
Directive 2014/61 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications 
networks seems to herald a shift in concerns. The Directive seeks to promote the deployment of new 
networks whereas, until then, the focus was on ensuring access to existing infrastructures. 
 
The underlying idea was that entrants needed to be provided access to the network of the incumbent 
telecom operators in order to allow them to build a customer base and generate revenue streams 
allowing them to deploy their own networks (“ladder of investment"). The ladder of investment 
approach aims to promote end-to-end infrastructure duplication in a progressive manner. NRAs imposed 
different kinds of access to the incumbent’s operator copper network, beginning with a resale model, 
continuing with bitstream (wholesale broadband access), and proceeding to local loop unbundling. These 
alternative forms of access were presented as a succession of ‘rungs’ which new entrants were expected 
to ‘climb’ until they had built out their own networks. 
 
Since then, a number of studies39 assessing the cost of local access found that its high costs might make 
duplication of the fixed local access unviable except in specific localised circumstances. This suggests 
that local access in many parts of Europe would be a natural monopoly or duopoly. Translated into the 
concepts of the current Framework, this means that local fixed access is an enduring bottleneck; that 
its owners will forever be considered to enjoy significant market power (SMP) and will forever have to 
provide regulated access.  
 
This is not the right signal in order to attract investments in the EU, in particular outside the dense 
areas. Another approach is required to attract investments and ensure that fibre networks are 
deployed.  
 
Two of the three pillars of the 6 May 2015 Digital Single Market for Europe (DSM) strategy are: creating 
the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish and maximising the growth potential 
of our European Digital Economy. 
 
In this regard, the business case for infrastructure investment by network operators is strongest where: 
- Regulation is simple and certain; 
- The access provider is free to choose how, where and when to invest; 
- The access provider has maximum pricing freedom at the wholesale and retail level; 
- The access provider can close legacy services with the minimum of regulatory constraints. 
 
Investment incentives of integrated operators providing also electronic communications services are 
strongly impacted by the contribution of the retail services margins to their operating revenues and 
consequently their future earnings before interest, taxes and amortization (EBITA). EBITA shows the 
ability of undertakings to service debt and thus the capacity to invest. However, under the current 
electronic communications services regulation, network operators’ revenues on electronic 
communications services markets are increasingly under pressure because of (a) new competition 
from other telecommunications’ undertakings and internet-based service providers, (b) new 
technological challenges, and (c) a lack of a level playing field. 
 
                                                 
39 See Analysis Mason (2008a), The business case for subloop unbundling in Belgium, report for BIPT; Analysis Mason (2007), 
The business case for sub-loop unbundling in Dublin, Final Report for Comreg, at  
http://www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0810a.pdf; and Elixmann, D., Ilic, D., Neumann, K.-and T. 





To be successful, the DSM strategy will therefore also need to remove the disproportionate obligations 
resting on electronic communications services providers in order to create ‘the right conditions for 
digital networks and services to flourish’. 
 
3.2. The amendments proposed 
In order to align the current rules with the above-mentioned DSM strategy, a limited number of 
targeted amendments suffice: 
 
• Regulate using an overarching objective for NRAs – promoting the competitiveness of the EU 
industry and maximising the long-term interest of end-users. In applying this principle to 
economic regulation, devise rules that optimise the combination of dynamic, productive and 
allocative efficiency to maximise (total) economic welfare. Changing objectives in this way 
should incentivise NRAs to consider the extent to which proposed regulations promote 
investment and innovation, promote infrastructure-based competition, and preserve 
sustainable choice for consumers.  Establishing an overarching regulatory objective should also 
lead to more harmonised regulation across the EU. 
 
• Restrict ex-ante regulation to the minimum required to deal with the competition problems 
identified. The existing framework already contains a number of features that reflect the 
principle of minimum regulation – that markets that are effectively competitive should not be 
regulated; that remedies should be implemented at the wholesale rather than the retail level; 
and that remedies should be proportionate. These are important principles. But it is clear that 
the regulatory practice by NRAs not always follows these principles. 
 
• Recognise and encourage use of voluntary commercial agreements. Where infrastructure-
based competition is strong, the interests of the regulated access provider and access seekers 
are increasingly aligned. This has led to voluntary long-term agreements that are superior from 
a public interest perspective to ex-ante regulation. Voluntary agreements can increase 
investment incentives and infrastructure-based competition. As such, they are an important 
innovation that should be encouraged and considered when reviewing the effectiveness of 
retail market competition and when assessing the need for ex-ante regulation. 
 
• Give access providers the maximum commercial freedom. Where retail markets are not 
effectively competitive, regulation may be required to preserve effective service-based 
competition. This regulation needs to be carefully crafted if the case for infrastructure 
investment, especially by the regulated access provider, is not to be undermined. There are 
two main ways to do this: 
o By moving away from cost oriented price regulation regulators give access providers 
greater pricing freedom at the wholesale level and concomitantly at the retail level 
thereby strengthening the case for infrastructure investment. This is possible through a 
range of alternative measures which include investment-friendly economic replicability 
tests and reliance on voluntary agreements between the access provider and access 
seekers; 
o By simplifying wholesale remedies. Regulation at multiple wholesale levels is complex 
and costly40, and discourages investment and innovation. In particular, NRAs should 
impose a single wholesale remedy per subnational geographic area to deal with the 
competition problem identified in a retail market. 
                                                 
40 The experience in several Member States, among which France, shows that access at a single network layer (in the relevant 






• Move from ex-ante to ex-post sector-specific regulation where possible. It is now 15 years 
since EU telecommunications markets were opened to competition. As a result, ex-ante 
measures which were designed to promote market entry have become increasingly irrelevant. 
Over the past five years in particular we have seen substantial consolidation between entrant 
market players and little new entry. At the same time, it is clear that ex-ante regulatory 
measures have reduced infrastructure investment in the EU. In these circumstances, NRAs 
should give priority to use ex-post intervention and use ex-ante regulation only as a last resort. 
 
The specific provisions of the Framework, Access and Universal Service Directive that need to be 
amended are listed in the following chapters with a justification for the various amendments proposed. 
 
3.2.1. Simplifying the aims and the scope of the Framework  
 
Taking into account the evolutions set out above and in order to make the rules sustainable for the 
future, a priority should be to extend the current narrow regulatory focus of the Framework – currently 
the pure consumer surplus. The Framework should aim at maximising European social welfare as a 
whole, including the producers’ surplus. To achieve this overarching vision the following objectives 
should become the objectives of the future Framework: 
- The promotion of sustainable investment and innovation, to maximize the quality, availability 
and sustainable choice for EU citizens; 
- Ensuring a level playing field on the whole digital value chain, taking into account the 
converging technologies and services; 
- Encouraging the development of open and interoperable innovative services, and supporting 
and securing industrial and commercial cooperation between market players for that purpose; 
- Bringing about harmonized, common, effective and proportionate consumer protection 
standards for EU citizens across the whole digital single market. 
- Complying with the principle of technological neutrality. 
 
In addition, the future regulatory framework should support R&D, standardisation and EU 
technological leadership. It should in particular encourage the cooperation between market players, 
necessary to launch end-to-end, open, and interoperable innovative services, on top of the R&D and 
standardisation phases. The Framework should stress the principle that cooperation between 
(potentially) competing market players relating to additional facilities and services delivers a positive 
outcome for consumers. 
 
Regulation of services instead of regulation of operators 
 
The definition of ‘electronic communication services’ is a legacy from the technical and market 
structures of the 1990s.  In 2002, legal definitions had to be created to distinguish the regulation of, 
on the one hand, content and information society services and, on the other, electronic 
communications networks and services. At the time, the problem was how to subdivide and justify 
different regulatory treatment of different categories of services offered over electronic 
communications networks. 
 
The solution found was to create a sui generis category of services: the electronic communications 
services, carved out from the generic category of services normally provided for remuneration, at a 
distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. The rationale of 
the creation of this category was first that these services were provided by the undertakings controlling 




as opposed to for example services offered over the internet. The second reason was more practical: 
ensure a smooth transfer of rights and obligations in force at the time of adoption of the Framework. 
For example, the e-commerce Directive referred to and exempted from its obligations services covered 
by the Framework Directive’41. The 2002 Review built on the existing silos. 
 





Since 2002, the legal category of electronic communications services defined as services “normally 
provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks” and which are not “information society services”, co-exists with information 
society services. The latter are defined43 as “any service normally provided for remuneration44, at a 
distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services” and aimed to cover 
websites. However, with the exponential success of apps and social networks, certain information 
services have increasingly become alternatives to electronic communications services. For many 
consumers, these services have become substitutes. 
 
ETNO proposes to abandon the legal distinction. Instead, the definition of information society services 
should be extended to include also the publicly available telephone services, text messaging and TV 
distribution services (over cable, other mobile and fixed IP networks, satellite or terrestrial digital 
broadcasting). The problem that the 2002 creation of a distinct service category sought to solve was 
mainly the continuation of the quality of service and interoperability requirements in force regarding 
publicly available telephone services45.  For the same reason, several Member States, associations of 
broadcasters, of cable operators and of alternative operators, consumer associations, cable players and 
OTTs replied to the Commission’s public consultation on the review that sector–specific services 
                                                 
41 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general 
authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services. 
42 Peter Scott, "The new regulatory framework for Electronic Networks and Services", PwP presentation, 2006, available on: 
< http://www2.gov.si/mid/emcis.nsf/V/KCB09DFDF2A57EE7BC1256BCD004CDBC8/$file/PPT_TS_2_1_Peter_Scott.ppt> 
43 by Directive 98/48/EC amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field 
of technical standards and regulations. 
44 In its judgment of 23 March 2010 in Case Google France SARL, Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and others,  the CJEU 
found that "An internet referencing service constitutes an information society service consisting in the storage of information 
supplied by the advertiser". 
45 Under Directive 98/10/EC of 26 February 1998 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and 




regulation is still needed46. However, beyond the rules set in the Open Internet Regulation regarding 
Internet access services and roaming, any further rules should be updated and only apply to services of 
providing interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on numbers, and as far as 
necessary to guarantee interoperability, number portability and end-to-end quality of service 
requirements throughout the EU. 
 
Moreover, the rationale for regulating communications services between individuals does not apply 
to the vast majority of services where machines are involved. Future M2M services are not clear yet. 
Some of the current telecoms rules are still relevant (e.g. in regard to interoperability, numbers etc.), 
whereas others are not (e.g. consumer protection rules). An updated framework for services needs to 
allow flexibility for the emerging M2M services. Only information society services for the purposes of 
providing interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on numbers should be regulated 
in selected areas. 
 
The internet society services category – of which the services for the purposes of providing 
interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on numbers would be part of - would co-
exist with (and not overlap) internet access services (IAS) as defined by Regulation 2015/2120 of 25 
November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access47. 
 
3.2.2. Mandate network access only to key inputs 
Principles 
Asymmetric access network regulation should be limited to fixed access infrastructures. Moreover, the 
future Regulatory Framework should provide for ex-ante intervention only under strict conditions: 
- The existence of robust objective grounds (indispensability) in the light of the specific 
objectives of the Framework. This means that the wholesale offer concerned is necessary to 
foster effective competition in the retail market. In the case commercial wholesale offers are 
in place which are appropriate in terms of economic and technical replicability, no further 
regulatory analysis would be justified and existing ex-ante obligations on transparency, 
accounting separation and price control must be lifted; 
- Be proportional (i.e. the least intrusive possible intervention);  
- Justified by an impact assessment, examining the positive impact expected from the remedy 
on the long-term consumer welfare, the absence of negative impact of the envisaged remedy 
on investment and its contribution to incentives to infrastructure competition; and 
- Applied on a transitory basis. 
The procedure to identify key network inputs 
Ex-ante regulation should be limited to “Key Network Input (KNI)” and avoid hampering the 
development of full infrastructure competition where it is feasible. 
 
The ‘test’ performed by NRA would start from a bottom-up assessment of the retail market, to 
determine which type of geographic areas in a country show similar competitive characteristics. Areas 
with sufficiently similar competitive characteristics that are different from other areas should be 
grouped together and analysed separately (geographic segmentation). In areas where the retail 
                                                 
46 Synopsis Report on the public consultation on the evaluation and review of the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, April 2016, p.12. Retail Internet access services, numbering, end-user protection, universal service 
obligations, roaming and downstream availability and accessibility of a wide variety of audio-visual services are given as 
examples of reasons to maintain sector-specific regulation of electronic communications services. 
47 ‘a publicly available digital service that provides access to the internet, and thereby connectivity to virtually all end points 




market has become sustainably competitive (i.e. not where the competition is the result of the 
regulation in place), NRAs should lift wholesale obligations leaving to market forces the negotiation of 
access agreements under market conditions. In areas where the retail market is not sustainably 
competitive, the NRA should identify the KNI to which access is required in order to enable competition 
in these retail markets. 
 
Alternatively, if the NRA has strong evidence that a retail market is national and is not prospectively 
competitive absent regulation, the NRA should assess whether there are no substantial differences in 
competitive pressure from region to region, for example “as a consequence of the  presence of 
alternative platforms, i.e. technologies other than xDSL, including cable, Wi-Fi, mobile broadband or 
competing high-speed fibre networks (inter-platform competition)”48 in certain areas and not in others. 
In such case, the NRA should, under the proportionality principle, consider identifying, for those 
geographic areas, a KNI different of the KNI identified for other areas within the same national 
geographic market, in particular as regards the network layer to which access is mandated. 
Conditions under which access to key network inputs can be imposed 
The NRA would first examine whether the owner of the KNI concluded voluntary wholesale commercial 
agreements with entrants and whether other entrants had the opportunity to enter into similar 
agreements.  In the relevant case, the concerned network input would continue to be potentially 
subject to mandatory access, but not necessarily at the same conditions49. The non-discrimination 
obligation does not prevent terms and conditions to vary. Knowing that the NRA will not grant 
regulated access at better conditions than those accepted by market players would incentivize 
alternative operators to share the investment risks and afterwards the investment benefit.  
 
In the case the network operator does not make a satisfactory, voluntary wholesale offer, the NRA 
could mandate access to KNIs at a single, specified access level, which needs not necessarily to 
correspond with the access level sought by the access seeker. 
 
NRAs should show that the imposed access/access conditions are indispensable for the provision of 
competitive services in the retail market, based on a genuine impact assessment of the envisaged 
measure. Access conditions could encompass the economic conditions of the access imposed, for 
example taking account the pricing level on the retail markets concerned – replicability test - but cost 
orientation would no longer be part of the toolbox of NRAs. 
 
The introduction of a new technology would not warrant, as such, access remedies. The introduction 
of new technologies is decided by operators in order to decrease costs and introduce new 
functionalities and thus innovate. If the investor is required to offer these functionalities on a regulated 
basis, the network differentiation incentive will be removed. 
 
In addition, the Access and Framework Directives could be revised in order to ensure that no further 
access obligations are imposed where competition is possible based on symmetric remedies, for 
example as a result of the sharing of the last drop/vertical in-house wiring. 
                                                 
48 See Staff Working Document Explanatory Note Accompanying the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, p. 13. 
49  The Commission Recommendation of 11.9.2013 on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies 
to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment (C(2013) 5761 final) acknowledges that “ (…) 




Review of the mandated access to KNIs 
In order to provide regulatory stability and regulatory predictability and boost long-term highly risky 
investments, NRA decisions should have a duration, which is more compatible with the timeframe of 
investment decisions.  The Directive should determine a range of possible durations, e.g. between five 
and ten years, leaving thus a margin of appreciation to the NRA to fix the specific review date(s) of its 
decision taking into account the KNI concerned and the market circumstance.  Before the expiry of the 
review period, the access provider should have the right to ask a review of the access obligations if 
market circumstances change significantly. 
At the same time, NRAs should oversee the implementation of wholesale commercial access 
arrangements and intervene timely as dispute resolution bodies, in case of disagreement between 
parties going further than normal commercial price negotiations or issues of interpretation of 
contractual clauses in the arrangements in force.  
Interconnection 
Commercial interconnection (termination) agreements should always be given priority to regulated 
intervention. Where network operator and access seekers do not reach a commercial agreement in a 
timely manner, interconnection should be regulated as far as necessary for the purpose of providing 
interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality based on numbers. Regulated 
conditions should apply symmetrically to the interconnected undertakings. 
 
Networks are being completely switched to IP.  IP-services are delivered completely independent from 
the network50. Nonetheless, it is justified to maintain a process under which NRAs can intervene to 
ensure termination, in order to preserve two public interests in the case of services provided by 
undertakings that use numbers for the provision of the mentioned interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality: 
- universal interoperability between users of communication services with same quality; 
- Reliable connections end-to-end, for example for reliable emergency services. 
 
Taking into account the specific advantages related to traditional voice services, providers of services 
based on best effort, should, in principle, not be entitled to interconnect to services that ensure end-
to-end quality. This also reflects that customers should get the quality they pay for. This principle shall 
apply irrespective of the kind of provider. Service providers that are no network operators may also 
get the option to provide numbers that enable any-to-any-connectivity of their services with other 
similar services, at ensured quality. In addition, only undertakings supporting the costs of an ECN 
carrying voice service to end-users should be entitled to receive termination fees. 
 
In summary, ETNO proposes the following approach: 
 
- Regulation should set out the baseline elements defining a framework for efficient 
interconnection, but leave a margin for commercial negotiation; 
- The specific conditions for interconnection, including the fees, should thereupon be set by 
commercial negotiation, which is in the interest of all market players; 
- NRAs should intervene, at the request of either party, in the framework of the ex-post dispute 
resolution procedure, where no agreement can be reached;  
- Interconnection obligations, when imposed, should be symmetrical between equivalent 
operators (e.g. same fixed termination rates between fixed networks and same mobile 
termination rates between mobile networks). Fixed and mobile networks have different 
characteristics that justify distinct interconnection conditions; 
                                                 




- European service providers should not incur any disadvantage with third countries operators; 
European service providers should be enabled to manage efficiently agreements with 
operators established in third countries. 
    
3.2.3. Regulation of digital services 
Linking regulatory obligations to the authorisation of services based on numbering plan resources 
for interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality 
ETNO acknowledges that specific regulation continues to be necessary for interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality based on numbers. However, the specific rules should focus on the 
kind of the specific service provided and not on the category of provider. A distinct legal category of 
electronic communications services would no longer be required, because rights and obligations in 
view of any-to-any connectivity, and to guarantee reliable emergency calls, can be imposed under the 
general authorisation as far as these services are based on numbering resources and ensured end-to-
end quality.  
 
The same holds true for the specific publicly accessible telephone service-related provisions of the 
ePrivacy Directive, for example the provisions on calling line identification (Articles 8 and 10), 
automatic call forwarding (Article 11) and directories (Article 12). There should be a thorough 
assessment on whether these provisions are still relevant. To the extent in which it is concluded that 
there is still a need to keep any of these provisions, they should be transferred to legislation that covers 
all relevant services equally, except when their object is related exclusively to specific characteristics 
of services at ensured quality based on numbers. In that case, it may be considered to include these 
obligations in the Authorisation Directive51.  
 
All these obligations should be applied in a proportionate way and only where objectively 
indispensable. While any service provider needs to have the possibility to offer quality services, 
providers of such quality standards must not be overly burdened, considering that they particularly 
contribute to consumers’ and public benefit.  
 
Universal Service obligations adapted to the digital society 
 
The current obligations should be completely revised, given that the objectives pursued have been 
achieved: 
- Availability: as of today, every demand for local access within closed development is satisfied. 
New housing areas are covered by at least one network operator, besides mobile coverage. 
- Affordability: prices for local access with the same service level have been dramatically 
decreasing over the last 20 years. Thanks to the increasing competitiveness of European 
telecommunication markets, including for mobile services, it has become superfluous to 
preserve tools for regulatory intervention on retail prices. Socially excluded customers are 
better addressed by national social systems. 
- Accessibility of electronic communications services: for all services, today customers can 
widely choose between offers of different providers including substituting services.  
 
The universal service obligations should be replaced by a funding system based on public finances.  
 
                                                 




Moreover, the scope of the universal ‘service’ should be limited to the availability of broadband 
internet access52, at the exclusion of any broadband service. Universal service should remain an 
instrument to ensure that end-users are safeguarded from the risk of social exclusion, but should not 
be used as a policy tool for broadband penetration and access to digital services. These should be 
attained by other means such as the incentives to take-up, a more investment-friendly regulatory 
framework and public funding, where appropriate. 
 
The universal internet access guaranteed at EU level would primarily consist in a mandatory political 
objective to be achieved by the Member States. The tools to fulfil this objective would be: 
- Creating an investment-friendly regulatory framework incentivizing maximum coverage by 
private undertakings on commercial grounds to minimize the extension and the cost of non-
profitable areas; 
- Supporting coverage in non-profitable areas via public subsidies; 
- Guaranteeing the benefit of a competitive retail market to all customers, including those of 
non-profitable areas; 
- Using demand-side instruments, such as affordability schemes (e.g. vouchers), digital literacy 
programs and other types of social policies aimed at fostering service penetration and usage 
amongst relatively disadvantaged groups of citizens. 
A guaranteed basic access to the internet to fight social exclusion 
The basic universal internet access would be harmonized at EU level, but would be filled in at national 
level taking into account the services to which access needs to be enabled in the concerned Member 
State to avoid social exclusion (safety net). Given the rapid technological evolution, the service would 
not be defined according to technical characteristics, like bandwidth, but functionally. The guaranteed 
access should be defined in terms of the possibility to use certain services – i.e. services that a customer 
should access in order to avoid social exclusion – without referring to any technical solution. Services 
such as web browsing and messaging services, access to basic e-government, e-banking may be 
considered as essential for the standard citizen. At the same time, any decision on the range and type 
of services to be included should carefully and duly take into account the costs of the provision of such 
services. 
 
The Universal Service Directive as it now stands should therefore be substantially simplified. The 
current obligations of its end user interest and rights chapter that aim to guarantee an ensured quality 
of interpersonal voice communications based on numbers would be transferred to the Authorisation 
Directive to become conditions attached to the general authorisation. 
 
Consumer protection 
End users' protection should be based on horizontal rules without additional sector-specific regulation, 
which leads to fragmented consumer protection standards. Only if indispensable, service specific rules 
are possible and have to be of limited scope, applicable to all similar services irrespective of the 
provider.  
 
In addition, complete or maximum harmonization of national rules should have precedence over 
minimum harmonization. Minimum harmonization – as currently applied to network providers’ 
services – does not allow to achieve a high degree of harmonisation across the EU and facilitate cross-
border services provision. Provisions imposing minimal harmonization should be repealed and, where 
necessary, replaced by less intrusive instruments like co- or self-regulation. 
 
                                                 
52 As defined by Regulation 2015/2120 of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access "a 
publicly available electronic communications service that provides access to the internet, and thereby connectivity to virtually 




In concrete terms, aligning the current rules in the end user interest and rights chapter of the Directive 
on the horizontal consumer protections rules would mean retaining only selected specific obligations 
going beyond the current horizontal rules and some obligations in the case of the basic universal 
broadband internet access. 
 
Obligations in favour of disabled users would be transferred to the future Directive on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States as regards 
the accessibility requirements for products and services, taking into consideration that, today, the 
dynamic and innovative market already delivers efficient solutions, providing a variety of offerings that 
may replace the earlier dedicated systems facilitating voice telephony for disabled users and can even 
provide better solutions. 
 
The following measures would be abolished 
- Transparency: the obligation to publish standardized information, to provide before and within 
contract, and after contract conclusion, e.g. for cost control and on contract duration, beyond 
those provided by the Open Internet Regulation. 
- Technical cost control measures: the mandatory provision of technical tools that support 
consumers to control expenses, e.g. through spending caps and warning signals. 
- Contract duration and termination: the provision for each service of at least one contract with 
minimum duration time of no more than 12 months. 
 
ETNO considers that self-regulatory tools can be as an efficient solution to address the concerns that 







4. Scope, Aims and Definitions 
4.1. Definitions 
 
The scope of the Framework as currently defined is outdated due to technology and market evolutions 
and leads to different rules being applied to services depending on who provides them - network 
operators or Over-The-Top (OTT) players – even though they are largely substitutable from the demand 
side. The category of ‘electronic communication services’ should therefore be abandoned. Current 
obligations relating to these services should be maintained irrespective of the providers concerned: 
- when still indispensable for public interest objectives and 
- concerning interpersonal voice communications related to the granting of telephone numbers, 
and ensuring end-to-end quality (ensured quality53 as opposed to best-efforts services), or 
- related to the basic internet access that will be the subject of the new universal service 
obligation.  
 
The repeal of the definition of ‘electronic communication services’ in the Framework Directive will 
require editorial adjustments in legal acts, referring to this definition (e.g. Open Internet Regulation).  
 
Electronic communications services consist already partly in machine-to-machine communications54 
and that share will increase. It would be disproportionate to regulate these new services55 in the same 
way of interpersonal communications. Flexibility is thus required56.  
 
Current provision Proposed amendment 
 
Article 2 Framework Directive 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Directive: 




(c) ‘electronic communications service’ means a 
service normally provided for remuneration 
which consists wholly or mainly in the 
 
Article 2 Framework Directive 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Directive, the definition 
set out in Article 2 (2) of Regulation 2015/2120 
shall apply. 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
  
(c) ‘electronic communications service’ means 
an information society service normally 
provided for remuneration which consists 
                                                 
53 Aiming, as the managed services referred to in Article 3(5) and recital 16 of Regulation 2015/2120 do, “(…)to meet 
requirements of the content, applications or services for a specific level of quality”  and "(…) for which specific levels of quality, 
that are not assured by internet access services, are necessary. Such specific levels of quality are, for instance, required by 
some services responding to a public interest (…)". 
54 Some Member States have introduced a special range of numbers for M2M communications.  These special ranges typically 
have number blocks, which use a longer number sequence (up to the full 15 digits) in the E.164 format. For example, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. 
55 E.g. specific rules have been adopted for eCall transactions (i.e. the establishment of a mobile wireless communications 
session across a public wireless communications network and the transmission of the minimum set of data (MSD) from a 
vehicle to an eCall public safety answering point (PSAP) and the establishment of an audio channel between the vehicle and 
the same eCall PSAP). See Regulation (EU) 2015/758 of 29 April 2015 concerning type-approval requirements for the 
deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system based on the 112 service and amending Directive 2007/46, O.J. L 123 of 19.5.2015, 
p.77. 
56 There may be a need to ensure M2M service providers equal exercise of the right of access and interconnection to the 
network, without regard to the volumes of M2M services (see e.g. AGCOM, Fact-finding survey concerning Machine to 
Machine (M2M) communication services, Final report, Annex A to decision no. 120/15/CONS, p. 56). Nevertheless, in the 
early stage of development of the activity, there is no justification to impose a common approach without having observed 




conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks, including 
telecommunications services and transmission 
services in networks used for broadcasting, but 
exclude services providing, or exercising editorial 
control over, content transmitted using 
electronic communications networks and 
services; it does not include information society 
services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly 
in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks; 
(..) 
wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks, including 
telecommunications services and transmission 
services in networks used for broadcasting, but 
exclude services providing, or exercising 
editorial control over, content transmitted using 
electronic communications networks and 
services; it does not include information society 
services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly 




4.2. Objectives for the Framework 
 
Policy objectives and regulatory principles for NRAs are set out in the Framework Directive. These 
objectives are: promoting competition, contributing to the development of the internal market, and 
promoting the interests of the citizens of the European Union. These goals are reflected in the 
remedies provided in the Access Directive and in the Universal Service Directive, which together 
allowed NRAs to pursue these goals in a balanced manner. The provision has been considered on a 




The regulatory framework assumes that the telecommunications sector has become competitive 
except in those cases where an operator has been identified as having significant market power in the 
relevant market susceptible of ex-ante regulation or in a market added by the NRA to the list of the 
markets in the Commission recommendation concerned.58 In a market with competing network 
providers, the objectives in Article 8 of the Framework Directive are to be achieved through 
commercial negotiation in good faith, with the minimum of regulatory interference59. 
 
In case of abusive refusal to provide access to key network inputs, national and EU competition law 
provide means of redress, except in specific situations where for instance the compliance 
requirements of an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are extensive or where 
frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable60. In those cases, competition law remedies are 
likely to be insufficient and regulatory intervention should be considered an appropriate complement 
                                                 
57 Case C-227/07 Commission v Poland of 13 Nov. 2008 In particular point 6: "the Court has interpreted Article 8 as placing 
on the Member States the obligation to ensure that the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures aimed 
at promoting competition in the provision of electronic communications services, ensuring that there is no distortion or 
restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector and removing remaining obstacles to the provision of those 
services at European level" and Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera Finland Oyj of 12 Nov. 2009. 
58 Commission Recommendation 2014/710 of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation, OJ L 295, 11.10.2014, p. 79. 
59 Recital 5 Access Directive: “In the context of achieving a more efficient, truly Pan-European market, with effective 
competition, more choice and competitive services to consumers, undertakings which receive requests for access or 
interconnection should in principle conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and negotiate in good faith”. 
60 See Commission Recommendation 2014/710/EU of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC on a common 




to competition law to adequately address the persistent market failure(s) identified. According to the 
proportionality principle, imposing access remedies is thus a second-best, fall-back option. 
 
The amendment proposed would specify that ex-ante regulation of networks is a last resort 
intervention in the market, where commercial agreements failed and where horizontal law, in 
particular competition law, consumer protection law and soft law (self- or co-regulation) cannot 
achieve the objectives of the Framework. This does not mean that ex-ante intervention should be 
completely phased out to the benefit of ex-post competition law. The NRAs will continue to play an 
important role in identifying key network inputs, supervising the implementation of commercial 
agreements and settling disputes. 
 
In parallel, the objective of technology neutrality should be strengthened for several reasons61: 
- Market players have far more information than regulators on both the incremental costs of 
deploying new technologies and the incremental revenues, which might flow from investing. 
Market players also have stronger incentives to assess all available options in terms of costs 
and current and future customer demand; 
- There is a range of technology choices available to market players to meet end-users demands 
for higher speeds. As well as FTTH there are technologies such as g.fast (for upgrading copper 
loops) and DOCSIS 3.1 (for upgrading HFC access networks). Both offer very substantial 
broadband speed increases over existing technologies. FTTH may offer higher speeds but may 
be more expensive and slower to deploy than other technologies; 
- The cost of deploying high-speed broadband using any given technology varies considerably 
by member state. For example, it depends on the availability of high-quality ducts and the 
extent to which overhead cabling is allowed. That means that in some countries, like Malta, 
Portugal and Spain, FTTH might be the right technology to deploy while in other member states 
alternative technologies may represent the efficient investment choice; 
- Attempting to favour technology choices that do not correspond to the assessment by market 
players would be likely to drive investment to other world regions and industry sectors and 
prove counterproductive; 
- Technology neutrality allows the market to make the greatest possible contribution to 
achieving broadband policy goals and minimises the need for public subsidy. 
 
On the other hand, electronic communications services are characterised by innovation and 
competition. Specific rules are no longer justified, beyond consistent protection standards that 
consumers can rely on – applicable to all digital services. The current obligations applied to telecoms 
operators, should, if they are still required to be necessary, equally apply to all service providers, 
particularly if services are comparable or, when related to end-to-end quality communications making 
use of numbers, be linked to the service concerned, irrespective of the provider. 
 
Third, the reference to content related objectives needs to be removed to make the objectives of the 
Framework Directive consistent with the thrust of Regulation 2015/2120, which imposes net neutrality 
on IAS providers and prohibits the promotion, by the provider of the concerned electronic 




The objectives of Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive assume, on the one hand, that consumer 
welfare will generally be achieved with competition. On the other hand, this still requires national 
                                                 




regulatory authorities to promote both. Promoting competition as such was a legitimate transitory 
objective when moving from a monopoly situation to liberalized markets, but the current model is no 
longer adapted to the Europe’s current aim to promote competitiveness62. 
 
In a study for the European Parliament, WIK noted that "The EU telecommunications framework 
contains a number of potentially conflicting objectives which may be the source of policy tensions"63  
"(…) a number of concerns should be immediately evident to the reader: 
- There are a rather large number of distinct objectives. 
- It is by no means ensured that all of the objectives are fully mutually consistent (…). 
- There is no prioritisation among objectives, nor among groups of objectives. Is promotion of 
competition more important than promotion of the internal Single Market? Is competition 
more important than consumer rights?"64 
 
Reformulating the objectives so that they become operational and predictable is therefore crucial to 
assist NRAs, provide legal certainty to investors and promote the single market.  
 
It is therefore proposed to further specify what is meant with ‘the promotion of competition’. 
Promoting competition is a means to maximise general welfare and the longer-term interest of the 
consumers, i.e. maximizing the consumer welfare in terms of choice and quality. In the longer term, 
the growth in living standards will depend on a nation's or firm's ability to improve productivity. 
Improvements in the quality and quantity of inputs and technological progress - i.e. a sector's 
propensity to innovate – will, on their turn, determine productivity growth. For this reason, 
infrastructure competition, innovation and unit price reduction are all means to increase consumer 
choice, when sufficient investment incentives are guaranteed to innovators and first movers. 
Conversely, in the absence of investment and dynamic efficiency, consumers will over time be 
confronted with obsolete services, less innovation and reduced choice. The framework should 
therefore focus on competition to innovate and competition to invest in networks without penalizing 




The objective of Article 8(3a) of removing the remaining obstacles dates back from the liberalisation 
of the sector. It does no longer seem to correspond to the priorities for the next decade. 
 
Article 8(5b) referring to the non-discrimination principle needs also to be updated. Today, services at 
various levels of the value chain increasingly compete among each other. Regulators should also 
consider such competition when exercising their powers. 
 
Moreover, discrimination, like price discrimination, can have benefits and improve efficiency, if 
discrimination is not merely the exploitation of market power to extract rents from customers, and if 




A framework conducive to competition for investment and innovation best promotes the interests of 
the citizens of the EU. Retaining the current, distinct, objective of promoting consumer interest would 
                                                 
62 “Industrial competitiveness refers on one side to the ability of companies to compete in domestic and global markets. On 
the other side, it relates to the capacity of EU countries to support the development of businesses. Competitiveness is a key 
determinant for growth and jobs in Europe and it is very important for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), the 
backbone of the EU economy”. 
63 WIK, How to Build a Ubiquitous EU Digital Society, 2013, p. 49. 




therefore be confusing. In addition, issues like protection of personal data and privacy or the needs of 
specific social groups are more effectively dealt with under horizontal legislation. Where no adequate 
horizontal rules are established yet, such rules need to be swiftly adopted. Overall, this will increase 
protection standards that consumers can rely on, irrespective of the kind of provider or the digital 
service concerned. 
 
Current provision Proposed amendments 
 
Article 8 Framework Directive 
Policy objectives and regulatory principles 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that in carrying out 
the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive and 
the Specific Directives, the national regulatory 
authorities take all reasonable measures which 
are aimed at achieving the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Such measures shall be 









Member States shall ensure that in carrying out 
the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive and 
the Specific Directives, in particular those 
designed to ensure effective competition, national 
regulatory authorities take the utmost account of 
the desirability of making regulations 
technologically neutral. 
 
National regulatory authorities may contribute 
within their competencies to ensuring the 
implementation of policies aimed at the 
promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as 
well as media pluralism. 
 
2.  The national regulatory authorities shall 
promote competition in the provision of electronic 
communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities 
and services by inter alia: 
 
 
(a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, 
derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, 
and quality; 
 
Article 8 Framework Directive 
Policy objectives and regulatory principles 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that in carrying out 
the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive and 
the Specific Directives, the national regulatory 
authorities take all reasonable measures which 
are aimed at achieving the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Such measures shall be 
proportionate to those objectives. Regulatory 
intervention should only be implemented where 
parties could not reach freely negotiated 
commercial agreements, where self- or co-
regulatory instruments offer no appropriate 
solution and where competition law and general 
consumer protection law remedies do not suffice 
to adequately address the problem. 
 
Member States shall ensure that in carrying out 
the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive and 
the Specific Directives, in particular those 
designed to ensure effective competition, national 
regulatory authorities shall seek to make take the 
utmost account of the desirability of making 
regulations technologically neutral. 
 
National regulatory authorities may contribute 
within their competencies to ensuring the 
implementation of policies aimed at the 
promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as 
well as media pluralism. 
 
2. The national regulatory authorities shall 
promote the competitiveness of the EU industry 
and the long term interest of end-users in terms 
of quality and choice the provision of electronic 
communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities 
and services by inter alia: 
(a) promoting ensuring that users, including 
disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms 




(b) ensuring that there is no distortion or 
restriction of competition in the electronic 
communications sector; 
 
(c) encouraging efficient investment in 
infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and 
(d) encouraging efficient use and ensuring the 








3.  The national regulatory authorities shall 
contribute to the development of the internal 
market by inter alia: 
(a) removing remaining obstacles to the provision 
of electronic communications networks, 
associated facilities and services and electronic 




(b) encouraging the establishment and 
development of trans-European networks and the 






(d) cooperating with each other and with the 
Commission in a transparent manner to ensure 
the development of consistent regulatory practice 
and the consistent application of this Directive and 
the Specific Directives. 
 
4.  The national regulatory authorities shall 
promote the interests of the citizens of the 
European Union by inter alia: 
(a) ensuring all citizens have access to a universal 
service specified in Directive 2002/22/EC 
(Universal Service Directive); 
(b) ensuring a high level of protection for 
consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in 
particular by ensuring the availability of simple 
and inexpensive dispute resolution procedures 
carried out by a body that is independent of the 
parties involved; 
(b) ensuring that there is no distortion or 
restriction of competition in the electronic 
communications sector; 
(c) encouraging efficient investment in 
infrastructure high-speed networks, and 
promoting innovation and 
(d b) encouraging efficient use and ensuring the 
effective management of radio frequencies and 
numbering resources, 
c) cooperating with other competent authorities 
to ensure that the universal basic fixed internet 
access, specified in Directive 2002/22 (Universal 
Service Directive), is adequate to prevent social 
exclusion. 
 
3.  The national regulatory authorities shall 
contribute to the development of the internal 
market by inter alia: 
(a) ensuring a level playing field on the whole 
digital value chain, taking into account the 
converging technologies and services removing 
remaining obstacles to the provision of electronic 
communications networks, associated facilities 
and services and electronic communications 
services at European level; 
(b) encouraging the development of open and 
interoperable innovative services, and to support 
and secure industrial and commercial 
cooperation between market players for that 
purpose encouraging the establishment and 
development of trans-European networks and the 
interoperability of Pan-European services, and 
end-to-end connectivity; 
(d) cooperating with each other and with the 
Commission in a transparent manner to ensure 
the development of consistent regulatory practice 
and the consistent application of this Directive and 
the Specific Directives. 
 
4.  The national regulatory authorities shall 
promote the interests of the citizens of the 
European Union by inter alia: 
(a) ensuring all citizens have access to a universal 
service specified in Directive 2002/22/EC 
(Universal Service Directive); 
(b) ensuring a high level of protection for 
consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in 
particular by ensuring the availability of simple 
and inexpensive dispute resolution procedures 





(c) contributing to ensuring a high level of 
protection of personal data and privacy; 
(d) promoting the provision of clear information, 
in particular requiring transparency of tariffs and 
conditions for using publicly available electronic 
communications services; 
(e) addressing the needs of specific social groups, 
in particular disabled users; and 
(f) ensuring that the integrity and security of public 
communications networks are maintained. 
(g) promoting the ability of end-users to access 
and distribute information or run applications and 
services of their choice;  
 
5. The national regulatory authorities shall, in 
pursuit of the policy objectives referred to in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, apply objective, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate regulatory principles by, inter alia:  
(a) promoting regulatory predictability by 
ensuring a consistent regulatory approach over 
appropriate review periods;  
(b) ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is 
no discrimination in the treatment of undertakings 
providing electronic communications networks 
and services;  
 
 
(c) safeguarding competition to the benefit of 
consumers and promoting, where appropriate, 
infrastructure-based competition;  
(d) promoting efficient investment and innovation 
in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by 
ensuring that any access obligation takes 
appropriate account of the risk incurred by the 
investing undertakings and by permitting various 
cooperative arrangements between investors and 
parties seeking access to diversify the risk of 
investment, whilst ensuring that competition in 
the market and the principle of non-discrimination 
are preserved;  
(e) taking due account of the variety of conditions 
relating to competition and consumers that exist 
in the various geographic areas within a Member 
State;  
(f) imposing ex-ante regulatory obligations only 
where there is no effective and sustainable 
competition and relaxing or lifting such obligations 
as soon as that condition is fulfilled. 
(c) contributing to ensuring a high level of 
protection of personal data and privacy; 
(d) promoting the provision of clear information, 
in particular requiring transparency of tariffs and 
conditions for using publicly available electronic 
communications services; 
(e) addressing the needs of specific social groups, 
in particular disabled users; and 
(f) ensuring that the integrity and security of public 
communications networks are maintained. 
(e) (g) promoting the ability of end-users to access 
and distribute information or run applications and 
services of their choice;  
 
5. The national regulatory authorities shall, in 
pursuit of the policy objectives referred to in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, apply objective, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate regulatory principles by, inter alia:  
(a) promoting regulatory predictability by 
ensuring a consistent regulatory approach over 
appropriate review periods time;  
(b) ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is 
no discrimination in the treatment of undertakings 
providing electronic communications networks 
and interpersonal voice communications services 
at ensured quality based on numbers and 
undertakings providing similar services;  
(c) safeguarding competition to the benefit of 
consumers and promoting, where appropriate, 
infrastructure-based competition;  
(d) promoting efficient investment and innovation 
in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by 
ensuring that any access obligation takes 
appropriate account of the risk incurred by the 
investing undertakings and by permitting various 
cooperative arrangements between investors and 
parties seeking access to diversify the risk of 
investment, whilst ensuring that competition in 
the market and the principle of non-discrimination 
are preserved;  
(e) taking due account of the variety of conditions 
relating to competition and consumers that exist 
in the various geographic areas within a Member 
State;  
(f) imposing ex-ante regulatory obligations 
mandated access to a key network input only 
where there is no effective and sustainable 
competition in the retail markets concerned 
absent regulation and relaxing or lifting such 








5. Streamlining the mandatory network access regime 
 
Under Articles 14 to 16 of the Framework Directive, NRAs are required to impose ex-ante access 
remedies, which are further, detailed in the Access Directive, i.e. access obligations going from the 
obligation to publish a reference offer, to price controls on undertakings, which individually or jointly 
hold significant market power.65  
 
The EU regulatory model is however not merely requiring NRAs to ensure that dominant undertakings 
provide access to their network facilities, but requires that wholesale access is provided at different 
levels of their networks. The aim of this approach is to provide ‘stepping stones’ to entrants to foster 
parallel infrastructure deployment. 66 It is achieved by identifying markets – in certain cases purely 
notional - susceptible to ex-ante regulation at different levels of the existing networks of the operators 
with significant market power. 
 
ETNO proposes a fundamental reform of the system, which is summarised in Figure 6 below and 
explained in the following sections. 
 
5.1. The trigger for economic regulation 
 
The complex administrative procedures to define markets, market power and designate operators with 
significant market power are not justified and those successive steps can be strongly simplified.  The 
usage of wholesale relevant markets for regulatory purposes proved having many drawbacks, and in 
particular: 
- Regulators have struggled in several cases to adjust the scope of the wholesale markets to the 
evolution of technologies and of players active on the markets. 
- Wholesale market regulation had a negative impact on incentives to invest in networks, both 
on the access provider’s side67 and on the access seeker’s one. On the access provider’s side, 
because it forecloses the opportunity of benefitting from competitive advantages as a result 
of investment; on the access seeker’s side because access regulation allows it to enjoy the 
benefit of network investment without having to invest itself. 
- The narrow68 definition of wholesale relevant markets has contributed to the development of 
service competition instead of infrastructure competition.  
- Impact on the take-up of high quality services by the end-users has been very limited also 
because of this type of regulation. 
- The specific definition of wholesale markets (particularly notional markets) and corresponding 
access obligations have restricted network architecture flexibility and required numerous 
specific functions and interfaces in operators’ Information Systems. This represents a 
significant burden for the industry as a whole. 
                                                 
65 In line with the approach of competition authorities when applying the antitrust rules, the sector-specific market power 
assessment does not, for the finding of SMP in a wholesale market, require that there should also be a finding of SMP in the 
retail market. However, under antitrust, there is an additional test: an abuse must be identified on the wholesale market. 
Under the sector-specific approach, there is no second test. An undertaking enjoying significant market power on the 
wholesale market can be imposed access obligations, even in the absence of market power on the retail market. 
66 This approach was supported by the economists Martin Cave and Ingo Vogelsang who coined the term ‘ladder of 
investment: M. Cave and I. Vogelsang (2003), “How Access Pricing and Entry Interact”, Telecommunications Policy 27, 717–
727. 
67 In particular, where NRAs have extended historic networks (PSTN/xDSL) wholesale access rules to the new types of 
networks/services offered by the same historic operators (FTTx).  
68  wholesale broadband markets, for example, have generally been defined in a ‘non technology-neutral’ way, by excluding 




- A more succinct market review process based on a “modified greenfield approach”69 is 








                                                 
69 The modified Greenfield approach consists in answering the following question: would the retail market be prospectively 




A new test for economic regulation: key network inputs 
 
Where ex-post enforcement of competition law against the abuse of such market power is not likely 
to be effective, ex-ante mandatory access to the key network inputs concerned is justified. Despite 
possible scarcity of certain key bands, spectrum ownership can hardly be considered as a key network 
input given that in the medium term other spectrum bands or more effective usage of the spectrum 
bands concerned are likely to offer an alternative to the claimed access bottleneck. Consequently, the 
concept of key network input does, in practice, only cover access to fixed network elements. 
 
Article 2 Framework Directive should be amended to introduce a definition of ‘key network input’.   
- The input is necessary to compete on a retail market; 
- Access is indispensable. The 'indispensability' criterion would not be met if other access 
seekers are satisfied with a commercial wholesale offer, which they consider appropriate in 
terms of economic and technical replicability; 
- There are no less intrusive access remedies allowing the provision by the access seeker of the 
envisaged innovative end-user services;  
Moreover, the possibility to impose access to software systems of the network provider, including 
operational support systems is technically obsolete70 and should be removed. In view of the 
transition to software-defined networks (SDN) access to software system would interfere with the 
network provisioning of the regulated operator and strongly undermine incentives to advances in 
network modernisation. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 





Article 2 Framework Directive 
Definitions 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(u) ‘key network input’ means an electronic 
communications network facility, including the 
ancillary services necessary for its provision, 
that fulfils the following three criteria: 
- access to the network facility concerned is 
necessary to enter and or compete in retail 
markets,  
- there is no actual or potential substitute and 
the facility concerned cannot be economically 
replicated in a reasonable timeframe in the 
geographic area or areas concerned; and 
- a refusal to provide access to the facility 
concerned, at reasonable conditions, would 
result in the unfeasibility for access seekers to 
compete at retail level with the owner or 






                                                 
70  In view of the transition to software-defined networks (SDN) access to software system would interfere with the network 




Current provisions Proposed amendments 
Article 2 Access Directive 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Directive the definitions 
set out in Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive) shall apply. 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(a) ‘access’ means the making available of 
facilities and/or services to another undertaking, 
under defined conditions, on either an exclusive 
or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of 
providing electronic communications services, 
including when they are used for the delivery of 
information society services or broadcast 
content services. It covers inter alia: access to 
network elements and associated facilities, 
which may involve the connection of equipment, 
by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this 
includes access to the local loop and to facilities 
and services necessary to provide services over 
the local loop); access to physical infrastructure 
including buildings, ducts and masts; access to 
relevant software systems including operational 
support systems; access to information systems 
or databases for pre-ordering, provisioning, 
ordering, maintaining and repair requests, and 
billing; access to number translation or systems 
offering equivalent functionality; access to fixed 
and mobile networks, in particular for roaming; 
access to conditional access systems for digital 
television services and access to virtual network 
services; 
 
Article 2 Access Directive 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Directive the definitions 
set out in Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive) shall apply. 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(a) ‘access’ means the making available of 
facilities including ancillary services necessary 
for its provision, constituting key network 
inputs to another undertaking, under defined 
conditions, on either an exclusive or non-
exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing 
electronic communications information society 
services, including when they are used for the 
delivery of information society services or 
broadcast content services, to customers of the 
access-seeker. It covers inter alia: access to 
network elements and associated facilities 
including virtual access, which may involve the 
connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed 
means (in particular this includes access to the 
local loop and to facilities and services necessary 
to provide services over the local loop as well as 
access to in-house wiring); access to physical 
infrastructure including buildings, ducts and 
masts; access to relevant software systems 
including operational support systems; access to 
information systems or databases for pre-
ordering, provisioning, ordering, maintaining 
and repair requests and billing; access to number 
translation or systems offering equivalent 
functionality; access to fixed and mobile 
networks, in particular for roaming; access to 
conditional access systems for digital television 
services and access to virtual network services; 
 
 
Transition to the new framework (new Article 16 Framework Directive) 
 
As soon as the revised Directive would become applicable, the NRAs would review the remedies in 
place at the date of the entry into force of the amended Framework starting with the assessment of 
the retail markets. NRAs would identify the possible retail competition problems, starting from the 
smallest possible geographical areas, in order to assess the need of regulation at wholesale level. Areas 
with sufficiently similar competitive characteristics that are different from other areas would be 
grouped together and analysed separately (geographic segmentation). 
 
- In areas where infrastructure competition is in place, and would be sustainable in the absence 




the absence of key network inputs and, in principle, lift wholesale obligations leaving market 
players to negotiate access agreements under market conditions. 
 
- In the other areas, the NRA should first examine whether wholesale commercial agreements 
have been concluded for access to the key network input.  In those cases, regulated access 
should also be lifted.  
 
- In areas where no alternative infrastructures exist and where owners of key network inputs 
do not make satisfactory, voluntary wholesale offers, NRAs would maintain regulated access 
products. However, based on the proportionality principle, NRAs would only mandate access 
at a single, specified access level, which needs not necessarily to correspond with the access 
level requested by the access seeker. NRAs should grant access to key network inputs only in 
view of the objectives referred to in the amended Article 8 Framework Directive, i.e. promoting 
efficient investment in infrastructure and innovation. The granting of access should be justified 
by an impact assessment of mandated access, including the positive impact expected from the 
remedy on the long-term consumer welfare, the absence of negative impact of the envisaged 
remedy on investment and its contribution to incentives to infrastructure competition. A strict 
enforcement of the indispensability test would incentivize alternative operators to share the 
investment risks and afterwards the investment benefit, instead of seeking to benefit from 
regulated access. Operators not sharing the investment risk would not be eligible to benefit 
from the investment, at the same terms and conditions. 
 
The NRAs, when mandating access to a key network input, should set the time period of application 
of the access obligation. Depending on the market circumstances and the exact nature of the issue 
at hand, longer or shorter review periods could both be appropriate. At the same time, the access 
provider should have the right to ask a review of the access obligations if market circumstances 
change significantly before the expiry of the review period. 
 
There is a clear need for regulatory stability and regulatory predictability to boost long-term highly 
risky investments. Indeed, investors in such projects prefer to have clear visibility on what to 
expect as external constraints, and this over a longer period of their investment timeframe.  
 
NRAs should lift regulation when the conditions for mandating access are no longer met, notably 
when voluntary agreements have been signed or the asset in question has lost its character as a 









Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 16 Framework Directive 
Market analysis procedure 
 
1.  As soon as possible after the adoption of the 
recommendation or any updating thereof, 
national regulatory authorities shall carry out an 
analysis of the relevant markets, taking the 
 
Article 16 Framework Directive 
Market analysis procedure 
 
1.  As soon as possible after [the date of the 
entry into force of the amended Directive] 
adoption of the recommendation or any 




utmost account of the guidelines. Member 
States shall ensure that this analysis is carried 
out, where appropriate, in collaboration with the 









2.  Where a national regulatory authority is 
required under Articles 16, 17, 18 or 19 of 
Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service 
Directive), or Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 
2002/19/EC (Access Directive) to determine 
whether to impose, maintain, amend or 
withdraw obligations on undertakings, it shall 
determine on the basis of its market analysis 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article whether 
a relevant market is effectively competitive. 
 
3.  Where a national regulatory authority 
concludes that the market is effectively 
competitive, it shall not impose or maintain any 
of the specific regulatory obligations referred to 
in paragraph 2 of this Article. In cases where 
sector-specific regulatory obligations already 
exist, it shall withdraw such obligations placed 
on undertakings in that relevant market. An 
appropriate period of notice shall be given to 




4.  Where a national regulatory authority 
determines that a relevant market is not 
effectively competitive, it shall identify 
undertakings with significant market power on 
that market in accordance with Article 14 and 
the national regulatory authority shall on such 
undertakings impose appropriate specific 
regulatory obligations referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Article or maintain or amend such 







shall carry out an analysis of the relevant retail 
markets, corresponding to the access remedies 
in force taking the utmost account of the 
guidelines. In its assessment, the national 
regulatory authority shall also take into account 
the impact of obligations imposed that are not 
subject to this assessment and the existence of 
any freely negotiated commercial agreements. 
Member States shall ensure that this analysis is 
carried out, where appropriate, in collaboration 
with the national competition authorities. 
 
2.  Where a national regulatory authority is 
required under Articles 16, 17, 18 or 19 of 
Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service 
Directive), or Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 
2002/19/EC (Access Directive) to determine 
whether to impose, maintain, amend or 
withdraw obligations on undertakings, it shall 
determine on the basis of its market analysis 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article whether 
a relevant market is effectively competitive. 
 
3.  Where a national regulatory authority 
concludes that a retail market is prospectively 
competitive absent the wholesale regulation in 
force, it shall not impose or maintain any of the 
specific regulatory obligations referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this Article. In cases where 
sector specific regulatory obligations already 
exist, it shall withdraw such the related 
regulatory obligations placed on undertakings 
in that relevant market. An appropriate period 
of notice shall be given to parties affected by 
such a withdrawal of obligations. 
 
4.  Where a national regulatory authority 
determines that a relevant retail market is not 
effectively competitive and is likely to remain so 
in the absence of mandated access and 
competition law is not susceptible to remedy 
the problem, it shall identify the key network 
input. It shall for that purpose aggregate 
geographical areas with similar competitive 
characteristics and for each geographical area, 
determine a single key network input, including 
its basic technical characteristics, to which 
access must be granted. undertakings with 
significant market power on that market in 
accordance with Article 14 and the national 
regulatory authority shall on such undertakings 

































obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
Article or maintain or amend such obligations 
where they already exist. 
 
4a. The decision on access to a key network 
input shall be taken for a fixed time period, the 
duration of which shall be determined by 
objective elements. The access provider shall 
have the right to ask for a revision of the 
decision, referred to in paragraph 4b of this 
Article, if circumstances and state of the art 
technologies are evolving significantly during 
the time period set in the decision, so as to 
allow for economically viable alternatives to 
the key network input concerned. 
 
4b. In its decision under paragraph 4 of this 
Article the national regulatory authority shall 
request the undertaking controlling the key 
network input to negotiate access within a 
reasonable time period, including the technical 
and economic conditions under which access 
will be provided. If within that period no 
commercial wholesale agreement is concluded 
and notified to the national regulatory 
authority or if the conditions set in the 
concluded agreements are not susceptible of 
ensuring effective competition in the retail 
market, the authority shall, upon request of any 
of the market parties or on its own initiative, 
initiate a procedure, as far as necessary 
determining  appropriate specific regulatory 
conditions under Articles 10 to 13 of Directive 
[Access Directive] or amend such obligations 
where they already exist.  
 
 
Periodic review of the retail markets  
 
Depending on the market circumstances and the exact nature of the issue at hand, longer or shorter 
review periods will be appropriate. 
 
There is a clear need for regulatory stability and regulatory predictability to boost long-term highly 
risky investments. Indeed, investors in such projects prefer to have clear visibility on what to expect as 
external constraints, and this over a longer period of their investment timeframe. This means that 
regulatory conditions as decided at a certain moment should not be altered as long as the context does 
not substantially change. 
 







The starting point should be the assumption that the market became competitive. However, if strong 
evidence demonstrates that the retail market is not prospectively competitive absent the regulated 
access to the KNI concerned, and competition law will not be able to deal with the problem, the NRA 
should identify, per geographic area, whether access to the regulated KNI should be continued or 
whether access at another level would better correspond to the competition problems identified and 
the objective of promoting infrastructure competition.  Where the NRA considers that mandatory 
access can be repealed, the NRA will specify a transitory regime for the existing commercial 






The access would also be granted for a specific time period, the duration of which could vary with the 
nature of the access concerned. The duration set by the NRA should ensure that the regulatory 
framework to provide regulatory stability and predictability to boost long-term highly risky 
investments. 
 
The introduction of a new technology by the electronic communications network operator should not 
warrant, as such, new access remedies. The introduction of new technologies is decided by operators 
in order to decrease costs and introduce new functionalities and thus innovate. If the investor would 
be required to offer these functionalities on a regulated basis, the network differentiation incentive 
will be removed. 
 
 






New Article 16a Framework Directive 
Periodic review of the retail markets 
 
1. Before the expiry of the time period set in the 
decisions adopted by the national regulatory 
authority under Article 16 paragraph 4 of this 
Directive, the national regulatory authority 
shall examine the corresponding retail market 
or markets, aggregating where justified 
geographical areas with similar competitive 
characteristics. The national regulatory 
authority shall assume that the markets are 
competitive absent access remedies. If the 
national regulatory finds evidence showing the 
contrary, it shall examine whether competition 
law is not sufficient to deal with the problems 
identified. Member States shall ensure that this 
analysis is carried out, where appropriate, in 
collaboration with the national competition 
authorities. 
 
2. In its assessment, the national regulatory 
authority shall also take into account the 
impact of obligations imposed that are not 
subject to the assessment of the retail market 
or markets concerned and the existence of any 
freely negotiated commercial agreements. The 
national regulatory authority shall have the 
power to request all relevant market data and 
existing contracts necessary for the purpose of 
its assessment. 
 
3. If the national regulatory authority finds that 
one or more retail markets are not 
prospectively competitive absent regulation, it 
shall apply the procedure defined in Article 16 





 New Article 16b Framework Directive 
commitments 
 
1. Member States shall give the national 
regulatory authority the power to make 
commitments regarding access to a key 
network input, received before the adoption of 
a decision under Article 16 paragraph 4 of this 
Directive from the undertaking controlling the 
key network input, binding. 
 
2. Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall be implemented in accordance with 
the procedures referred to in Articles 6 and 7a 
of this Directive. 
 




Access to key network inputs should be imposed only after an impact assessment, aiming at 
corroborating: 
- Its positive impact of a regulatory intervention on longer term consumer welfare,  
- The absence of negative impact of a regulatory intervention on investments;  
- Its contribution to the maximisation of incentives for infrastructure competition, to ensure 
that infrastructure competition would not be jeopardised by regulation.  
 
NRAs should retain most of the ‘toolbox’ contained in Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive, with the 
exception of price regulation, accounting separation and functional separation. The proposal is to allow 
the NRA to differentiate geographically remedies to take account of specific local conditions such as 
network architectures, degree of replicability of the network assets, etc.  Functional separation does 
not fit in such approach. The envisaged economic conditions of the mandatory access imposed is an 
important element in this assessment. The economic conditions could for example refer to a medium 
term replicability test taking account investments carried out in the network, risk-sharing agreements 
and the future price level on the retail markets concerned. On the other hand, NRAs would no more 
be empowered to impose cost orientation given its possible detrimental effect on investment 
incentives. 
 
Remedies should be proportional, focused on the identified problem, transitory (only for as long as the 
market failure persists). An obligation to disaggregate key network inputs, entailing full externalization 
of servicing certain key network inputs (with direct relationships between the access seeker and the 
external enterprises) should, in principle, not be possible when other less intrusive remedies are 
possible. For example, pricing controls under a replicability test or key performance indicators linked 
to equivalence of output comparisons would be, on the one hand, less intrusive and would, on the 
other, allow to attain the same objective. The objective is in this case preventing the access provider 
to transfer the burden of possible inefficiencies on the access seekers. 
 
Currently, a possibility exists for NRAs to impose “in exceptional circumstances” obligations for access 




with significant market power. This vaguely defined possibility is no longer required and should be 
deleted to increase investor’s confidence in the access framework applicable to key network inputs.  
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 8 Access Directive 
Imposition, amendment or withdrawal of 
obligations 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are empowered to impose 
the obligations identified in Articles 9 to 13a. 
 
2.  Where an operator is designated as having 
significant market power on a specific market as 
a result of a market analysis carried out in 
accordance with Article 16 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), national 
regulatory authorities shall impose the 
obligations set out in Articles 9 to 13 of this 
Directive as appropriate. 
 
3.  Without prejudice to: 
— the provisions of Articles 5(1) and 6, 
— the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), 
Condition 7 in Part B of the Annex to Directive 
2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive) as applied 
by virtue of Article 6(1) of that Directive, Articles 
27, 28 and 30 of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal 
Service Directive) and the relevant provisions of 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications) containing 
obligations on undertakings other than those 
designated as having significant market power, 
or 
— the need to comply with international 
commitments, 
national regulatory authorities shall not impose 
the obligations set out in Articles 9 to 13 on 
operators that have not been designated in 





In exceptional circumstances, when a national 
regulatory authority intends to impose on 
 
Article 8 Access Directive 
Imposition, amendment or withdrawal of 
obligations 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are empowered to impose 











3.  Without prejudice to: 
— the provisions of Articles 5(1) and 6, 
— the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Condition 7 in 
Part47 B of the Annex to Directive 2002/20/EC 
(Authorisation Directive) as applied by virtue of 
Article 6(1) of that Directive, Articles 27, 28 and 30 
of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service 
Directive) and the relevant provisions of Directive 
2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications) containing obligations on 
undertakings other than those designated as 
having significant market power, or 
— the need to comply with international 
commitments, 
national regulatory authorities shall not impose 
the access obligations set out in Articles 9 to 13 on 
operators that have not been designated in 
accordance with paragraph 2 only to key network 
inputs. National authorities shall impose access 
at a single, specified access level, per geographic 
area. The access imposed needs not necessarily 
to correspond with the access level requested by 
potential access seekers.  
In exceptional circumstances, when a national 




operators with significant market power 
obligations for access or interconnection other 
than those set out in Articles 9 to 13 in this 
Directive, it shall submit this request to the 
Commission. The Commission shall take utmost 
account of the opinion of the Body of Europeans 
Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC). The Commission, acting in accordance 
with Article 14(2), shall take a decision 
authorising or preventing the national regulatory 
authority from taking such measures. 
 
4.  Obligations imposed in accordance with this 
Article shall be based on the nature of the 
problem identified, proportionate and justified 
in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 
8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework 
Directive). Such obligations shall only be 
imposed following consultation in accordance 












5.  In relation to the third indent of the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 3, national 
regulatory authorities shall notify decisions to 
impose, amend or withdraw obligations on 
market players to the Commission, in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework 
Directive). 
operators with significant market power 
obligations for access or interconnection other 
than those set out in Articles 9 to 13 in this 
Directive, it shall submit this request to the 
Commission. The Commission shall take utmost 
account of the opinion of the Body of Europeans 
Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC). The Commission, acting in accordance 
with [Article 14(2)]71, shall take a decision 
authorising or preventing the national regulatory 
authority from taking such measures. 
 









4a. National regulatory authorities shall 
undertake an impact assessment of envisaged 
access obligations. This impact assessment 
should identify and if possible quantify the 
positive impact expected from the remedy on the 
long-term consumer welfare, the absence of 
negative impact of the envisaged remedy on 
investment and its contribution to fostering to 
infrastructure competition.  
 




The current transparency obligations should be simplified. Article 9(4) and (5) of the Access Directive 
and the Annex related to the unbundling of the copper local loop could be repealed. The aim of the 
Annexes was to harmonize local loop unbundling reference offers from the SMP players in this market 
across the EU. Today, local loop unbundling is a well-established remedy in most of the Member States 
and it is not expected that unbundling copper lines would grow during the lifetime of the revised rules. 
The harmonization achieved its objective and the corresponding rules can be phased out.  At the same 
time, the national regulatory authorities should further have the power to request the notification of 
agreements concerning key network inputs to monitor the evolution of the regulated market.  
                                                 





Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 9 Access Directive 
Obligation of transparency 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations for transparency in relation 
to interconnection and/or access, requiring 
operators to make public specified information, 
such as accounting information, technical 
specifications, network characteristics, terms 
and conditions for supply and use, including any 
conditions limiting access to and/or use of 
services and applications where such conditions 
are allowed by Member States in conformity 
with Community law, and prices. 
 
2.  In particular where an operator has 
obligations of non-discrimination, national 
regulatory authorities may require that operator 
to publish a reference offer, which shall be 
sufficiently unbundled to ensure that 
undertakings are not required to pay for facilities 
which are not necessary for the service 
requested, giving a description of the relevant 
offerings broken down into components 
according to market needs, and the associated 
terms and conditions including prices. The 
national regulatory authority shall, inter alia, be 
able to impose changes to reference offers to 
give effect to obligations imposed under this 
Directive. 
 
3.  National regulatory authorities may specify 
the precise information to be made available, 
the level of detail required and the manner of 
publication. 
 













Article 9 Access Directive 
Obligation of transparency 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations for transparency in relation to 
interconnection and/or access, requiring 
operators to make public specified information, 
such as accounting information, technical 
specifications, network characteristics, terms and 
conditions for supply and use, including any 
conditions limiting access to and/or use of services 
and applications where such conditions are 
allowed by Member States in conformity with 
Community law, and prices. 
 
2.  In particular where an operator has 
obligations of non-discrimination, national 
regulatory authorities may require that operator 
to notify all agreements concluded to the 
national regulatory authority including a 
description of the relevant facilities broken down 
into components, and the associated terms and 









3.  National regulatory authorities may, while 
respecting the principle of proportionality, 
specify the precise information to be made 
available and the level of detail required. 
 
3a. National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that, where implementation of a cost accounting 
system is mandated in order to support non- 
discrimination, a description of the cost 
accounting system is made publicly available, 
showing at least the main categories under which 
costs are grouped and the rules used for the 
allocation of costs. Compliance with the cost 
accounting system shall be verified by a qualified 
independent body. A statement concerning 





4.  Notwithstanding paragraph 3, where an 
operator has obligations under Article 12 
concerning wholesale network infrastructure 
access, national regulatory authorities shall 
ensure the publication of a reference offer 
containing at least the elements set out in Annex 
II. 
 
5.  The Commission may adopt the necessary 
amendments to Annex II in order to adapt it to 
technological and market developments. The 
measures, designed to amend non-essential 
elements of this Directive, shall be adopted in 
accordance with the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny referred to in Article 14(3). In 
implementing the provisions of this paragraph, 
the Commission may be assisted by BEREC. 













Any application of the non-discrimination obligation should be made in accordance with its underlying 
goal and aim, which is to ensure competition among operators to the benefit of end users. This also 
requires that its application be proportionate with this goal, i.e. be relevant for achieving the objective 
and not go beyond what is necessary. In particular, there should be flexibility for better conditions 
granted to undertakings willing to assume risk-sharing schemes.  
 
The national regulatory authorities should avoid micro-management of operational non-discrimination 
measures. It should not be seen as an a priori requirement for providing access products on a strictly 
equivalent basis but as a tool for addressing real problems in a balanced way, taking into account the 
costs for the operator concerned and the benefits for access seekers. A different approach could lead 
to artificial and inefficient situations. Where a form of equivalence is deemed necessary to create a 
level playing field, equivalence of output is an efficient and sufficient approach. The equivalence of 
output indeed implies that the wholesale products provided by the access provider to access seekers 
allow the latter to provide equivalent retail services.  
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 10 Access Directive 
Obligation of non-discrimination 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations of non-discrimination, in 
relation to interconnection and/or access. 
 
 
2.  Obligations of non-discrimination shall 
ensure, in particular, that the operator applies 
equivalent conditions in equivalent 
circumstances to other undertakings providing 
equivalent services, and provides services and 
 
Article 10 Access Directive 
Obligation of non-discrimination 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations of non-discrimination, in 
relation to mandated interconnection and/or 
access to a key network input. 
 
2.  Obligations of non-discrimination shall ensure, 
in particular, that the operator controlling the key 
network input applies equivalent technical and 
operational conditions in equivalent 




information to others under the same conditions 
and of the same quality as it provides for its own 
services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners. 
equivalent services, and provides services and 
information relating to the input to others under 
the same conditions and of the same quality as it 
provides for its own services, or those of its 
subsidiaries or partners. 
 
3. Obligations of non-discrimination do not 
prevent the application over time of different 





Taking into account the proposed amendment of Article 13 to replace cost orientation by economic 
replicability, the obligation of accounting separation has become obsolete. 
 
Accounting separation is not necessary to enforce the principle of non-discrimination, since the latter 
relates mainly to operational and technical aspects of the access provided to the KNI concerned. In the 
framework of a qualitative assessment of the access conditions in comparison to self-provision of the 
relevant facilities, accounting separation (a quantitative exercise) is of little use. 
As regards the need to identify retail costs for the application of the economic replicability test, the 
accounting obligations, which are part of Article 13 (1) Access Directive, are sufficient. 
 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 11 Access Directive 
Obligation of accounting separation 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations for accounting separation in 
relation to specified activities related to 
interconnection and/or access. 
In particular, a national regulatory authority may 
require a vertically integrated company to make 
transparent its wholesale prices and its internal 
transfer prices inter alia to ensure compliance 
where there is a requirement for non-
discrimination under Article 10 or, where 
necessary, to prevent unfair cross-subsidy. 
National regulatory authorities may specify the 
format and accounting methodology to be used. 
 
2.  Without prejudice to Article 5 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), to facilitate 
the verification of compliance with obligations of 
transparency and non-discrimination, national 
regulatory authorities shall have the power to 
require that accounting records, including data 
on revenues received from third parties, are 
 
Article 11 Access Directive 









provided on request. National regulatory 
authorities may publish such information as 
would contribute to an open and competitive 
market, while respecting national and 





An amendment to Article 12 of the Access Directive is necessary to refer to the new concept of KNI 
and to specify that access to, and use of, specific network facilities should be limited to just one layer, 
according to the principle of proportionality. The aim is to have only the least disruptive and most 
proportional access remedy imposed per area. 
 
There is a consensus that sustainable competition is a positive market outcome. In a forward-looking 
assessment, it is important to examine whether competition would be sustainable absent the current 
regulation.  However, the references to ‘sustainable’ competition is ambiguous in the specific context 
of designing access remedies: does it refer to sustainable in the absence of access remedies or 
sustainable in the sense that access based players are granted a margin to move up the investment 
ladder? The latter could justify burdensome intrusive intervention in the margin of manoeuvre of the 
network owner to decide on the technology/topology used (multi-fibre, WDM technology). NRAs 
should not be required to introduce a bias in the KNI they define. The access remedy should have a 
neutral focus on creating competition in the retail market in case it is not competitive absent 
regulation. The duty of the NRA should be limited to maintain competition and choice at the retail level 
to the benefit of end-users. 
 
Article 12 should specify expressly that the intervention many not be to the detriment of end-users to 
make a clear link with to article 8 where end-user benefit is the overarching goal. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 12 Access Directive 
Obligations of access to, and use of, specific 
network facilities 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations on operators to meet 
reasonable requests for access to, and use of, 
specific network elements and associated 
facilities, inter alia in situations where the 
national regulatory authority considers that 
denial of access or unreasonable terms and 
conditions having a similar effect would hinder 
the emergence of a sustainable competitive 







Article 12 Access Directive 
Obligations of access to, and use of, specific 
network facilities 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations on operators to meet 
reasonable requests for access to, and use of, 
specific key network inputs elements and 
associated facilities, inter alia in situations where 
the national regulatory authority considers that 
denial of access or unreasonable terms and 
conditions having a similar effect would hinder the 
emergence of a sustainable competitive market at 
the retail level, , or would not be in to the 
detriment of the long-term interest of the end-
users, interest and that the obligations under 
Article 9 to 11 of this Directive are not sufficient 





Operators may be required inter alia: 
(a) to give third parties access to specified 
network elements and/or facilities, including 
access to network elements which are not active 
and/or unbundled access to the local loop, to, 
inter alia, allow carrier selection and/or pre-




(b) to negotiate in good faith with undertakings 
requesting access; 
(c) not to withdraw access to facilities already 
granted; 
(d) to provide specified services on a wholesale 
basis for resale by third parties; 
(e) to grant open access to technical interfaces, 
protocols or other key technologies that are 
indispensable for the interoperability of services 
or virtual network services; 
(f) to provide co-location or other forms of 
associated facilities sharing; 
(g) to provide specified services needed to 
ensure interoperability of end-to-end services to 
users, including facilities for intelligent network 
services or roaming on mobile networks; 
(h) to provide access to operational support 
systems or similar software systems necessary to 
ensure fair competition in the provision of 
services; 
(i) to interconnect networks or network facilities; 
(j) to provide access to associated services such 
as identity, location and presence service. 
National regulatory authorities may attach to 
those obligations conditions covering fairness, 
reasonableness and timeliness. 
 
2.  When national regulatory authorities are 
considering the obligations referred in 
paragraph 1, and in particular when assessing 
how such obligations would be imposed 
proportionate to the objectives set out in Article 
8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework 
Directive), they shall take account in particular of 
the following factors: 
 
 
(a) the technical and economic viability of using 
or installing competing facilities, in the light of 
the rate of market development, taking into 
account the nature and type of interconnection 
and/or access involved, including the viability of 
Operators may be required inter alia: 
(a) to give third parties access to a specified key 
network input at a single network layer per 
geographic area depending on local conditions 
such as: network architectures or degree of 
replicability of the network assets including 
access to network elements which are not active 
and/or unbundled access to the local loop, to, 
inter alia, allow carrier selection and/or pre-
selection and/or subscriber line resale offers; 
(b) to negotiate in good faith with undertakings 
requesting access; 
(c) not to withdraw access to facilities a key 
network input already granted; 
(d) to provide specified services on a wholesale 
basis for resale by third parties; 
(e) to grant open access to technical interfaces, 
protocols or other key technologies that are 
indispensable for the interoperability of services 
or virtual network services; 
(f) to provide co-location or other forms of 
associated facilities sharing; 
(g) to provide specified services needed to ensure 
interoperability of end-to-end services to users, 
including facilities for intelligent network services 
or roaming on mobile networks; 
(h) to provide access to operational support 
systems or similar software systems necessary to 
ensure fair competition in the provision of 
services; 
(i) to interconnect networks or network facilities; 
(j) to provide access to associated services such as 
identity, location and presence service. 
 
National regulatory authorities may attach to 
those obligations conditions covering fairness, 
reasonableness and timeliness. 
 
2.  When national regulatory authorities are 
considering the obligations referred in paragraph 
1, and in particular when assessing how such 
obligations would be imposed proportionate to 
the objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), they shall 
undertake an impact assessment of the 
envisaged remedies according to Article 8 of this 
Directive and take into account in particular of the 
following factors: 
(a) the technical and economic viability of using or 
installing competing facilities, in the light of the 
rate of market development, taking into account 




other upstream access products such as access 
to ducts; 
(b) the feasibility of providing the access 
proposed, in relation to the capacity available; 
(c) the initial investment by the facility owner, 
taking account of any public investment made 
and the risks involved in making the investment; 
(d) the need to safeguard competition in the long 
term, with particular attention to economically 
efficient infrastructure-based competition; 
(e) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual 
property rights; 
(f) the provision of Pan-European services. 
 
3.  When imposing obligations on an operator to 
provide access in accordance with the provisions 
of this Article, national regulatory authorities 
may lay down technical or operational 
conditions to be met by the provider and/or 
beneficiaries of such access where necessary to 
ensure normal operation of the network. 
Obligations to follow specific technical standards 
or specifications shall be in compliance with the 
standards and specifications laid down in 
accordance with Article 17 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). 
access involved, including the viability of other 
upstream access products such as access to ducts; 
(b) the feasibility of providing the access 
proposed, in relation to the capacity available; 
(c) the initial investment by the facility owner, 
taking account of any public investment made and 
the risks involved in making the investment; 
 
(d) the need to safeguard competition in the long 
term, with particular attention to economically 
efficient infrastructure-based competition; 
(e) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual 
property rights; 
(f) the provision of pan-European services. 
 
 
3.  When imposing obligations on an operator to 
provide access in accordance with the provisions 
of this Article, national regulatory authorities may 
lay down technical or operational conditions to be 
met by the provider and/or beneficiaries of such 
access where necessary to ensure normal 
operation of the network. Obligations to follow 
specific technical standards or specifications shall 
be in compliance with the standards and 
specifications laid down in accordance with Article 





Cost oriented prices should give way to an approach based on economic replicability.  This amendment 
will enable a variety of wholesale pricing regimes, under which operators contribute to investment 
either through co-investment/financing or long-term bulk access commitments. Pricing obligations 
should only be considered when necessary to avoid margin squeezes or excessive prices (economic 
replicability test). 
 
Ex-ante economic replicability test should specify at least the following parameters: 
(i) The relevant downstream cost taken into account; 
(ii) The relevant cost standard; 
(iii) The relevant regulated wholesale inputs concerned and the relevant reference prices; 
(iv) The relevant retail products; and 
(v) The relevant time period for running the test. 
 
In carrying out the economic replicability test, it is important to bear in mind that a KNI can be needed 
to provide a bundle of retail services (for example voice, broadband services and television distribution 
in the case of the local loop). It will be important to take into account a bundle of the most relevant 





In order to ensure consistency between the economic replicability tests72 (ex-ante margin squeeze 
test) that NRAs will apply in each of the 28 Member States, the Access Directive should set common 
principles, while leaving sufficient discretion to the NRAs to define their own models taking into 
consideration the specific competitive situation of the markets under their jurisdiction. 
 
Moreover, the current Commission recommendations on NGA and non-discrimination73 should be 
reviewed after the adoption of the proposed amendments, and in particular be simplified (among 
other by removing the requirements of ‘equality of input’) and more broadband investment enhancing, 
by further detailing the parameters to be used in economic replicability tests, in line with the 
recommendations made in the Charles River Associates’ study on Economic Replicability Testing for 
NGA Services74. Defining the economic replicability test for NGA services must be accurate in order to 
avoid discouraging investment because “NGA economics are incompatible with the conventional 
margin squeeze test used by regulators”75. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 13 Access Directive 
Price control and cost accounting obligations 
 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose obligations relating to cost recovery and 
price controls, including obligations for cost 
orientation of prices and obligations concerning 
cost accounting systems, for the provision of 
specific types of interconnection and/or access, 
in situations where a market analysis indicates 
that a lack of effective competition means that 
the operator concerned may sustain prices at an 
excessively high level, or may apply a price 
squeeze, to the detriment of end-users. To 
encourage investments by the operator, 
including in next generation networks, national 
regulatory authorities shall take into account the 
investment made by the operator, and allow him 
a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital 
employed, taking into account any risks specific 




Article 13 Access Directive 
Economic replicability Price control and cost 
accounting obligations 
 
1.  A national regulatory authority may, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 8, 
impose the obligation to enable economic 
replicability obligations relating to cost recovery 
and price controls, including obligations for cost 
orientation of prices and obligations concerning 
cost accounting systems, for the provision of the 
key network input or inputs concerned specific 
types of interconnection and/or access, in 
situations where the national regulatory 
authority’s assessment a market analysis indicates 
that the absence of economically viable 
alternative for the key network input concerned 
a lack of effective competition means that the 
operator concerned may sustain prices at an 
excessively high level, or may apply a price 
squeeze, to the detriment of end-users’ long term 
interest. To encourage investments by the 
operator, including in next generation networks, 
national regulatory authorities shall take into 
account the investment made by the operator, 
                                                 
72  See also BEREC Guidance on the regulatory accounting approach to the economic replicability test (i.e. ex-ante/sector-
specific margin squeeze tests), BoR (14) 190 of 5 December 2014, which concluded, “At this stage, the Guidance document 
cannot develop ‘best practices’”. 
73 Commission Recommendation 2010/572 of 20 September 2010 on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA), O.J. [2010] L 251/35 and Commission Recommendation 2013/466 of 11 September 2013 on consistent non-
discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment 
environment, O.J. [2013] L 251/13. 
74  ETNO, Economic Replicability Testing for NGA Services, stud, A consistent and proportionate approach to promote  efficient 
investment and safeguard competition, by Charles River Associates, 18 March 2015, available on 
https://www.etno.eu/datas/publications/studies/FinalCRAreport_18032015.pdf 
75  L. Jaunaux and M. Lebourges, Economic replicability tests for next-generation access networks, Florence School of 









2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that any cost recovery mechanism or pricing 
methodology that is mandated serves to 
promote efficiency and sustainable competition 
and maximise consumer benefits. In this regard 
national regulatory authorities may also take 





3.  Where an operator has an obligation 
regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the 
burden of proof that charges are derived from 
costs including a reasonable rate of return on 
investment shall lie with the operator 
concerned. For the purpose of calculating the 
cost of efficient provision of services, national 
regulatory authorities may use cost accounting 
methods independent of those used by the 
undertaking. National regulatory authorities 
may require an operator to provide full 
justification for its prices, and may, where 
appropriate, require prices to be adjusted. 
 
4.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that, where implementation of a cost accounting 
system is mandated in order to support price 
controls, a description of the cost accounting 
system is made publicly available, showing at 
least the main categories under which costs are 
grouped and the rules used for the allocation of 
costs. Compliance with the cost accounting 
system shall be verified by a qualified 
independent body. A statement concerning 
compliance shall be published annually. 
and allow him a reasonable rate of return on 
adequate capital employed, taking into account 
any risks specific to a particular new investment 
network project.  
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that any economic replicability obligation cost 
recovery mechanism or pricing methodology that 
is mandated is based on the methodology set in 
the Annex to this Directive. serves to promote 
efficiency and sustainable competition and 
maximise consumer benefits. In this regard 
national regulatory authorities may also take 
account of prices available in comparable 
competitive markets. 
 














Moved to Article 9 (transparency) 
 
 
New Annex Access Directive 








Avoidable cost or if incremental cost is used, long run incremental cost 
(LRIC) excluding shared costs and, if necessary, a combinatorial approach 






The “most relevant regulated inputs” should reflect an efficient mix of 
inputs that national regulatory authorities deem realistic for access 
seekers to use during the market review period. 
Relevant wholesale 
prices 
Where there are volume discounts, model the discount achievable by the 
largest access seeker. 
Where there are commitment arrangements: If an ERT is to be 
conducted, it should be at an aggregated level and use a time period that 
reflects the length of the commitments. If fixed wholesale charges are 
modelled, an ERT should only be conducted on a prospective basis; and 
there is no need to apply an ERT to “no-commitment” wholesale charges 





When it was introduced in the toolbox of the NRAs in 2009, functional separation was already 
considered as a remedy of last resort, because of the difficulty to make such intrusive remedy match 
the proportionality and appropriateness requirements. In a context where the objectives pursued by 
the regulatory intervention would be significantly altered, functional separation would even become 
less proportional as a remedy given that the regulatory objective of long term consumers interest can 
be achieved through less intrusive regulatory means, and in particular targeted mandated access to 
the key network input necessary to support retail competition and consumers’ interests.  
 
In the UK, where functional separation was introduced several years ago, there is no evidence pointing 
to enduring competition problems that require such a remedy of last resort, let alone point to more 
intrusive structural separation arrangements being proportionate and necessary over and above less 
intrusive ex-ante regulatory remedies.  
The removal of Article 13b (voluntary separation) would not prevent undertakings to introduce on a 
voluntary basis or in the framework of commitments in antitrust cases such separation. Such 
separation once implemented would constitute a significant change of the context that the NRA took 
into account when reviewing obligations.  The regulated undertaking would therefore be entitled 
under Article 16(6) of the FWD, as revised (see above). 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 13a Access Directive 
Functional separation 
 
1.  Where the national regulatory authority 
concludes that the appropriate obligations 
imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to 
achieve effective competition and that there are 
important and persisting competition problems 
and/or market failures identified in relation to 
the wholesale provision of certain access 
product markets, it may, as an exceptional 
measure, in accordance with the provisions of 
the second subparagraph of Article 8(3), impose 
an obligation on vertically integrated 
undertakings to place activities related to the 
 





wholesale provision of relevant access products 
in an independently operating business entity. 
 
Article 13b Access Directive 
Voluntary separation by a vertically integrated 
undertaking 
 
1.  Undertakings which have been designated as 
having significant market power in one or several 
relevant markets in accordance with Article 16 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) 
shall inform the national regulatory authority in 
advance and in a timely manner, in order to 
allow the national regulatory authority to assess 
the effect of the intended transaction, when 
they intend to transfer their local access network 
assets or a substantial part thereof to a separate 
legal entity under different ownership, or to 
establish a separate business entity in order to 
provide to all retail providers, including its own 
retail divisions, fully equivalent access 
products….. 
 




Regulatory control on retail services 
 
Over the last years, asymmetric obligations on retail markets were progressively phased out. This 
should be reflected in the Directives. In practice, certain undertakings will continue to control specific 
key network inputs that affect competition in retail markets. However, under the proposed 
amendments, where this control is likely to constitute a barrier to entry and to competition in these 
retail markets, the NRAs will have the power to regulate access to these inputs in order to foster 
competition and consumer choice in the related retail markets. 
 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 17 Universal Service Directive 
Regulatory controls on retail services 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities impose appropriate 
regulatory obligations on undertakings identified 
as having significant market power on a given 
retail market in accordance with Article 14 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) 
where: 
(a) as a result of a market analysis carried out in 
accordance with Article 16 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), a national 
regulatory authority determines that a given 
retail market identified in accordance with 
 
 





Article 15 of that Directive is not effectively 
competitive; and 
(b) the national regulatory authority concludes 
that obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 
of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) would 
not result in the achievement of the objectives 
set out in Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive). 
 
2.  Obligations imposed under paragraph 1 shall 
be based on the nature of the problem identified 
and be proportionate and justified in the light of 
the objectives laid down in Article 8 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). The 
obligations imposed may include requirements 
that the identified undertakings do not charge 
excessive prices, inhibit market entry or restrict 
competition by setting predatory prices, show 
undue preference to specific end-users or 
unreasonably bundle services. National 
regulatory authorities may apply to such 
undertakings appropriate retail price cap 
measures, measures to control individual tariffs, 
or measures to orient tariffs towards costs or 
prices on comparable markets, in order to 
protect end-user interests whilst promoting 
effective competition. 
 
4.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that, where an undertaking is subject to retail 
tariff regulation or other relevant retail controls, 
the necessary and appropriate cost accounting 
systems are implemented. National regulatory 
authorities may specify the format and 
accounting methodology to be used. Compliance 
with the cost accounting system shall be verified 
by a qualified independent body. National 
regulatory authorities shall ensure that a 
statement concerning compliance is published 
annually. 
 
5.  Without prejudice to Article 9(2) and Article 
10, national regulatory authorities shall not 
apply retail control mechanisms under 
paragraph 1 of this Article to geographical or 
user markets where they are satisfied that there 






5.3. Notification procedure 
 
The streamlined procedure to define access remedies will free resources of the NRAs, which will be, 
used for market surveillance and ‘ex-post’ intervention, in particular dispute resolution. In the case of 
disagreement between parties going further than normal commercial price negotiations or issues of 
interpretation of contractual clauses in the arrangements in force, either party could submit the matter 
for dispute resolution to the NRA concerned. The result will likely be a more fragmented picture of 
access remedies, reflecting national and sub-national market specificities. In this context, the 
notification procedure provided by Article 16 of the Access Directive will retain all its importance.  
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 16 Access Directive 
Notification 
 
1.  Member States shall notify to the Commission 
by at the latest the date of application referred 
to in Article 18(1) second subparagraph the 
national regulatory authorities responsible for 
the tasks set out in this Directive. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall notify to 
the Commission the names of operators deemed 
to have significant market power for the 
purposes of this Directive, and the obligations 
imposed upon them under this Directive. Any 
changes affecting the obligations imposed upon 
undertakings or of the undertakings affected 
under the provisions of this Directive shall be 
notified to the Commission without delay. 
 
Article 16 Access Directive 
Notification 
 
1.  Member States shall notify to the Commission 
by at the latest the date of application referred 
to in Article 18(1) second subparagraph the 
national regulatory authorities responsible for 
the tasks set out in this Directive. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall notify to 
the Commission the names of operators which 
were required to provide access to key network 
inputs deemed to have significant market power 
for the purposes of this Directive, and the 
obligations imposed upon them under this 
Directive, including the beneficiaries making 
use of the regulated access. Any changes 
affecting the obligations imposed upon 
undertakings or of the undertakings affected 
under the provisions of this Directive shall be 




5.4. Dispute resolution 
 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Framework Directive, which set the obligations and the timeframe for NRAs 
to settle disputes, govern the sector specific dispute settlement procedures. The provisions should be 
amended to reflect the new categories of ‘internet access services’ and ‘information society services’. 
Moreover, the procedure should also be available for disputes between EU based undertakings and 
non-European companies, regarding services provided in the EU: i.e. an NRA would be competent to 
deal with any dispute concerning services targeting consumers in its jurisdiction irrespective of the 
country of establishment of the service provider. 
 
Disputes may be based on the failure of the other party to negotiate. However, operators may see the 
frequent intervention of the NRA in dispute resolution as taking away the incentives to negotiate in 
good faith and, in the medium term, generate an excessive workload for the NRA. Systematic initiation 





Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 20 Framework Directive 
Dispute resolution between undertakings 
 
1.  In the event of a dispute arising in 
connection with obligations arising under this 
Directive or the Specific Directives between 
undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks or services in a 
Member State, the national regulatory 
authority concerned shall, at the request of 
either party, and without prejudice to the 
provisions of paragraph 2, issue a binding 
decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest 
possible time frame and in any case within four 
months except in exceptional circumstances. 
The Member State concerned shall require that 




2.  Member States may make provision for 
national regulatory authorities to decline to 
resolve a dispute through a binding decision 
where other mechanisms, including mediation, 
exist and would better contribute to resolution 
of the dispute in a timely manner in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 8. The national 
regulatory authority shall inform the parties 
without delay. If after four months the dispute 
is not resolved, and if the dispute has not been 
brought before the courts by the party seeking 
redress, the national regulatory authority shall 
issue, at the request of either party, a binding 
decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest 
possible time frame and in any case within four 
months. 
 
3.  In resolving a dispute, the national 
regulatory authority shall take decisions aimed 
at achieving the objectives set out in Article 8. 
Any obligations imposed on an undertaking by 
the national regulatory authority in resolving a 
dispute shall respect the provisions of this 
Directive or the Specific Directives. 
 
4.  The decision of the national regulatory 
authority shall be made available to the public, 
having regard to the requirements of business 
confidentiality. The parties concerned shall be 
 
Article 20 Framework Directive 
Dispute resolution between undertakings 
 
1.  In the event of a dispute relating to a service 
or facilities in the territory of a Member State 
arising in connection with obligations arising 
under this Directive or the Specific Directives 
between undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks, internet access 
services or information society services, the 
national regulatory authority concerned shall, at 
the request of either party, and without 
prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2, issue 
a binding decision to resolve the dispute in the 
shortest possible time frame and in any case 
within four months except in exceptional 
circumstances. The Member State concerned 
shall require that all parties cooperate fully with 


































given a full statement of the reasons on which it 
is based. 
 
5.  The procedure referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 
and 4 shall not preclude either party from 







5.5. Review procedure 
 
The Framework Directive requires a review no later than three years after the date of application.  In 
view of the need for legal certainty, this time period is too short. A longer period should be provided 
for the review of the amended rules. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
Article 25 Framework Directive 
Review procedures 
 
1. The Commission shall periodically review the 
functioning of this Directive and report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council, on the 
first occasion not later than three years after 
the date of application referred to in Article 
28(1), second subparagraph. For this purpose, 
the Commission may request information from 
the Member States, which shall be supplied 
without undue delay. 
Article 25 Framework Directive 
Review procedures 
 
1. The Commission shall periodically review the 
functioning of this Directive and report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council, on the 
first occasion not later than [6] years after the 
date of application referred to in Article 28(1), 
second subparagraph. For this purpose, the 
Commission may request information from the 





6. Regulation of services 
 
ETNO believes that the regulation of the electronic communications services needs important 
amendments along three main directions: 
 
First, the interconnection obligations, currently in the Access and Interconnection Directive, should 
be related to services that provides interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on 
telephone number and the need to ensure end-to-end quality call. 
 
Second, the sector-specific consumer protection rules, currently in the Chapter IV of the Universal 
Service Directive and in the ePrivacy Directive, should be split: 
- Some rules should be attached to services, including services that provides interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality based on telephone numbers, and included in the new 
Authorisation Directive; 
- Other rules should be attached to the redefined universal service and be maintained in the 
Universal Service Directive; 
- Other rules should be repealed as they are already covered by horizontal consumer law, in 
particular the Consumer Rights Directive which was adopted after the last revision of the 
electronic communications regulatory framework; 
- Rules that were specifically designed for the liberalisation of the traditional public access 
telephony 18 years ago are outdated and should also be repealed; 
- Selected rules currently only applied to telecoms should be transferred to laws that cover all 
services in the digital market, if the obligations concerned are still required. 
 
Third, the universal service rules, currently in Chapter II of the Universal Service Directive, should be 
adapted to the redefinition of the universal service centred on the functional Internet access and be 
kept in the new Universal Service Directive. 
 
Consumer expectations are changing. The consumer protection obligations of the Universal Service 
Directive date back from the end of the 1990 when the telephone service was the main means of 
communication and social integration in Western Europe. Today, the internet has taken over this role. 
Multiple social communication tools are available on the internet, often free of charge for the user: 
the 'over the top services' (OTT) such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Skype … For that reason, it is proposed 
to limit the scope of the universal service to the availability of basic internet access. 
 
The recently adopted Open Internet Regulation has addressed 'ex-ante' the consumer issues that could 
occur in this new context by imposing on the internet access service (IAS) providers, which hold a 
gatekeeper position: obligations on non-discrimination and net neutrality as well as transparency on 
quality of service. The current consumer protection obligations imposed on electronic communications 
network and service providers listed in Chapter IV of the Universal Service Directive can therefore be 








6.1. Definitions and scope  
 
Scope of the Universal Service Directive 
 
Currently, the Universal Service Directive covers three different issues: (i) the scope, the characteristics 
and the means of provision of the universal service as such, (ii) the obligations which can be imposed 
on the retail market in case of non-effective competition, and (iii) the sector-specific consumer 
protection rules. This is very misleading and does not correspond to the technology, market and 
legislative evolutions. 
 
The directive should deal only with a redefined universal service.  The other provisions should either 
be deleted as they are no longer justified due to market evolution (e.g. the retail market obligations), 
by legislative evolution (e.g. some sector-specific consumer protection) or transferred to the 
Authorisation Directive. Therefore, the scope of the directive should be redefined and focus on 





Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 1  Universal Service Directive 
Subject-matter and scope 
 
1.  Within the framework of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), this 
Directive concerns the provision of electronic 
communications networks and services to end-
users. The aim is to ensure the availability 
throughout the Community of good-quality 
publicly available services through effective 
competition and choice and to deal with 
circumstances in which the needs of end-users 
are not satisfactorily met by the market. The 
Directive also includes provisions concerning 
certain aspects of terminal equipment, 
including provisions intended to facilitate access 




2.  This Directive establishes the rights of end-
users and the corresponding obligations of 
undertakings providing publicly available 
electronic communications networks and 
services. With regard to ensuring provision of 
universal service within an environment of open 
and competitive markets, this Directive defines 
the minimum set of services of specified quality 
to which all end-users have access, at an 
affordable price in the light of specific national 
conditions, without distorting competition. This 
Directive also sets out obligations with regard to 






3.  This Directive neither mandates nor prohibits 
conditions, imposed by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications and 
services, limiting end-users’ access to, and/or 
use of, services and applications, where allowed 
under national law and in conformity with 
Community law, but lays down an obligation to 
provide information regarding such conditions. 
National measures regarding end-users’ access 
to, or use of, services and applications through 
electronic communications networks shall 
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
 
Article 1  Universal Service Directive 
Subject-matter and scope 
 
1.  Within the framework of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), this 
Directive concerns the provision of access to 
broadband internet electronic communications 
networks and services to consumers end-users. 
The aim is to ensure the availability throughout 
the Community European Union of good-
quality publicly available services internet 
access through effective competition and 
choice and to deal with circumstances in which 
the consumer needs of end-users are not 
satisfactorily met by the market. The Directive 
also includes provisions concerning certain 
aspects of terminal equipment, including 
provisions intended to facilitate access for 
disabled end-users. 
 
2.  This Directive establishes the rights of end-
users and the corresponding obligations of 
undertakings providing publicly available 
electronic communications networks and 
services. With regard to ensuring provision of 
universal basic broadband internet access 
service and prevent social exclusion within an 
environment of open and competitive markets, 
this Directive requires Member State to define 
the minimum set of information society 
services of specified quality to which all 
consumers end-users need to have access via 
internet connections at fixed location at an 
affordable price in the light of specific national 
conditions, without distorting competition. This 
Directive also sets out obligations with regard to 
the provision of certain mandatory services. 
 
3.  This Directive neither mandates nor prohibits 
conditions, imposed by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications and 
services, limiting end-users’ access to, and/or 
use of, services and applications, where allowed 
under national law and in conformity with 
Community law, but lays down an obligation to 
provide information regarding such conditions. 
National measures regarding end-users access 
to the internet, or use of, services and 
applications through electronic 




natural persons, including in relation to privacy 
and due process, as defined in Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
 
4.  The provisions of this Directive concerning 
end-users’ rights shall apply without prejudice 
to Community rules on consumer protection, in 
particular Directives 93/13/EEC and 97/7/EC, 
and national rules in conformity with 
Community law. 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, including in relation to privacy and due 
process, as defined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 





The current scope of universal service consists of (1) a connection to the public telephone network at 
a fixed location and (2) access to publicly available telephone services where the connection enables 
voice and data communications services - at narrowband speeds – with functional access to the 
Internet. The definitions in Article 2 of the Universal Service Directive reflect this scope.  However, 
‘functional access to the internet’ is not defined76.   
 
Directive 2009/140 stresses that “the Internet is essential for education and for the practical exercise 
of freedom of expression and access to information” which are considered fundamental human rights, 
protected under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.  The Directive therefore provided flexibility to the Member States in 2009 to mandate the 
provision of a broadband connection within the scope of universal service in light of their national 
circumstances. Some Member States (Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Malta, Spain, Sweden and, only for 
disabled end-users, Latvia) have decided to include broadband connections within the scope of 
universal service (from 144kbps up to 1 and 4 Mbps). Defining ‘functional access’ in terms of download 
speeds fails however to take into account that other parameters than speed can be critical. “For 
example, app-based universal access to eHealth information will be as much critically dependent on 
geographic coverage, security, and latency, as it is on speed of connection or bandwidth”77. 
 
Moreover, any definition in terms of download speed confuses the legitimate political objective to 
reach more ambitious broadband targets with the essence of the EU universal service, which is to 
guarantee internet access for the sake of social and economic inclusion. To avoid this confusion, the 
universal service should therefore be defined as ‘basic access to the internet’78, the minimum to avoid 
                                                 
76 Recital 5 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive amending the Universal Service Directive on functional internet access states: 
“Data connections to the public communications network at a fixed location should be capable of supporting data 
communications at rates sufficient for access to online services such as those provided via the public Internet. The speed of 
Internet access experienced by a given user may depend on a number of factors, including the provider(s) of Internet 
connectivity as well as the given application for which a connection is being used. The data rate that can be supported by a 
connection to the public communications network depends on the capabilities of the subscriber's terminal equipment as well 
as the connection. For this reason, it is not appropriate to mandate a specific data or bit rate at Community level. Flexibility is 
required to allow Member States to take measures, where necessary, to ensure that a data connection is capable of supporting 
satisfactory data rates which are sufficient to permit functional Internet access, as defined by the Member States, taking due 
account of specific circumstances in national markets, for instance the prevailing bandwidth used by the majority of 
subscribers in that Member State, and technological feasibility, provided that these measures seek to minimise market 
distortion (…)”. 
77 The UK government’s response to Commission Consultation: “Public consultation on the evaluation and the review of the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services”, December 2015, p.22. 
78 While the telephone access was used to access the internet at the time of the drafting of the Universal Service Directive, 




social exclusion.  The definition should moreover refer to the demand for the access and the cost of 
providing it. 
 
The definitions of ‘public pay telephone’ and ‘publicly available telephone service’ should be removed 
since there is no longer any demand for these services and these services are no longer crucial for 
social inclusion. In any case, availability, affordability and accessibility of these services have been 
mostly achieved by market forces. In particular, prices for local fixed access with the same service level 
have been dramatically decreasing over the last 20 years, besides mobile offers.  
 
The definition of geographic and non-geographic numbers should be transferred to the Authorisation 
Directive as specific rights and obligations should be maintained on providers of services at ensured 
quality for interpersonal voice communications based on numbering resources, notably regarding 
number portability or reliable emergency calls. These obligations would become conditions for the 
provision of interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality based on numbers. 
 
Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 2  Universal Service Directive 
 
For the purposes of this Directive, the 
definitions set out in Article 2 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) shall apply. 
 
 








(a) ‘public pay telephone’ means a telephone 
available to the general public, for the use of 
which the means of payment may include 
coins and/or credit/debit cards and/or pre-
payment cards, including cards for use with 
dialling codes; 
 
(c) ‘publicly available telephone service’ means 
a service made available to the public for 
originating and receiving, directly or indirectly, 
national or national and international calls 
through a number or numbers in a national or 
international telephone numbering plan; 
 
(d) ‘geographic number’ means a number from 
the national telephone numbering plan where 
part of its digit structure contains geographic 
significance used for routing calls to the 
physical location of the network termination 
point (NTP); 
 
Article 2  Universal Service Directive 
 
For the purposes of this Directive, the 
definitions set out in Article 2 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) and Article 
2 of Regulation 2015/2120 shall apply. 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(a) basic access to the internet means an 
access capable of providing an access with 
satisfactory consumer experience to services 
that are necessary to avoid social exclusion 
taking into account demand and the cost of 


























(f) ‘non-geographic number’ means a number 
from the national telephone numbering plan 
that is not a geographic number. It includes, 
inter alia, mobile, freephone and premium rate 
numbers. 
 





Availability of services 
 
Legacy PSTN networks offer very high levels of resilience to consumers, particularly in the event of a 
power failure to the home. This has been particularly important given the historic role of the PSTN 
providing access to emergency services. Where this level of network-based resilience is not available, 
OFCOM79 has for example provided guidance that battery backup sufficient to support operation for 
one hour should be deployed to allow emergency calls in the event of a power failure.  
 
Reliable access to the emergency services is of fundamental importance, and this objective is shared 
by all market players, but should be imposed only as regards services at ensured quality based on 
numbers for the purpose of interpersonal voice communications (see above). 
 
In addition, Article 23 only imposes obligations on providers of publicly available telephone services, 
while today calls are increasingly made over OTT services. Best effort communication services that lack 
end-to-end quality and phone numbers and, thus, cannot provide reliable emergency call functionality. 
OTT provides need to be required to clearly informing users about the limitations of services. 
 
Costs related to the provisioning of emergency call functionality should be publicly funded. At least, 
the burden, which is currently, only borne by telecom operators, should be shared among the various 
service providers in the digital market. 
 
Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 23 Universal Service Directive 
Availability of services 
 
Member States shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure the fullest possible availability of publicly 
available telephone services provided over public 
communications networks in the event of 
catastrophic network breakdown or in cases of force 
majeure. Member States shall ensure that 
undertakings providing publicly available telephone 
services take all necessary measures to ensure 
uninterrupted access to emergency services. 
 
Article 23 Universal Service Directive 
Availability of services 
 
Deleted in the Universal Service Directive. 
However the main obligations of the provision 
would be linked to interpersonal voice 
communications services at ensured quality 








ETNO believes that operators of public networks should be granted the right and the obligation to 
interconnect for providing interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality based on 
numbers. Network interconnection is indispensable, among other, to guarantee end-to-end quality 
                                                 




throughout the European Union, interoperability of the services concerned as well as emergency 
services. There is no need to extend network providers’ rights and obligations on interconnection to 
service providers to achieve these objectives. 
 
In the Access Directive, the definition of interconnection should accordingly be amended to link it to 
any-to-any connectivity and interoperability of information society services. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
Article 2 Access Directive 
 
For the purposes of this Directive the definitions 
set out in Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive) shall apply. 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(b) ‘interconnection’ means the physical and 
logical linking of public communications 
networks used by the same or a different 
undertaking in order to allow the users of one 
undertaking to communicate with users of the 
same or another undertaking, or to access 
services provided by another undertaking. 
Services may be provided by the parties involved 
or other parties who have access to the network. 
Interconnection is a specific type of access 
implemented between public network 
operators; 
Article 2 Access Directive 
 
For the purposes of this Directive the definitions 
set out in Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive) shall apply. 
 
The following definitions shall also apply: 
(b) ‘interconnection’ means the physical and 
logical linking of public communications 
networks used by the same or a different 
undertakings in order to allow the users of one 
undertaking to communicate with users of the 
same or another undertaking, or to access 
services provided by another undertaking. 
Services may be provided by the parties involved 
or other parties who have access to the network. 
Interconnection is a specific type of access 
implemented between public network 
operators;  
 
Interconnection covers different realities, going from the direct or indirect interconnection of fixed 
and a mobile network to provide mutual access to each other’s end-users, to agreements between 
Internet backbones. The aim of interconnection of fixed and mobile networks is to ensure that any 
caller may call or SMS the called party’s network. Numbers from the numbering plans identify the caller 
and called party. On the other hand, numbers can be used for services in principle not requiring 
interconnection, such as IoT applications. Interconnection rights and obligations should therefore be 
reserved to undertakings providing services using numbers for the purposes of providing interpersonal 
voice communications at ensured end-to-end quality regardless of technology. 
 
Such obligations should include the requirement to comply with possible NRA decisions fixing terms 
and conditions for interconnection. These terms and conditions should, in principle, be the same for 
all operators being granted these numbering resources.  Accordingly, the current references to the 
Article 7 procedure should be deleted. Moreover, the wording of Article 5 Access Directive should 
clarify that regulatory intervention is only justified to ensure interoperability of services of equivalent 
quality, i.e. that a specification of quality requirements can be required in order to ensure end-to-end-
quality. 
 
In the data networks, the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol) defines a 
boundary between what is ‘below the IP layer’, namely the infrastructure of data flows transport, and 
‘above the IP layer’, namely the command network and all Internet services80 and applications: access, 
browsers, applets…  
                                                 
80 The issuance of new E.164 numbers will be phased out when IPv6 becomes widely available for those devices that do not 






In 201081, BEREC highlighted the fact that peering and transit interconnection arrangements 
"developed without any regulatory intervention, although the obligation to negotiate for 
interconnection applies to IP networks as well. These agreements have been largely outside the scope 
of activity of NRAs. This appeared justified in particular due to the competitiveness of the transit market 
on IP backbones". Network operators which do not make use of dedicated numbering resources for 
interpersonal voice communications would no longer be subject to ex-ante obligations. In case of 
abusive refusal to interconnect or discrimination, competition law would apply82. NRAs would 
nevertheless retain a possibility to use Article 5 of the Access Directive to intervene in interconnection 
disputes (e.g. peering disputes) “to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity”, 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 4 Authorisation Directive 
Minimum list of rights derived from the 
general authorisation 
 
2.  When such undertakings provide electronic 
communications networks or services to the 
public the general authorisation shall also give 
them the right to: 
(a) negotiate interconnection with and where 
applicable obtain access to or interconnection 
from other providers of publicly available 
communications networks and services covered 
by a general authorisation anywhere in the 
Community under the conditions of and in 
accordance with Directive 2002/19/EC (Access 
Directive); 
 
(b) (…)  
 
Article 4 Authorisation Directive 
Minimum list of rights derived from the 
general authorisation 
 
2.  When such undertakings provide electronic 
communications networks or services to the 
public the general authorisation shall also give 
them the right to: 
(a) negotiate interconnection with and where 
applicable obtain access to or interconnection 
from other providers of publicly available 
communications networks and services covered 
by a general authorisation anywhere in the 
Community under the conditions of and in 
accordance with Directive 2002/19/EC (Access 
Directive); 
 
(b) (… )  
 
Article 4 Access Directive 
Rights and obligations for undertakings 
 
1.  Operators of public communications 
networks shall have a right and, when requested 
by other undertakings so authorised in 
accordance with Article 4 of Directive 
2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), an 
obligation to negotiate interconnection with 
each other for the purpose of providing publicly 
available electronic communications services, in 
order to ensure provision and interoperability of 
services throughout the Community. Operators 
shall offer access and interconnection to other 
undertakings on terms and conditions consistent 
 
Article 4 Access Directive 
Rights and obligations for undertakings 
 
1.  Operators of public communications 
networks shall have a right and, when requested 
by other undertakings so authorised in 
accordance with Article 4 of Directive 
2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), an 
obligation to negotiate interconnection with 
each other for the purpose of providing publicly 
available electronic interpersonal voice 
communications services at ensured quality 
based on numbers, in order to ensure provision 
and interoperability of these services at ensured 
quality based on numbers, throughout the 
                                                 
81 BEREC’s Response to the Commission Questionnaire on Net Neutrality (BEREC (10) 42, p.15. 





with obligations imposed by the national 
regulatory authority pursuant to Articles 5 to 8. 
 
 
European Union Community. Operators shall 
offer access and interconnection to other 
undertakings on terms and conditions consistent 
with obligations imposed by the national 
regulatory authority pursuant to Articles 5 to 8. 
 
Article 5 Access Directive 
Powers and responsibilities of the national 
regulatory authorities with regard to access 
and interconnection 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities shall, acting in 
pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), 
encourage and where appropriate ensure, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Directive, 
adequate access and interconnection, and the 
interoperability of services, exercising their 
responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, 
sustainable competition, efficient investment 
and innovation, and gives the maximum benefit 
to end-users. 
In particular, without prejudice to measures that 
may be taken regarding undertakings with 
significant market power in accordance with 
Article 8, national regulatory authorities shall be 
able to impose: 
(a) to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-
to-end connectivity, obligations on undertakings 
that control access to end-users, including in 
justified cases the obligation to interconnect 
their networks where this is not already the case; 
(ab) in justified cases and to the extent that is 
necessary, obligations on undertakings that 
control access to end-users to make their 
services interoperable; 
 
(b) to the extent that is necessary to ensure 
accessibility for end-users to digital radio and 
television broadcasting services specified by the 
Member State, obligations on operators to 
provide access to the other facilities referred to 
in Annex I, Part II on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms. 
 
2.  Obligations and conditions imposed in 
accordance with paragraph 1 shall be objective, 
transparent, proportionate and non-
discriminatory, and shall be implemented in 
accordance with the procedures referred to in 
Articles 6, 7 and 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive). 
 
Article 5 Access Directive 
Powers and responsibilities of the national 
regulatory authorities with regard to access 
and interconnection 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities shall, acting in 
pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), 
encourage and where appropriate ensure, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Directive, 
adequate access and interconnection, and the 
interoperability of services, exercising their 
responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, 
sustainable competition, efficient investment 
and innovation, and gives the maximum benefit 
to end-users. 
In particular, without prejudice to measures that 
may be taken regarding undertakings with 
significant market power in accordance with 
Article 8, national regulatory authorities shall be 
able to impose: 
(a) to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-
to-end connectivity of services of equivalent 
quality, obligations on undertakings that control 
access to end-users, including in justified cases 
the obligation to interconnect their networks 
where this is not already the case; 
(ab) in justified cases and to the extent that is 
necessary, obligations on undertakings that 
control access to end-users to make their 
services interoperable; 
(b) to the extent that is necessary to ensure 
accessibility for end-users to digital radio and 
television broadcasting services specified by the 
Member State, obligations on operators to 
provide access to the other facilities referred to 














3.  With regard to access and interconnection 
referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall 
ensure that the national regulatory authority is 
empowered to intervene at its own initiative 
where justified in order to secure the policy 
objectives of Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive), in accordance with the 
provisions of this Directive and the procedures 
referred to in Articles 6 and 7, 20 and 21 of 





6.3. Obligations attached to numbers and services for interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality  
 
Article 10 of the Framework Directive still contains the wording enacted83 at the time of the 
liberalisation of the sector aiming to ensure that adequate numbers were available and assigned to 
entrants, for example by changes in the national numbering plans consisting of a change of maximum 
number length. ETNO believes that such requirements are now obsolete and should be updated, 
including to reflect the end of the regulation of providers of electronic communications service and 
the regulation instead of services for interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on 
numbers. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 10 Framework Directive 
Numbering, naming and addressing 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities control the assignment of 
all national numbering resources and the 
management of the national numbering plans. 
Member States shall ensure that adequate 
numbers and numbering ranges are provided 
for all publicly available electronic 
communications services. National regulatory 
authorities shall establish objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory assigning procedures 
for national numbering resources. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that numbering plans and procedures are 
applied in a manner that gives equal treatment 
to all providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services. In particular, Member 
States shall ensure that an undertaking 
 
Article 10 Framework Directive 
Numbering, naming and addressing 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities control the assignment of 
all national numbering resources and the 
management of the national numbering plans. 
Member States shall ensure that adequate 
numbers and numbering ranges are provided 
for all publicly available communications 
services. National regulatory authorities shall 
establish objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory assigning procedures for national 
numbering resources. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that numbering plans and procedures are 
applied in a manner that gives equal treatment 
to all providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services requesting numbers. 
In particular, Member States shall ensure that 
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allocated a range of numbers does not 
discriminate against other providers of 
electronic communications services as regards 
the number sequences used to give access to 
their services. 
(…) 
an undertaking allocated a range of numbers 
does not discriminate against other providers of 
similar services as regards the number 
sequences used to give access to their services. 
(…) 
 
6.3.1. Quality of service requirements for interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality 
 
The Universal Service Directive and the ePrivacy Directive contain certain obligations of public access 
telephone service operators, such as an obligation on (end-user) access to numbers and to additional 
facilities, which will continue to be relevant in the future. ETNO proposes to transfer these obligations, 
which are in essence conditions for the provision of the services concerned, to the Authorisation 
Directive. 
 
Access to services, including emergency services 
 
The first of these obligations is the single European emergency call number, which was introduced in 
199184. At the time, there was a need to require Member States to amend their legislation so as to 
ensure that a single number would be available across the EU that citizens could remember even under 
the pressure of an emergency situation. 
 
Article 26 of the Universal Service Directive carried over the obligations of the 1991 Decision. Under 
Article 26 of the Universal Service Directive: 
- Member States must ensure that users of fixed and mobile telephones, including payphones, 
are able to call 112 free of charge; 
- 112 calls must be appropriately answered and handled, irrespective of whether other 
emergency numbers exist in a specific country; 
- Member States must ensure that emergency services are able to establish the location of the 
person calling 112; 
- All EU countries must inform their own citizens and visitors of the existence of 112 and in which 
circumstances they should call it. 
 
Moreover, the Roaming Regulation obliges roaming service providers to send an SMS to people 
travelling to another EU country with information about the European emergency number 112. 
 
Today, legal obligations are in place in all Member States. Harmonisation of national legislations is no 




Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 26 Universal Service Directive 
Emergency services and the single European 
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1.  Member States shall ensure that all end-users of 
the service referred to in paragraph 2, including 
users of public pay telephones, are able to call the 
emergency services free of charge and without 
having to use any means of payment, by using the 
single European emergency call number ‘112’ and 
any national emergency call number specified by 
Member States. 
 
2.  Member States, in consultation with national 
regulatory authorities, emergency services and 
providers, shall ensure that undertakings providing 
end-users with an electronic communications 
service for originating national calls to a number or 
numbers in a national telephone numbering plan 
provide access to emergency services. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that calls to the single 
European emergency call number ‘112’ are 
appropriately answered and handled in the manner 
best suited to the national organisation of 
emergency systems. Such calls shall be answered 
and handled at least as expeditiously and effectively 
as calls to the national emergency number or 
numbers, where these continue to be in use. 
 
4.  Member States shall ensure that access for 
disabled end-users to emergency services is 
equivalent to that enjoyed by other end-users. 
Measures taken to ensure that disabled end-users 
are able to access emergency services whilst 
travelling in other Member States shall be based to 
the greatest extent possible on European standards 
or specifications published in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 17 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive), and they shall not prevent 
Member States from adopting additional 
requirements in order to pursue the objectives set 
out in this Article. 
 
5.  Member States shall ensure that undertakings 
concerned make caller location information 
available free of charge to the authority handling 
emergency calls as soon as the call reaches that 
authority. This shall apply to all calls to the single 
European emergency call number ‘112’. Member 
States may extend this obligation to cover calls to 
national emergency numbers. Competent regulatory 
authorities shall lay down criteria for the accuracy 
and reliability of the caller location information 
provided. 
 









To be included in an amended form in a new 






























To be included in an amended form in a new 














6.  Member States shall ensure that citizens are 
adequately informed about the existence and use of 
the single European emergency call number ‘112’, in 
particular through initiatives specifically targeting 
persons travelling between Member States. 
 
7.  In order to ensure effective access to ‘112’ 
services in the Member States, the Commission, 
having consulted BEREC, may adopt technical 
implementing measures. However, these technical 
implementing measures shall be adopted without 
prejudice to, and shall have no impact on, the 
organisation of emergency services, which remains 
of the exclusive competence of Member States. 
Those measures, designed to amend non-essential 
elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall 
be adopted in accordance with the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 37(2). 
 






To be deleted 
 
In addition to these two provisions from Article 26 Universal Service Directive, the new Article in the 
Authorisation Directive would carry over also the main obligations under Articles 28 Universal Service 
Directive. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 28 Universal Service Directive 
Access to numbers and services 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that, where 
technically and economically feasible, and 
except where a called subscriber has chosen for 
commercial reasons to limit access by calling 
parties located in specific geographical areas, 
relevant national authorities take all necessary 
steps to ensure that end-users are able to: 
(a) access and use services using non-
geographic numbers within the Community; 
and 
(b) access all numbers provided in the 
Community, regardless of the technology and 
devices used by the operator, including those in 
the national numbering plans of Member 
States, those from the ETNS and Universal 
International Freephone Numbers (UIFN). 
 
2.  Member States shall ensure that the relevant 
authorities are able to require undertakings 
providing public communications networks 
and/or publicly available electronic 
communications services to block, on a case-by-
case basis, access to numbers or services where 
 
New Article Authorisation Directive 


















2.  Member States shall ensure that the relevant 
authorities are able to require undertakings 
making use of numbering resources for the 
provision of interpersonal voice 
communications at ensured quality providing 
public communications networks and/or publicly 




this is justified by reasons of fraud or misuse 
and to require that in such cases providers of 
electronic communications services withhold 





Art. 26 Universal Service Directive 
 
2.  Member States, in consultation with national 
regulatory authorities, emergency services and 
providers, shall ensure that undertakings 
providing end-users with an electronic 
communications service for originating national 
calls to a number or numbers in a national 





5.  Member States shall ensure that 
undertakings concerned make caller location 
information available free of charge to the 
authority handling emergency calls as soon as 
the call reaches that authority. This shall apply 
to all calls to the single European emergency 
call number ‘112’. Member States may extend 
this obligation to cover calls to national 
emergency numbers. Competent regulatory 
authorities shall lay down criteria for the 
accuracy and reliability of the caller location 
information provided. 
block, on a case-by-case basis, access to 
numbers or services where this is justified by 
reasons of fraud or misuse and to require that in 
such cases providers of electronic interpersonal 
voice communications services at ensured 
quality based on numbers withhold relevant 
interconnection or other service revenues. 
 
 
3. Member States, in consultation with national 
regulatory authorities, emergency services and 
providers, shall ensure that undertakings 
providing end-users with an electronic 
communications service making use of 
numbering resources for originating national 
calls to a number or numbers in a national 
telephone-numbering plan for the provision of 
interpersonal voice communications at ensured 
quality provide access to emergency services. 
 
4. Member States shall ensure that undertakings 
concerned make caller location information 
available free of charge to the authority handling 
emergency calls as soon as the call reaches that 
authority. This shall apply to all calls to the single 
European emergency call number ‘112’. 
Member States may extend this obligation to 
cover calls to national emergency numbers. 
Competent regulatory authorities shall lay down 
criteria for the accuracy and reliability of the 
caller location information provided taking into 
account the technology deployed by the 
operators concerned.  Member States may also 
provide obligations on handset manufacturers 
with GPS functionalities for making caller 






Article 29 should be deleted, in line with the deletion of Article 10 Universal Service Directive 
(Control of expenditure). 
 
 
Article 29 Universal Service Directive 
Provision of additional facilities 
 
1. Without prejudice to Article 10(2), Member 
States shall ensure that national regulatory 
authorities are able to require all undertakings 
that provide publicly available telephone 
 
Article 29 Universal Service Directive 
Provision of additional facilities 
 





services and/or access to public communications 
networks to make available all or part of the 
additional facilities listed in Part B of Annex I, 
subject to technical feasibility and economic 
viability, as well as all or part of the additional 
facilities listed in Part A of Annex I. 
 
2.  A Member State may decide to waive 
paragraph 1 in all or part of its territory if it 
considers, after taking into account the views of 
interested parties, that there is sufficient access 
to these facilities. 
 
Moreover, ETNO believes that Annex I of the Universal Service Directive should be deleted, taking into 
account that the obligations listed are obsolete or disproportionate in the current market conditions. 
For example, the obligation to provide tone dialing or DTMF (dual-tone multi-frequency operation) or 
to provide calling-line identification. The provision of these services does not require prescriptive 
regulation, given that best-effort communications services providers do not ensure these standards 
either, which obviously does not appear to be an issue for consumers. 
 
Annex I Universal Service Directive 
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES 
REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 (CONTROL OF 
EXPENDITURE), ARTICLE 29 (ADDITIONAL 
FACILITIES) AND ARTICLE 30 (FACILITATING 
CHANGE OF PROVIDER) 
 
Part A:   Facilities and services referred to in 
Article 10  
(a)   Itemised billing  
Member States are to ensure that national 
regulatory authorities, subject to the 
requirements of relevant legislation on the 
protection of personal data and privacy, may lay 
down the basic level of itemised bills which are 
to be provided by undertakings to subscribers 
free of charge in order that they can: 
(i) allow verification and control of the charges 
incurred in using the public communications 
network at a fixed location and/or related 
publicly available telephone services; and 
(ii) adequately monitor their usage and 
expenditure and thereby exercise a reasonable 
degree of control over their bills. 
Where appropriate, additional levels of detail 
may be offered to subscribers at reasonable 
tariffs or at no charge. 
 
Calls which are free of charge to the calling 
subscriber, including calls to helplines, are not 
to be identified in the calling subscriber's 
itemised bill. 
Annex I Universal Service Directive 
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES 
REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 (CONTROL OF 
EXPENDITURE), ARTICLE 29 (ADDITIONAL 
FACILITIES) AND ARTICLE 30 (FACILITATING 
CHANGE OF PROVIDER) 
 





























(b)   Selective barring for outgoing calls or 
premium SMS or MMS, or, where technically 
feasible, other kinds of similar applications, free 
of charge  
i.e. the facility whereby the subscriber can, on 
request to the designated undertaking that 
provides telephone services, bar outgoing calls 
or premium SMS or MMS or other kinds of 
similar applications of defined types or to 
defined types of numbers free of charge. 
 
(c)   Pre-payment systems  
Member States are to ensure that national 
regulatory authorities may require designated 
undertakings to provide means for consumers 
to pay for access to the public communications 
network and use of publicly available telephone 
services on pre-paid terms. 
 
(d)   Phased payment of connection fees  
Member States are to ensure that national 
regulatory authorities may require designated 
undertakings to allow consumers to pay for 
connection to the public communications 
network on the basis of payments phased over 
time. 
 
(e)   Non-payment of bills  
Member States are to authorise specified 
measures, which are to be proportionate, non-
discriminatory and published, to cover non-
payment of telephone bills issued by 
undertakings. These measures are to ensure 
that due warning of any consequent service 
interruption or disconnection is given to the 
subscriber beforehand. Except in cases of fraud, 
persistent late payment or non-payment, these 
measures are to ensure, as far as is technically 
feasible that any service interruption is confined 
to the service concerned. Disconnection for 
non-payment of bills should take place only 
after due warning is given to the subscriber. 
Member States may allow a period of limited 
service prior to complete disconnection, during 
which only calls that do not incur a charge to 
the subscriber (e.g. ‘112’ calls) are permitted. 
 
(f)   Tariff advice  
i.e. the facility whereby subscribers may 
























































regarding alternative lower-cost tariffs, if 
available. 
 
(g)   Cost control  
i.e. the facility whereby undertakings offer 
other means, if determined to be appropriate 
by national regulatory authorities, to control 
the costs of publicly available telephone 
services, including free-of-charge alerts to 
consumers in case of abnormal or excessive 
consumption patterns. 
 
Part B:   Facilities referred to in Article 29  
(a)   Tone dialling or DTMF (dual-tone multi-
frequency operation) i.e. the public 
communications network and/or publicly 
available telephone services supports the use of 
DTMF tones as defined in ETSI ETR 207 for end-
to-end signalling throughout the network both 
within a Member State and between Member 
States. 
(b)   Calling-line identification  
i.e. the calling party’s number is presented to 
the called party prior to the call being 
established. 
This facility should be provided in accordance 
with relevant legislation on protection of 
personal data and privacy, in particular 
Directive 2002/58/EC (Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications). 
To the extent technically feasible, operators 
should provide data and signals to facilitate the 
offering of calling-line identity and tone dialling 
across Member State boundaries. 
 
Part C:   Implementation of the number 
portability provisions referred to in Article 30  
The requirement that all subscribers with 
numbers from the national numbering plan, 
who so request can retain their number(s) 
independently of the undertaking providing the 
service shall apply: 
(a) in the case of geographic numbers, at a 
specific location; and 
(b) in the case of non-geographic numbers, at 
any location. 
This Part does not apply to the porting of 
numbers between networks providing services 










































Quality of Services 
 
Today Articles 11 and 22 of the Universal Service Directive refer to a number of quality of service 
parameters and measurement methods aimed at ensuring end-to-end quality of the publicly accessible 
telephone service. These quality of service parameters are listed in Annex III of the Universal Service 
Directive. 
 
Certain of these obligations could be maintained, as an optional catalogue for NRAs where they would 
deem it necessary to impose quality of service requirements to draw a clear borderline between ‘end-
to-end quality’ of services that use numbers vs. best effort services. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
ANNEX III USD 
QUALITY OF SERVICE PARAMETERS 
Quality-of-Service Parameters, Definitions and 
Measurement Methods referred to in Articles 
11 and 22 
 
(…) 
For undertakings providing a publicly available 
telephone service 
 
Call set up time 
(Note 2) 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 
Response times for directory 
enquiry services 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 
Proportion of coin and card 
operated public pay-telephones in 
working order 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 
Bill correctness complaints ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI 
EG 202 057 
Unsuccessful call ratio 
(Note 2) 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 







Member States may decide not to require up-to-date 
information concerning the performance for these 
two parameters to be kept if evidence is available to 
show that performance in these two areas is 
satisfactory. 
 
ANNEX II Authorisation Directive 
QUALITY OF SERVICE PARAMETERS 
Quality-of-Service Parameters, Definitions and 




For undertakings providing services using 
numbers for the provision of interpersonal 
voice communications at ensured quality  
 
Call set up time (Note 2) 
ETSI EG 202 057                 ETSI EG 202 057 
Response times for directory 
enquiry services 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 
Proportion of coin and card 
operated public pay-telephones in 
working order 
ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI EG 202 057 
Bill correctness complaints ETSI EG 202 057 ETSI 
EG 202 057 
Unsuccessful call ratio (Note 2) 
ETSI EG 202 057                   ETSI EG 202 057 








Member States may decide not to require up-to-date 
information concerning the performance for these 
two parameters to be kept if evidence is available to 






6.3.3. Number portability 
 
Article 30 (1) to (4) of the Universal Service Directive requires Member States to ensure number 
portability, i.e. the facility that allows the subscribers of Publicly Available Telephone Services (PATS) 
to change their service provider while retaining their original number, which today, in reality, 
constitute conditions attached to the right of being assigned E.164 numbering resources.85 The number 
portability provisions do however not cover IP addresses, for which no portability requirement exists.  
 
The concept of portability will possibly become important beyond communications services making 
use of telephone numbers. Other communications services use also personal identifiers for their 
customers, while not offering the portability of these identifiers to competing providers. Beyond 
identifiers, portability of content or data becomes relevant, e.g. “for cloud services which involve 
storing customer data or content and applications owned by the customer. In these cases, the lack of 
the ability to readily move data can create significant issues for competition and for the ability of new 
entrants to gain a foothold in established markets. Relevant examples include:  
• Cloud computing facilities such as online office or personal locker facilities; 
• Social networking sites in which a large amount of user-generated content such as 
contacts, messages, photos and videos might be stored; or 
• Online digital media services where customers purchase music, video and other media 
on one platform and may wish later to access and play such services on other 
platforms”86. 
 
Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation as adopted by the Council in April 201687 
establishes a right to data portability. However, the obligation concerns only personal data and is 
limited to the obligation for the undertaking to provide the personal data to the consumer.   
 
It should be considered that portability obligations become a general principle applicable to all relevant 
digital services. As regards mobile and fixed telephony services, number porting continues to be one 
key facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition. It is proposed to attach number 
portability obligations as a condition to the granting of numbering resources in the Authorisation 
Directive for interpersonal voice communications services at ensured quality and to increase some 
flexibility as regards to the pricing and the duration of number portability. The current requirement 
that the maximal interruption of service should not exceed one working day would be maintained and 
provide a sufficient safeguard for the end-user. Further obligations at EU level are not necessary. 
 
Number portability must be distinguished from switching IAS. Porting numbers can happen 
independently from switching the IAS. Particularly for fixed IAS, there is not any more a necessary 
technical link between the IAS and numbers – consumers may e.g. conclude a Data-Only contract 
without requiring a phone number. Paragraph 1 to 4 of Article 30 are thus covering a reality distinct 
from the subject of paragraphs 5 and 6 of that Article. 
 
                                                 
85 E.g. other service providers do not even offer any portability, since they lack standard identifiers and any-to-any-
connectivity/ interoperability 
86  European Parliament, Over-the-Top (OTTs) players: Market dynamics and policy challenges, IP/A/IMCO/FWC/2013-046, 
December 2015, p.82 
87 “1. The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided 
to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to 
another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided, where: the 
processing is based on consent pursuant to point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2) or on a contract pursuant to 
point (b) of Article 6(1); and the processing is carried out by automated means.  
2. In exercising his or her right to data portability pursuant to paragraph 1, the data subject shall have the right to have the 




An obligation included in horizontal EU consumer protection law should ensure that also customers of 
IAS can rely on a smooth switching process. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 30 Universal Service Directive  
Facilitating change of provider 
 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that all 
subscribers with numbers from the national 
telephone numbering plan who so request can 
retain their number(s) independently of the 
undertaking providing the service in accordance 







2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that pricing between operators and/or service 
providers related to the provision of number 
portability is cost-oriented, and that direct 
charges to subscribers, if any, do not act as a 
disincentive for subscribers against changing 
service provider. 
 
3.  National regulatory authorities shall not 
impose retail tariffs for the porting of numbers 
in a manner that would distort competition, such 
as by setting specific or common retail tariffs. 
 
4.  Porting of numbers and their subsequent 
activation shall be carried out within the shortest 
possible time. In any case, subscribers who have 
concluded an agreement to port a number to a 
new undertaking shall have that number 
activated within one working day. 
Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, 
competent national authorities may establish 
the global process of porting of numbers, taking 
into account national provisions on contracts, 
technical feasibility and the need to maintain 
continuity of service to the subscriber. In any 
event, loss of service during the process of 
porting shall not exceed one working day. 
Competent national authorities shall also take 
into account, where necessary, measures 
ensuring that subscribers are protected 
 
New Article Authorisation Directive 
Number Portability  
Facilitating change of provider 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that operators 
using numbers for the purposes of providing 
interpersonal voice communications at ensured 
quality, arrange that when their subscribers 
change their subscription to subscribe to the 
services of a competitor and the subscribers 
with numbers from the national telephone 
numbering plan who so request, they can retain 
their number(s) independently of the 
undertaking providing the service in accordance 
with the provisions of Part C of Annex I. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that pricing between operators and/or service 
providers related to the provision of number 
portability is fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory cost-oriented, and that direct 
charges to subscribers, if any does not act as a 







4.  Porting of numbers and their subsequent 
activation shall be carried out within the 
shortest possible time. In any case, subscribers 
who have concluded an agreement to port a 
number to a new undertaking shall have that 
number activated within one working day. 
Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, 
competent national authorities may establish 
the global process of porting of numbers, taking 
into account national provisions on contracts, 
technical feasibility and the need to maintain 
continuity of service to the subscriber. In any 
event, loss of service during the process of 
porting shall not exceed one working day. 
Competent national authorities shall also take 
into account, where necessary, measures 




throughout the switching process and are not 
switched to another provider against their will. 
Member States shall ensure that appropriate 
sanctions on undertakings are provided for, 
including an obligation to compensate 
subscribers in case of delay in porting or abuse 
of porting by them or on their behalf. 
throughout the switching process and are not 
switched to another provider against their will. 
Member States shall ensure that appropriate 
sanctions on undertakings are provided for, 
including an obligation to compensate 
subscribers in case of delay in porting or abuse 
of porting by them or on their behalf. 
6.3.4. Directories 
 
Extensive smart and mobile phone penetration and access to the Internet has indeed reduced the need 
for directory services although there is still widespread use. Research by Comres88 for ETNO found that 
telephone directories and inquiries are becoming less and less essential for society, as they are 
generally much less used or are auxiliary services. 
 
ETNO therefore propose to substantially simplify the current obligations of the Universal Service and 
the ePrivacy Directives relating to directories and limit the mandated service to the provision of 
information to the publisher or publishers of electronic directories. The obligation should be a 
prerequisite linked to the granting of rights of use of dedicated numbering resources allocated for 
services using numbers for the purposes of providing interpersonal voice communications at ensured 
quality (usually E.164 and E.212).  
 
The current Article 5 of the Universal Service Directive requires Member States to ensure that there 
would be at least one comprehensive directory available on their territory. This obligation is outdated 
as explained in section 6.4 below.  At the same time, it remains crucial for publishers of online 
directories to be entitled to receive the data from all operators of services making use of numbers for 
interpersonal communications, required to publish an exhaustive directory.  
 
On the other hand, the current obligations on directories in the ePrivacy Directive should be reviewed 




















                                                 








Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 25 Universal Service Directive 
Telephone directory enquiry services 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that subscribers 
to publicly available telephone services have 
the right to have an entry in the publicly 
available directory referred to in Article 5(1)(a) 
and to have their information made available to 
providers of directory enquiry services and/or 





2. Member States shall ensure that all 
undertakings which assign telephone numbers 
to subscribers meet all reasonable requests to 
make available, for the purposes of the 
provision of publicly available directory enquiry 
services and directories, the relevant 
information in an agreed format on terms which 
are fair, objective, cost oriented and non-
discriminatory. 
 
3. Member States shall ensure that all end-users 
provided with a publicly available telephone 
 
New Article Authorisation Directive 
Telephone directory enquiry services 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that subscribers to 
services using numbers for the purposes of 
providing interpersonal voice communications 
at ensured quality publicly available telephone 
services, have the right to have an entry in the 
publicly available directory referred to in Article 
5(1)(a) and to have their information made 
available to providers of electronic directory 
enquiry services and/or directories in accordance 












3. Member States shall ensure that all end-users 




service can access directory enquiry services. 
National regulatory authorities shall be able to 
impose obligations and conditions on 
undertakings that control access of end-users 
for the provision of directory enquiry services in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of 
Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive). Such 
obligations and conditions shall be objective, 




4. Member States shall not maintain any 
regulatory restrictions which prevent end-users 
in one Member State from accessing directly 
the directory enquiry service in another 
Member State by voice call or SMS, and shall 
take measures to ensure such access in 
accordance with Article 28. 
 
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply subject to the 
requirements of Community legislation on the 
protection of personal data and privacy and, in 
particular, Article 12 of Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications). 
numbers for the purposes of providing 
interpersonal voice communications at ensured 
quality, can access electronic directory enquiry 
services. National regulatory authorities shall be 
able to impose obligations and conditions on 
undertakings that control access of end-users for 
the provision of electronic directory enquiry 
services in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 5 of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access 
Directive). Such obligations and conditions shall 










Para to be deleted 
 
6.3.5. Common EU numbering space 
 
European telephone access code 
 
Article 27 of the Universal Service Directive imposes obligations regarding European telephone access 
codes.  The first obligation – the use of the ‘00’ dialling code – has been implemented since many years. 
The application for a European 'country' code from International Telecommunications Union (ITU) can 
be submitted only by ITU members. At the end of the 1990s, the ETNS country code assignment was 
supported by the 15 European Union nations, plus Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Switzerland. 
 
The other obligations concern the European numbers (European Telephony Numbering Space, ETNS)89, 
which failed. The context has changed. “A European Telephony Numbering Space (ETNS) was less 
needed few years ago. It was not a great success, I must say. Perhaps it was a solution looking for a 
problem. But now the issue of a single European numbering plan has become relevant again with the 
rapid development of M2M communications and large scale pan-European applications like eCall. One 
car with its own chassis number, unique number and unique address”90. 
 
                                                 
89 This European E.164 number range had not been used sufficiently and was cancelled by ITU in 2010 
90 Roberto Viola, Machine to machine connectivity in a Digital Single Market, published in DAE blog on 04/09/2015, available 




However, support for a new European country code does not seem unanimous91 because the 
introduction of such code would be technically complicated and costly to implement. Moreover, “NRA-
administered number schemes for mobile phones (so called E.164 and E.212 numbers) are by no means 
the only ones that are being used to uniquely identify objects in networks. In fact, other industries such 
as automotive, avionics and retail already track objects in their global supply chains and their 
specialised numbering schemes are implemented in IT systems around the world”92. 
 
For this reason, ETNO proposes to delete the reference to the ETNS in Article 27 of the Universal 
Directive.  
 
Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 27 Universal Service Directive 
European telephone access codes 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the ‘00’ 
code is the standard international access code. 
Special arrangements for making calls between 
locations adjacent to one another across 
borders between Member States may be 
established or continued. End-users in the 
locations concerned shall be fully informed of 
such arrangements. 
 
2.  A legal entity, established within the 
Community and designated by the Commission, 
shall have sole responsibility for the 
management, including number assignment, 
and promotion of the European Telephony 
Numbering Space (ETNS). The Commission shall 
adopt the necessary implementing rules. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that all 
undertakings that provide publicly available 
telephone services allowing international calls 
handle all calls to and from the ETNS at rates 
similar to those applied for calls to and from 
other Member States. 
 
Article 27 Universal Service Directive 
European telephone access codes 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the ‘00’ 
code is the standard international access code. 
Special arrangements for making calls between 
locations adjacent to one another across 
borders between Member States may be 
established or continued. End-users in the 
locations concerned shall be fully informed of 
such arrangements. 
 








To be deleted 
 
Harmonised telephone number for harmonised services 
 
Article 27a USD establishes harmonised telephone numbers for harmonised services. In 2007, the 
Commission adopted a decision93 establishing the 116 number94. The Decision lays down the rules on 
                                                 
91 In the 1990s, some early reactions to the approval of the ETNS country code were already “concerned that the ETNS would 
be made obsolete by Internet websites” see < http://www.wtng.info/wtng-reg.html>. Today, this objection is likely even 
stronger. 
92 Roberto Viola, idem 
93 Decision 2007/116/EC of 15 February 2007 on reserving the national numbering range beginning with ‘116’ for harmonised 
numbers for harmonised services of social value, OJ L 17 February 2007, 49 p.30. 
94 Member States shall support the harmonisation of numbering resources within the Community where that is necessary to 
support the development of pan European services. The Commission may (…) take the appropriate technical implementing 




the scope of the 116 numbers, the reservation of 116 numbers and their assignment to operators, and, 
in its annex, the numbers themselves. The aim of the Decision is that EU citizens would be able to reach 
certain services that have a social value by using the same recognisable numbers in all Member States.  
 
In 2009 a specific provision was added to the Universal Service Directive requiring Member States to 
guarantee that citizens have access to a missing children hotline under the number 116000, promote 
the specific 116 numbers, ensure that disabled end-users are able to access the 116 numbers, ensure 
that citizens are adequately informed of the existence and use of the 116 numbers, in particular 
targeting persons travelling in the EU. 
 
The European Commission has reserved five short numbers with a single format 116 + 3 digits for 
helplines that should be accessible to everyone in Europe. The 116 numbers designated so far are: 116 
000 = missing children hotline; 116 006 = helpline for victims of crime; 116 111 = children’s helpline; 
116 117 = for non-emergency medical on-call services; 116 123 = emotional support helpline. The 
selected services tie in with wider EU objectives aimed at improving the wellbeing of European citizens, 
such as the European strategy for children’s rights in the case of 116 000 and 116 111.The Commission 
regularly publishes a report on the state of implementation of 116 numbers. 
 
ETNO considers that Article 27a USD could be deleted, Pan-European services of social interest with 
harmonized numbers having not risen a significant interest in Europe.  Such services are adequately 
addressed at national or local level. 
 
Instead of a binding requirement, the European Commission may encourage national governments to 
the provision of services harmonized as to their object but unique numbers are not needed at EU level. 
The identification of unique telephone numbers in all national numbering plans is complex and indirect 
costs fall on operators without an interest at the level of potential users while social networks, like 
Twitter, increasingly take over the envisaged role of harmonized numbers. 
 
Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 27a Universal Service Directive 
Harmonised numbers for harmonised services 
of social value, including the missing children 
hotline number 
 
1.  Member States shall promote the specific 
numbers in the numbering range beginning 
with ‘116’ identified by Commission Decision 
2007/116/EC of 15 February 2007 on reserving 
the national numbering range beginning with 
‘116’ for harmonised numbers for harmonised 
services of social value. They shall encourage 
the provision within their territory of the 
services for which such numbers are reserved. 
 
2.  Member States shall ensure that disabled 
end-users are able to access services provided 
under the ‘116’ numbering range to the 
greatest extent possible. Measures taken to 
facilitate disabled end-users' access to such 
services whilst travelling in other Member 











relevant standards or specifications published 
in accordance with Article 17 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that citizens are 
adequately informed of the existence and use 
of services provided under the ‘116’ numbering 
range, in particular through initiatives 
specifically targeting persons travelling 
between Member States. 
 
4.  Member States shall, in addition to 
measures of general applicability to all 
numbers in the ‘116’ numbering range taken 
pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, make every 
effort to ensure that citizens have access to a 
service operating a hotline to report cases of 
missing children. The hotline shall be available 
on the number ‘116000’. 
 
5.  In order to ensure the effective 
implementation of the ‘116’ numbering range, 
in particular the missing children hotline 
number ‘116000’, in the Member States, 
including access for disabled end-users when 
travelling in other Member States, the 
Commission, having consulted BEREC, may 
adopt technical implementing measures. 
However, these technical implementing 
measures shall be adopted without prejudice 
to, and shall have no impact on, the 
organisation of these services, which remains 
of the exclusive competence of Member States. 
Those measures, designed to amend non-
essential elements of this Directive by 
supplementing it, shall be adopted in 
accordance with the regulatory procedure with 








6.4. Universal service: Internet Access Services 
6.4.1. Scope of universal service 
 
A 2007 survey showed that: “The majority of Europeans thought that having a colour television and 
fixed telephone were necessary. Having a mobile phone, a computer and an internet connection were 
mainly regarded as being ‘desirable but not necessary”95.  
 
Until now, the focus was too much on the supply side only. Under the Universal Service Directive, 
obligations must be imposed on one or more suppliers which are subsequently remunerated for the 
resulting net costs calculated on an ex-post basis. This approach may have been reasonable in the 
transition from fixed telephony monopoly to competition. At the time, mobile telephony was an 
expensive luxury for a minority of citizens. 
 
However, the approach has led to repeated legal disputes96 and is questionable to ensure global public 
interest policies97. It is no longer appropriate. 
 
EU policy tools addressing the needs of users, in particular the deployment of broadband and access 
to digital services, were developed outside the universal service regime. For instance the Directive 
2014/61 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications 
networks; promotion of and usage of public funding from Structural Funds or from the Connecting 
Europe Facility; promotion of stability of prices for regulated wholesale access to SMP copper 
networks, and pricing flexibility for non-discriminatory regulated access to SMP NGA networks; 
advocacy of broadband coverage requirements in less densely populated areas as part of the spectrum 
assignment conditions; and adoption of the EU state aid rules to support the deployment of broadband 
networks in areas where there is a market failure. 
 
This confirms that public policy tools other than Universal Service obligations are better suited to foster 
broadband deployment in case the market fails or the outcome is unsatisfactory. The need to 
guarantee internet access for the sake of social and economic inclusion should be distinguished from 
the objective to reach more ambitious broadband targets. The objective of a universal service 
obligation for functional internet access is to ensure social and economic inclusion. Any universal 
service obligations with regard to internet access should remain limited to the provision of a basic 
safety net, to avoid any disruptive effects.  
 
It is most appropriate to define the scope and characteristics of functional internet access at a national 
level. 
 
Taking into account the societal evolution under way98 the future universal service regime, as long as 
maintained, should be limited to guaranteed functional internet access at fixed locations. The provision 
                                                 
95 Special Eurobarometer 279 report, quoted in Antje Kreutzmann-Gallasch e.a., Criteria to define essential telecoms services, 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, November 2013, p.20. 
 
96 19 infringement procedures and several requests for preliminary ruling 
97 Vodafone, Vodafone comments on European Commission questionnaire for the public consultation on universal service 
principles in e-communications, May 2010, p. 7 
98 As highlighted by the Commission in the same question 150 of its consultation on the evaluation of the regulatory 
framework for electronic communications and on its review: “Technological and market evolution has brought networks to 
move to internet protocol technology, and consumers to choose between a range of competing voice service providers. 36% 
of Europeans use voice over IP applications from a connected device to make cheaper or free phone calls (see "Special 




of telephony services at a fixed location, public payphones, directories and directory enquiry services 
should be removed from the scope of the universal service. 
 
It is already possible under the current Framework to use wireless technology to provide ‘access at a 
fixed location’, but mobile services cannot currently be included within the scope of a national USO. 
There is no reason to change the approach.  Research shows that despite the raise in mobile usage, 
internet access continues to occur predominantly via fixed networks, and in particular via Wi-Fi 
connections99. 
 
Functional Internet Access Services should be defined in terms of ‘use of certain services’ – i.e. services 
that a customer should access in order to avoid social exclusion - and not in terms of speed. Services 
such as web browsing, social media and messaging services, access to basic e-government, e-banking 
may be considered as essential for the standard citizen. An approach based on categories of services 
has the advantage of avoiding picking technical solution. 
 
The list of services to which access is indispensable to avoid social exclusion may vary between the 
Member States.  NRAs should therefore draw up a list of the online services to which access is essential 
in their country taking into account the prevailing technical circumstances and the cost of providing 
this basic internet access, after having consulted the interested organizations and national welfare 
bodies. In a second step, the Commission would define the common EU basic internet access. The 
Commission Decision would constitute a maximum harmonization, to avoid too wide national 
interpretations of what scope of USO could be in their Member State and a further fragmentation of 
the internal market. 
 
At the same time, any decision on the range and type of services to be included should carefully and 
duly take into account the costs of the provision of access to such services100.  
 
There is no reason to provide for a revision of the scope of the universal functional access.  The scope 
as defined appears sufficient to address possible new social needs in terms of access to applications 
and content over the internet during the lifetime of the revised framework. 
 
The Directive should set political objectives for Member States, including as regards demand side 
measures. These objectives for Member States would consist in: 
- requiring their NRAs to apply the regulatory framework in an investment-friendly manner, 
incentivizing maximum coverage by private undertakings on commercial grounds to minimize 
the extension and the cost of non-profitable areas; 
- promoting regional and local schemes to support coverage in non-profitable areas; 
- encouraging the inclusion in their social policies of affordability schemes (e.g. vouchers), digital 
literacy programs and other demand-side instruments aimed at fostering service penetration 






                                                 
99 Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2015–2020 White Paper, p.1: “Mobile offload 
exceeded cellular traffic for the first time in 2015. Fifty-one percent of total mobile data traffic was offloaded onto the fixed 
network through Wi-Fi or femtocell in 2015. In total, 3.9 exabytes of mobile data traffic were offloaded onto the fixed network 
each month”. 
100  The financing of the services to which access is provided – e.g. e-edu, e-health and e-gov - would, as now, remain outside 
the scope of the universal service defined under the Universal Service Directive. Certain of these services could as far they 




Current provisions amendments 
 
Article 3  Universal Service Directive 
Availability of universal service 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the services 
set out in this Chapter are made available at the 
quality specified to all end-users in their 
territory, independently of geographical 
location, and, in the light of specific national 



























2.  Member States shall determine the most 
efficient and appropriate approach for ensuring 
the implementation of universal service, whilst 
respecting the principles of objectivity, 
transparency, non-discrimination and 
proportionality. They shall seek to minimise 
market distortions, in particular the provision of 
services at prices or subject to other terms and 
conditions which depart from normal 
commercial conditions, whilst safeguarding the 
public interest 
 
Article 3 Universal Service  Directive 
Availability of universal service 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that basic access 
to the services functional internet at fixed 
locations set out in this Chapter are is made 
available at the quality specified to all end-users 
consumers in their territory, independently of 
geographical location, and, in the light of specific 
national conditions, at an affordable price. This 
basic access shall enable functional access to all 
services that must be accessible in order to 
prevent social exclusion. 
 
1a. the scope and the characteristics of the 
basic access to the internet will be set as 
follows: 
- National regulatory authorities shall define 
the list of online services to which access is 
indispensable to avoid social exclusion taking 
into account technological feasibility and the 
cost of provision; 
- National regulatory authorities shall consult 
all interested parties on the list according to 
Article 6 of the Framework Directive; 
- National regulatory authorities shall submit 
these lists to the Commission at the latest 
twelve months after the date for transposition 
of this Directive. 
- the Commission shall adopt and publish a 
decision establishing the characteristics of the 
basic functional internet access at the latest 6 
months after the deadline set in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
2.  Member States shall determine the most 
efficient and appropriate approach for ensuring 
the implementation of the basic universal 
service internet access, whilst respecting the 
principles of objectivity, transparency, non-
discrimination and proportionality. They shall 
seek to minimise market distortions, in particular 
the provision of services at prices or subject to 
other terms and conditions which depart from 
normal commercial conditions, whilst 









Article 4  Universal Service Directive 
Provision of access at a fixed location and 
provision of telephone services 
 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that all 
reasonable requests for connection at a fixed 
location to a public communications network are 





2.  The connection provided shall be capable of 
supporting voice, facsimile and data 
communications at data rates that are sufficient 
to permit functional Internet access, taking into 
account prevailing technologies used by the 
majority of subscribers and technological 
feasibility. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that all 
reasonable requests for the provision of a 
publicly available telephone service over the 
network connection referred to in paragraph 1 
that allows for originating and receiving national 
and international calls are met by at least one 
undertaking. 
 
Article 4  Universal Service Directive 
Promoting supply and demand for internet 
access at a fixed location and provision of 
telephone services 
 
1.  Member States shall apply national 
legislation in an investment-friendly manner, 
incentivizing maximum coverage by private 
undertakings on commercial grounds to 
minimize the extension and the cost of areas in 
which there is no perspective of commercial 
offer of the basic access defined in Article 3. 
 
2.  Member States shall authorise their national 
regulatory authority to promote regional and 
local schemes to support coverage of areas in 
which there is no perspective of commercial 




3. Member States shall encourage the inclusion 
in their social policies of affordability schemes, 
digital literacy programs and other demand-
side instruments aimed at fostering internet 
access penetration and internet usage amongst 
relatively disadvantaged groups of citizens. 
 
 
Current provisions amendments 
 
Article 5 Universal Service Directive 
Directory enquiry services and directories 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that: 
(a) at least one comprehensive directory is available 
to end-users in a form approved by the relevant 
authority, whether printed or electronic, or both, 
and is updated on a regular basis, and at least once 
a year; 
(b) at least one comprehensive telephone directory 
enquiry service is available to all end-users, 
including users of public pay telephones. 
 
2.  The directories referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
comprise, subject to the provisions of Article 12 of 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic 
 
 





communications), all subscribers of publicly 
available telephone services. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that the 
undertaking(s) providing the services referred to in 
paragraph 1 apply the principle of non-
discrimination to the treatment of information that 
has been provided to them by other undertakings. 
 
Article 6 Universal Service Directive 
Public pay telephones and other publics voice 
telephony access points 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities may impose obligations on 
undertakings in order to ensure that public pay 
telephones or other public voice telephony access 
points are provided to meet the reasonable needs 
of end-users in terms of the geographical coverage, 
the number of telephones or other access points, 
accessibility to disabled end-users and the quality 
of services. 
 
2.  A Member State shall ensure that its national 
regulatory authority can decide not to impose 
obligations under paragraph 1 in all or part of its 
territory, if it is satisfied that these facilities or 
comparable services are widely available, on the 
basis of a consultation of interested parties as 
referred to in Article 33. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that it is possible to 
make emergency calls from public pay telephones 
using the single European emergency call number 
‘112’ and other national emergency numbers, all 




To be deleted 
 
 
Article 15 Universal Service Directive 
Review of the scope of universal service 
 
1.  The Commission shall periodically review the 
scope of universal service, in particular with a view 
to proposing to the European Parliament and the 
Council that the scope be changed or redefined. A 
review shall be carried out, on the first occasion 
within two years after the date of application 
referred to in Article 38(1), second subparagraph, 
and subsequently every three years. 
 
2.  This review shall be undertaken in the light of 
social, economic and technological developments, 
 
 





taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data 
rates in the light of the prevailing technologies used 
by the majority of subscribers. The review process 
shall be undertaken in accordance with Annex V. 
The Commission shall submit a report to the 
European Parliament and the Council regarding the 
outcome of the review. 
 
6.4.2. Affordability and cost controls 
 
Affordability is and should remain a central component of the universal service. In particular, universal 
availability of basic internet access requires that it be available to all citizens, irrespective of their ability 
to pay, and including those who live in areas which are expensive to serve. The provisions in the 
Universal Service Directive empowering NRAs to mandate the provision of the basic service should be 
maintained. Social tariffs have helped to ensure affordability of the telephone service. However, today 
special tariffs and cost controls appear outdated in view of the generalisation of flat rates and the 
decreasing price levels.  
On the other hand, more targeted measures might remain necessary to promote the penetration of 
basic internet access services and their use, within broader social inclusion policies.  
 
National regulatory authorities should review the internet access service offers available in their 
jurisdiction. In the case basic offers are available, national regulatory authorities shall examine, in 
coordination with the national authorities in charge of social policy, whether the pricing of these offers 
constitutes a barrier for specific categories of the population. In the relevant case, national authorities 
in charge of social policy should design schemes or include specific measures in the schemes targeting 
the social groups concerned to help overcome the identified barriers. 
 
In case no basic offers are available in their jurisdiction, the national regulatory authorities shall consult 
all internet access providers and examine together possible joint proposals to address the market 
failure. If no voluntary commitments are obtained within a reasonable time period, Member States 
should consider the necessary financial appropriation within their social policy budgets. 
 
Consequently, ETNO believes that the complex system, which was put in place in the 1990s to 
guarantee the provision of the PSTN to all categories of the population during the liberalization 
process, can be repealed. 
 
Current provisions Amendments 
 
Article 9 Universal Service Directive 
Affordability of tariffs 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities shall monitor 
the evolution and level of retail tariffs of the 
services identified in Articles 4 to 7 as falling 
under the universal service obligations and 
either provided by designated undertakings or 
available on the market, if no undertakings are 
designated in relation to those services, in 
particular in relation to national consumer prices 
and income. 
 
Article 9 Universal Service Directive 
Affordability of tariffs 
 
1. National regulatory authorities shall review 
the offers of basic access to the internet 
currently available in their jurisdiction. In the 
case basic offers are available, national 
regulatory authorities shall examine, in 
coordination with the national authorities in 
charge of social policy, whether the pricing or 
other conditions of these offers constitute a 





2.  Member States may, in the light of national 
conditions, require that designated undertakings 
provide to consumers tariff options or packages 
which depart from those provided under normal 
commercial conditions, in particular to ensure 
that those on low incomes or with special social 
needs are not prevented from accessing the 
network referred to in Article 4(1) or from using 
the services identified in Article 4(3) and Articles 
5, 6 and 7 as falling under the universal service 
obligations and provided by designated 
undertakings. 
 
3.  Member States may, besides any provision for 
designated undertakings to provide special tariff 
options or to comply with price caps or 
geographical averaging or other similar schemes, 
ensure that support is provided to consumers 
identified as having low incomes or special social 
needs. 
 
4.  Member States may require undertakings 
with obligations under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 to 
apply common tariffs, including geographical 
averaging, throughout the territory, in the light 
of national conditions or to comply with price 
caps. 
 
5.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that, where a designated undertaking has an 
obligation to provide special tariff options, 
common tariffs, including geographical 
averaging, or to comply with price caps, the 
conditions are fully transparent and are 
published and applied in accordance with the 
principle of non-discrimination. National 
regulatory authorities may require that specific 
schemes be modified or withdrawn. 
of the population. Member States shall ensure 
that, in the relevant case, the national 
regulatory authorities may assist the national 
authorities in charge of social policy, in the 
design of schemes that could help overcoming 
the identified barrier, targeting specific social 
groups. 
 
2.  In case no basic internet access offers are 
available in their jurisdiction, the National 
regulatory authorities shall consult all internet 
access providers and examine together possible 
joint proposals to address the market failure.  
 
 
Article 10 Universal Service Directive 
Control of expenditure 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that designated 
undertakings, in providing facilities and services 
additional to those referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6, 
7 and 9(2), establish terms and conditions in such 
a way that the subscriber is not obliged to pay for 
facilities or services which are not necessary or 









2.  Member States shall ensure that designated 
undertakings with obligations under Articles 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 9(2) provide the specific facilities and 
services set out in Annex I, Part A, in order that 
subscribers can monitor and control expenditure 
and avoid unwarranted disconnection of service. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that the relevant 
authority is able to waive the requirements of 
paragraph 2 in all or part of its national territory 
if it is satisfied that the facility is widely available. 
 
6.4.3. Quality of Service and consumer protection 
 
Currently, the Universal Service Directive contains two categories of quality and consumer protection 
rules, those specifically for the universal service (Article 11) and those for all electronic 
communications services (Articles 20-30). Beyond the relevant obligations linked to services of 
interpersonal voice communications at ensured quality based on numbers (cf. supra), consumer 
protection obligations would further be maintained if indispensable from the consumers’ point of 
view, as far as applicable equally to other services. 
 
Quality of service 
 
Article 22 of the Universal Service Directive requires Member States to empower NRAs to set quality 
of service requirements.  This provision was inspired by the need to ensure high quality telephone 
calls.  The scope of the universal service will be limited to functional internet access. However, quality 
of service parameters of internet access services is already covered by Article 4 of the Open Internet 
Regulation101. In addition, the Regulation obliges IAS providers to indicate a range of different internet 
access specific quality parameters. 
 
Moreover, national authorities shall define the universal service by setting specific quality of service 
requirements, necessary to ensure functional access via the internet to applications indispensable to 
avoid social exclusion. In this context, ETNO suggests the abolition of Article 22. 
 
The quality of services using numbers for the provision of interpersonal voice communications at 
ensured quality can be specified by NRAs, if required, based on the modified Annex III - quality of 
service parameters – that would now become Annex II of the Authorisation Directive.  
 
 
Current provision Proposed amendment 
 
Article 22 Universal Service Directive 
Quality of service 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are, after taking account 
 
 
To be deleted 
 
                                                 
101 which requires providers of internet access services to specify in their contracts ‘the remedies available to the consumer 
in accordance with national law in the event of any continuous or regularly recurring discrepancy between the actual 





of the views of interested parties, able to require 
undertakings that provide publicly available 
electronic communications networks and/or 
services to publish comparable, adequate and 
up-to-date information for end-users on the 
quality of their services and on measures taken 
to ensure equivalence in access for disabled end-
users. That information shall, on request, be 
supplied to the national regulatory authority in 
advance of its publication. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities may specify, 
inter alia, the quality of service parameters to be 
measured and the content, form and manner of 
the information to be published, including 
possible quality certification mechanisms, in 
order to ensure that end-users, including 
disabled end-users, have access to 
comprehensive, comparable, reliable and user-
friendly information. Where appropriate, the 
parameters, definitions and measurement 
methods set out in Annex III may be used. 
 
3.  In order to prevent the degradation of service 
and the hindering or slowing down of traffic over 
networks, Member States shall ensure that 
national regulatory authorities are able to set 
minimum quality of service requirements on an 
undertaking or undertakings providing public 
communications networks. 
 
National regulatory authorities shall provide the 
Commission, in good time before setting any 
such requirements, with a summary of the 
grounds for action, the envisaged requirements 
and the proposed course of action. This 
information shall also be made available to the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC). The Commission may, 
having examined such information, make 
comments or recommendations thereupon, in 
particular to ensure that the envisaged 
requirements do not adversely affect the 
functioning of the internal market. National 
regulatory authorities shall take the utmost 
account of the Commission’s comments or 




Article 3 will require NRAs to define the quality of the basic internet access in their jurisdiction.  On the 




clear, comprehensive and easily accessible form, contractual information on the quality of service. 
Additionally, Article 4(1) of the Open Internet Regulation obliges to provide further contractual and 
public information on the quality of service. Considering these extensive obligations, ETNO suggest the 
deletion of Article 11 of the Universal Service Directive. 
 
Current provisions amendments 
 
Article 11 Universal Service Directive 
Quality of service of designated undertakings 
 
1.  National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that all designated undertakings with obligations 
under Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9(2) publish 
adequate and up-to-date information 
concerning their performance in the provision of 
universal service, based on the quality of service 
parameters, definitions and measurement 
methods set out in Annex III. The published 
information shall also be supplied to the national 
regulatory authority. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities may specify, 
inter alia, additional quality of service standards, 
where relevant parameters have been 
developed, to assess the performance of 
undertakings in the provision of services to 
disabled end-users and disabled consumers. 
National regulatory authorities shall ensure that 
information concerning the performance of 
undertakings in relation to these parameters is 
also published and made available to the 
national regulatory authority. 
 
3.  National regulatory authorities may, in 
addition, specify the content, form and manner 
of information to be published, in order to 
ensure that end-users and consumers have 
access to comprehensive, comparable and user-
friendly information. 
 
4.  National regulatory authorities shall be able 
to set performance targets for undertakings with 
universal service obligations. In so doing, 
national regulatory authorities shall take 
account of views of interested parties, in 
particular as referred to in Article 33. 
 
5.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are able to monitor 










6.  Persistent failure by an undertaking to meet 
performance targets may result in specific 
measures being taken in accordance with 
Directive 2002/20/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services 
(Authorisation Directive). National regulatory 
authorities shall be able to order independent 
audits or similar reviews of the performance 
data, paid for by the undertaking concerned, in 
order to ensure the accuracy and comparability 
of the data made available by undertakings with 





Article 20 of the Directive details the clauses that end-user contracts must contain. These rules 
constitute a lex specialis to the general regime set by Directive 2011/83102 on consumer rights 
(Consumer Rights Directive). The Consumer Rights Directive establishes rules on information to be 
provided for contracts (distance contracts, off-premises contracts and contracts other than distance 
and off-premises contracts). The Consumer Rights Directive does not exclude contracts for electronic 
communications services from its scope and consequently overlaps to a certain extent Articles 20 (and 
30) of the Universal Service Directive. For example, Articles 6 and 8 of the Consumer Rights Directive 
adequately address price transparency and information on the main characteristics of a service, when 
consumers conclude contracts.  
 
Moreover, Article 4 of the Open Internet Regulation obliges providers of internet access services to 
specify in their contracts, among other, the minimum, normally available, maximum and advertised 
download and upload speed of the services in the case of fixed networks and how significant deviations 
from the respective advertised download and upload speeds could affect universal internet access and 
usage. Moreover, the basic access to the internet should be as affordable as possible with the lightest 
quality of service requirements, as opposed to more expensive offerings. The current horizontal 
consumer protection rules applicable to the modification of consumer contracts have proven effective. 
There is no justification why internet access or communications services should be governed by stricter 
end-user protection rules, as those of Article 20(2) Universal Service Directive, particularly when 
considering that consumers are much better informed about their internet access services’ qualities. 
 
Taking into account the social objective pursued requesting compensation or refund ‘if contracted 
service quality levels are not met’ and explanations on ‘the type of action that might be taken by the 
undertaking in reaction to security or integrity incidents or threats and vulnerabilities’ would also seem 
disproportionate.     
 
Contracts with professional end-users, which are in the scope of the current universal service Directive 
but not of the Consumer Rights Directive, must be excluded from the scope of the universal service 
Directive. This is a logical evolution considering the evolution of the market of telecom services for 
business. Business does not need more sector-specific consumer protection for telecommunications 
                                                 
102 Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC 




than it does for other products or services. Besides, several Member States have already developed 
cross-sector laws protecting B2B contracts from unfair practices. In addition, Article 5 of the e-
commerce Directive imposes a series of transparency obligations on information services providers. 
Consequently, there is no reason to maintain Article 20 of the Universal Service Directive. With regard 
to contractual information requirements for reliable emergency services, requirements applicable to 
all providers of interpersonal voice communications (including best-effort services) should be 
considered. 
 
The reference to dispute settlement procedures in accordance with Article 34 should be replaced by a 
reference to Directive 2013/11 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, given that 
Article 34 would be deleted (see below). There is no reason to maintain specific procedures for internet 
access services. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendment 
 
Article 20 Universal service directive 
Contracts 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that, when 
subscribing to services providing connection to a 
public communications network and/or publicly 
available electronic communications services, 
consumers, and other end-users so requesting, 
have a right to a contract with an undertaking or 
undertakings providing such connection and/or 
services. The contract shall specify in a clear, 
comprehensive and easily accessible form at 
least: 
(a) the identity and address of the undertaking; 
(b) the services provided, including in particular, 
— whether or not access to emergency services 
and caller location information is being provided, 
and any limitations on the provision of 
emergency services under Article 26, 
— information on any other conditions limiting 
access to and/or use of services and applications, 
where such conditions are permitted under 
national law in accordance with Community law, 
— the minimum service quality levels offered, 
namely the time for the initial connection and, 
where appropriate, other quality of service 
parameters, as defined by the national 
regulatory authorities, 
— information on any procedures put in place by 
the undertaking to measure and shape traffic so 
as to avoid filling or overfilling a network link, 
and information on how those procedures could 
impact on service quality, 
— the types of maintenance service offered and 
customer support services provided, as well as 
the means of contacting these services, 
 
Article 20 Universal service directive 
Contracts 
 




— any restrictions imposed by the provider on 
the use of terminal equipment supplied; 
(c) where an obligation exists under Article 25, 
the subscriber's options as to whether or not to 
include his or her personal data in a directory, 
and the data concerned; 
(d) details of prices and tariffs, the means by 
which up-to-date information on all applicable 
tariffs and maintenance charges may be 
obtained, payment methods offered and any 
differences in costs due to payment method; 
(e) the duration of the contract and the 
conditions for renewal and termination of 
services and of the contract, including: 
— any minimum usage or duration required to 
benefit from promotional terms, 
— any charges related to portability of numbers 
and other identifiers, 
— any charges due on termination of the 
contract, including any cost recovery with 
respect to terminal equipment, 
(f) any compensation and the refund 
arrangements which apply if contracted service 
quality levels are not met; 
(g) the means of initiating procedures for the 
settlement of disputes in accordance with Article 
34; 
(h) the type of action that might be taken by the 
undertaking in reaction to security or integrity 
incidents or threats and vulnerabilities. 
Member States may also require that the 
contract include any information which may be 
provided by the relevant public authorities for 
this purpose on the use of electronic 
communications networks and services to 
engage in unlawful activities or to disseminate 
harmful content, and on the means of protection 
against risks to personal security, privacy and 
personal data, referred to in Article 21(4) and 
relevant to the service provided. 
 
2.  Member States shall ensure that subscribers 
have a right to withdraw from their contract 
without penalty upon notice of modification to 
the contractual conditions proposed by the 
undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks and/or services. 
Subscribers shall be given adequate notice, not 
shorter than one month, of any such 
modification, and shall be informed at the same 
time of their right to withdraw, without penalty, 




conditions. Member States shall ensure that 
national regulatory authorities are able to 




The Universal Service Directive requires the Member States to empower their NRAs among other to 
impose the publication of transparent, comparable, adequate and up-to-date information on 
applicable prices and tariffs, on any charges due on termination of a contract and on standard terms 
and conditions in respect of access to, and use of, services provided by them to end-users and 
consumers in accordance with Annex II of the Directive. These obligations seem disproportionate 
There is no similar obligations in the EU horizontal consumer protection rules, but consumers can find 
a broad variety of online tools allowing the comparison of different offerings in many sectors. Many of 
these online tools also cover services provided by network providers. 
 
Moreover, the obligations under Article 21 Universal Service are redundant because Article 5 of the 
Consumer Rights Directive imposes sufficient information requirements applicable to consumer 
contracts, including price, duration, functionality, interoperability, in any sector of the economy.  There 
seems to exist no justification for more stringent transparency rules in the electronic communications 
sector, beyond those publication requirements already set in Article 4 of the Open Internet 
Regulation.103 
In addition, several requirements of Article 21 relate to voice telephony and do not fit to internet 
access. In any case, there is no reason to require more or less transparency for basic internet access 
than for other services which are essential to prevent social exclusion (access to bank accounts, energy, 
water etc.). For these reasons, ETNO suggests the deletion of Article 21. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendment 
 
Article 21 Universal service directive 
Transparency and publication of information 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are able to oblige 
undertakings providing public electronic 
communications networks and/or publicly 
available electronic communications services to 
publish transparent, comparable, adequate and 
up-to-date information on applicable prices and 
tariffs, on any charges due on termination of a 
contract and on standard terms and conditions 
in respect of access to, and use of, services 
provided by them to end-users and consumers in 
accordance with Annex II. Such information shall 
be published in a clear, comprehensive and 
easily accessible form. National regulatory 
authorities may specify additional requirements 
 
Article 21 Universal service directive 
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parameters” and ‘to provide information on any procedures put in place by the provider to measure and shape traffic so as to 




regarding the form in which such information is 
to be published. 
 
2.  National regulatory authorities shall 
encourage the provision of comparable 
information to enable end-users and consumers 
to make an independent evaluation of the cost 
of alternative usage patterns, for instance by 
means of interactive guides or similar 
techniques. Where such facilities are not 
available on the market free of charge or at a 
reasonable price, Member States shall ensure 
that national regulatory authorities are able to 
make such guides or techniques available 
themselves or through third party procurement. 
Third parties shall have a right to use, free of 
charge, the information published by 
undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks and/or publicly 
available electronic communications services for 
the purposes of selling or making available such 
interactive guides or similar techniques. 
 
3.  Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are able to oblige 
undertakings providing public electronic 
communications networks and/or publicly 
available electronic communications services to 
inter alia: 
(a) provide applicable tariff information to 
subscribers regarding any number or service 
subject to particular pricing conditions; with 
respect to individual categories of services, 
national regulatory authorities may require such 
information to be provided immediately prior to 
connecting the call; 
(b) inform subscribers of any change to access to 
emergency services or caller location 
information in the service to which they have 
subscribed; 
(c) inform subscribers of any change to 
conditions limiting access to and/or use of 
services and applications, where such conditions 
are permitted under national law in accordance 
with Community law; 
(d) provide information on any procedures put in 
place by the provider to measure and shape 
traffic so as to avoid filling or overfilling a 
network link, and on how those procedures 
could impact on service quality; 
(e) inform subscribers of their right to determine 















































a directory, and of the types of data concerned, 
in accordance with Article 12 of Directive 
2002/58/EC (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications); and 
(f) regularly inform disabled subscribers of 
details of products and services designed for 
them. 
If deemed appropriate, national regulatory 
authorities may promote self- or co-regulatory 
measures prior to imposing any obligation. 
 
4.  Member States may require that the 
undertakings referred to in paragraph 3 
distribute public interest information free of 
charge to existing and new subscribers, where 
appropriate, by the same means as those 
ordinarily used by them in their communications 
with subscribers. In such a case, that information 
shall be provided by the relevant public 
authorities in a standardised format and shall, 
inter alia, cover the following topics: 
(a) the most common uses of electronic 
communications services to engage in unlawful 
activities or to disseminate harmful content, 
particularly where it may prejudice respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others, including 
infringements of copyright and related rights, 
and their legal consequences; and 
(b) the means of protection against risks to 
personal security, privacy and personal data 
when using electronic communications services. 
 
 
Alternative dispute resolution 
 
Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive requires the Member States to ensure that transparent, 
non-discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures are available for dealing with 
unresolved disputes between consumers and undertakings providing electronic communications 
networks and/or services arising under this Directive and relating to the contractual conditions and/or 
performance of contracts concerning the supply of those networks and/or services. Member States 
shall adopt measures to ensure that such procedures enable disputes to be settled fairly and promptly 
and may, where warranted, adopt a system of reimbursement and/or compensation. 
 
This provision is redundant because Article 5 of the ADR Directive104 requires Member States to ensure 
that disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales contracts or service contracts 
which involve a trader established on their respective territories can be submitted to an alternative 
dispute resolution entity. The obligation on Member States to ensure the availability of out of court 
settlement procedures for consumer contracts in the electronic communication sector derives 
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therefore from this ‘horizontal’ obligation.  Additional application of sector specific rules may lead in 
some Member States to legal uncertainty and overlaps. Article 34 should therefore be removed.  
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 34 Universal service directive 
Out-of-court dispute resolution 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that transparent, 
non-discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-
of-court procedures are available for dealing 
with unresolved disputes between consumers 
and undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks and/or services 
arising under this Directive and relating to the 
contractual conditions and/or performance of 
contracts concerning the supply of those 
networks and/or services. Member States shall 
adopt measures to ensure that such procedures 
enable disputes to be settled fairly and promptly 
and may, where warranted, adopt a system of 
reimbursement and/or compensation. Such 
procedures shall enable disputes to be settled 
impartially and shall not deprive the consumer of 
the legal protection afforded by national law. 
Member States may extend these obligations to 
cover disputes involving other end-users. 
 
2. Member States shall ensure that their 
legislation does not hamper the establishment of 
complaints offices and the provision of on-line 
services at the appropriate territorial level to 
facilitate access to dispute resolution by 
consumers and end-users. 
 
3. Where such disputes involve parties in 
different Member States, Member States shall 
coordinate their efforts with a view to bringing 
about a resolution of the dispute. 
 
Article 34 Universal service directive 





Facilitating change of provider 
 
Article 30(5) and (6) limit maximum contract duration to 24 months and require operators to offer 
users the possibility to subscribe to a contract with a maximum duration of 12 months. The scope of 
the current Article 30 (5) and (5) Universal Service Directive is very broad and probably  
disproportionate.  Consumers have today a broad choice of different offerings, including contracts with 
short minimum duration times, e.g. prepaid contracts for data and communication, and internet-based 
(best-effort) services for communication most often have no minimum duration times at all.  
If consumers still chose a contract with a longer minimum duration time, this would be usually linked 
to specific benefits, such as lower prices, subsidised devices or cost-free installations. In such 




ETNO believes that there is in principle no justification for a rule on maximum contract duration any 
longer. However, if stricter rules for network providers are found to be indispensable for consumers, 
ETNO proposes to limit the current restriction on the duration of contracts to internet service 
provision.  Access to the Internet suffices to allow a broad choice of OTT services, including audio-
visual services. 
 
Under the Commission Better Regulation Guidelines, the question should be asked whether self-
regulation or co-regulation is sufficient to achieve the objective pursued by the limitation of the 
duration of contracts. In case of persisting problems – of which there are no indications today - NRAs 
should examine first whether self-regulation or co-regulation would suffice to attain the objectives 
pursued.105 If this is not the case, it could be considered to empower the regulators to impose 
contractual limits, if so required.106 NRAs should nevertheless always take into account that more 
flexibility as regards contractual duration time also entails consumer benefits, such as device subsidies 
or subsidized CPE installation. Moreover, switching costs may have pro-competitive effects in that they 
may lengthen the expected customer lifetime (by lowering customer churn), thus making the 
acquisition of new customers more profitable for firms. This, in turn, could lead companies to invest 
more. The latter consideration is particularly important in view of the important investments necessary 
to upgrade the fixed broadband networks and deploy FttH. 
 
On other important positive (pro-competitive) effect of longer duration contracts and lower churn is 
that they allow for the reduction of entry prices, thus promoting penetration. 
 
This being said, the real switching barriers result from more important factors than contract duration, 
such as network-effects or lock-in effects. Many service provides in the internet impose such switching 
barriers, without being regulated at all. Applying strict rules on lowering switching barriers only to 
some players in the market would appear inappropriate and discriminatory. 
 
Current provisions Proposed amendments 
 
Article 30 Universal service directive 
Facilitating change of provider 
 
Para 1 to 4 
 
5.  Member States shall ensure that contracts 
concluded between consumers and 
undertakings providing electronic 
communications services do not mandate an 
initial commitment period that exceeds 24 
months. Member States shall also ensure that 
undertakings offer users the possibility to 
subscribe to a contract with a maximum duration 
of 12 months. 
6.  Without prejudice to any minimum 
contractual period, Member States shall ensure 
 
Article 30 Universal service directive 







                                                 
105 See Department for Media, Culture and Sport, The UK government’s response to Commission Consultation: “Public 
consultation on the evaluation and the review of the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services” December 2015:” Many of the welcome successes on consumer rights and protections in the UK in recent years have 
been achieved through voluntary agreements with industry, but these are often achieved where there is a credible threat of 
principle-based intervention provided for in the framework. These interventions can be deployed if and when needed (rather 
than relying on prescriptive rules which could create loopholes and raise the need for additional enforcement action)”.   




that conditions and procedures for contract 
termination do not act as a disincentive against 
changing service provider. 
 
6.4.4. Universal service providers 
 
In case no basic offers are available in their jurisdiction, Member States shall, under the proposed new 
Article 4(3) encourage the inclusion in their social policies of affordability schemes and other demand-
side instruments such as vouchers. If this does not suffice to ensure the availability of basic offers, the 
NRA shall have, under the proposed new Article 9, the power to impose all internet access providers 
to propose such basic internet access product, within their offers. 
 
Consequently, Member States would no longer have to designate a universal service provider and 
calculate the net cost of the provision of the service. 
 
Current provision Amendments 
 
Article 8 Universal Service Directive 
Designation of undertakings 
 
1.  Member States may designate one or more 
undertakings to guarantee the provision of 
universal service as identified in Articles 4, 5, 6 
and 7 and, where applicable, Article 9(2) so that 
the whole of the national territory can be 
covered. Member States may designate 
different undertakings or sets of undertakings 
to provide different elements of universal 
service and/or to cover different parts of the 
national territory. 
 
2.  When Member States designate 
undertakings in part or all of the national 
territory as having universal service obligations, 
they shall do so using an efficient, objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory designation 
mechanism, whereby no undertaking is a priori 
excluded from being designated. Such 
designation methods shall ensure that universal 
service is provided in a cost-effective manner 
and may be used as a means of determining the 
net cost of the universal service obligation in 
accordance with Article 12. 
 
3.  When an undertaking designated in 
accordance with paragraph 1 intends to dispose 
of a substantial part or all of its local access 
network assets to a separate legal entity under 
different ownership, it shall inform in advance 
the national regulatory authority in a timely 
 
 




manner, in order to allow that authority to 
assess the effect of the intended transaction on 
the provision of access at a fixed location and of 
telephone services pursuant to Article 4. The 
national regulatory authority may impose, 
amend or withdraw specific obligations in 
accordance with Article 6(2) of Directive 
2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive). 
 
Article 12 Universal Service Directive 
Costing 
 
To be deleted 
 
 
Article 13 Universal Service Directive 
Financing 
 
Article 14 Universal Service Directive 
Transparency 
 
To be deleted 
 
 
Annex IV: Universal Service Directive 
Calculating the net cost, if any, of universal 
service obligations 
 
To be deleted 
 
  
6.5. Services for disabled users 
 
The regulatory framework has among its policy objectives and regulatory principles to ensure that 
users, including disabled users, elderly users, and users with special social needs, derive maximum 
benefit in terms of choice, price and quality (Article 8 of the Framework Directive). With respect to 
disabled users, the Universal Service Directive contains specific requirements under the universal 
service obligation (Article 7) and regarding the equivalence in access and choice (Article 23a). 
 
Article 7 (and Article 26 concerning emergency numbers) contains measures that Member States have 
to take in order to ensure that disabled persons have affordable access to fixed telephone services, 
including emergency services, directory enquiry services and directories. Access should be equal to the 
services for other end-users. Member States should also ensure that disabled end-users are able to 
call emergency services. Furthermore, Article 7 gives Member States the option to oblige their NRA to 
assess inter alia the extent and form of specific measures for disabled end-users. Member States can 
take measures – in the light of national conditions – to ensure that disabled end-users can also benefit 
from the choice between undertakings and providers of services, which are available to the majority 
of end-users. 
 
Articles 21 and 22(1) commit Member States to empower their NRA respectively to impose obligations 
to inform disabled subscribers regularly and in detail about products and services intended for them 
and to impose the communication of information for the sake of end-users about the quality of their 
services, including equal access for disabled end-users. Under Article 23a, NRAs must be granted 
powers to impose rules on providers to ensure that disabled end-users get access and choices similar 
to the majority of end-users and to impose measures to promote accessibility of terminal equipment 
with services and functions necessary for disabled end-users. While NRAs can only impose obligations 
under Article 7 only on the Universal Service provider, obligations relating to access and choice for 
disabled end-users can be imposed under Article 23a of the Universal Service Directive, on a much 





The BEREC report107 on equivalent access and choice for disabled end-users gives an overview of the 
adjustments obtained by Member States in the framework of these provisions. The list shows that 
adjustments vary strongly between Member States. For example, as regards free directory enquiry 
service for users with visual impairments the overview mentions “free directory enquiry service for 
users with visual impairments (SK) or the possibility of making a certain number of free calls to directory 
enquiry services, particularly for blind and visually impaired users (EL, PT and UK); telephone directory 
enquiry service in a form appropriate to meet the needs of disabled end-users free of charge (CY); a call 
based enquiry service to end-users with visual impairments at a discounted price (0.67 €/call when the 
average price for calls is around 4–5 €/call) (FI); free directory enquiry service once certification of 
disability is provided by a registered medical practitioner or an agent (IE); directory enquiry service at 
the tariff for dialling a geographical number for visually impaired people (NL)”. A majority of Member 
States have apparently not deemed necessary to intervene in this area. The same holds true for other 
adjustments listed in the BEREC report.  There is likely no ‘one size fits all’ solution. One the other hand, 
specific national approaches to assist people with disabilities do not as such affect the single market 
for electronic communications networks and services. The case for dealing with adaptations at EU level 
is therefore extremely dubious.  
 
Moreover, Articles 7 and 23 of the Universal Service Directive were drafted at the time that voice 
telephony service was the main means of communications. Today, the Internet and new capabilities 
of terminal equipment (such as SIRI on IoS for visually impaired citizens) multiplied the possibilities for 
users with disabilities. In addition, telephony services and related consumer terminal equipment with 
advanced computing capability will be covered by the requirements in Section III of Annex I of the 
future directive108 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States as regards the accessibility requirements for products and services, once adopted. 
 
The wording of Article 23 - Member States shall “encourage” the availability of terminal equipment, 
rather than require it – stresses the difficulty to micro-manage at EU level the diverse solutions 
proposed by the sector players. In addition, players other than internet access providers develop the 
applications and solutions that will ensure the basic access to the internet by persons with disabilities 
(and internet access providers are moreover bound by a network-neutrality obligation). It would 
therefore not be proportional to maintain obligations only on the providers of networks and managed 
voice telephone services109.  
 
Under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, signed and ratified by the European 
Union and by most of the Member States110, the Parties have an obligation to ensure that Information 
and Communication Technologies and Services are made accessible to persons with disabilities111. The 
most proportional and effective means to conceive and make available specific solutions for disabled 
end-users and achieve that public objective is to promote initiatives from across the whole digital value 
chain, where required with subsidies from local authorities of the national social security schemes. 
                                                 
107 BoR (15) 135, Update of the report on equivalent access and choice for disabled end-users, 01.10.2015, in particular pp 9 
and 10. 
108  COM(2015) 615 final of 2.12.2015. 
109 Moreover, telecom equipment are covered by the Commission proposal of 2 December 2015 for a Directive on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States as regards the accessibility 
requirements for products and services, COM(2015) 615. 
110 For example, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands have not ratified the convention. The list of signatories can be consulted 
on: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en 
111 Under Article 9 of the Convention: “1. To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all 
aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis 
with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and 
communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban 




NRAs should play in cooperation measures with public authorities in charge of the social policy 
concerned at national, regional and local level, where required, a coordinating role to prioritize, test 
and promote new applications that could increase the accessibility of the internet by the various 
categories of people with disabilities. Such initiatives do not require mandatory legal obligations set 
under EU Directives.  If necessary, less intrusive means could be considered, such as recommendations 
or best practices. 
 
Obligations in favour of disabled users would be transferred to the future Directive on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States as regards 
the accessibility requirements for products and services, taking into consideration that today, the 
dynamic and innovative market already delivers efficient solutions, providing a variety of offerings that 
may replace the earlier dedicated systems facilitating voice telephony for disabled users. 
 
Current provision amendments 
 
Article 7 Universal service directive 
Measures for disabled end-users 
 
1. Unless requirements have been specified 
under Chapter IV which achieve the equivalent 
effect, Member States shall take specific 
measures to ensure that access to, and 
affordability of, the services identified in Article 
4(3) and Article 5 for disabled end-users is 
equivalent to the level enjoyed by other end-
users. Member States may oblige national 
regulatory authorities to assess the general need 
and the specific requirements, including the 
extent and concrete form of such specific 
measures for disabled end users. 
2. Member States may take specific measures, in 
the light of national conditions, to ensure that 
disabled end-users can also take advantage of 
the choice of undertakings and service providers 
available to the majority of end-users. 
3. In taking the measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States shall 
encourage compliance with the relevant 
standards or specifications published in 
accordance with Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). 
 
Article 7 Universal service directive 
Measures for disabled end-users 
 
To be deleted  
 
Article 23a Universal Service Directive 
Ensuring equivalence in access and choice for 
disabled end-users 
 
1.  Member States shall enable relevant national 
authorities to specify, where appropriate, 
requirements to be met by undertakings 
providing publicly available electronic 








(a) have access to electronic communications 
services equivalent to that enjoyed by the 
majority of end-users; and 
(b) benefit from the choice of undertakings and 
services available to the majority of end-users. 
 
2.  In order to be able to adopt and implement 
specific arrangements for disabled end-users, 
Member States shall encourage the availability 
of terminal equipment offering the necessary 









In the past seven years, ETNO member companies have collectively invested almost € 190 billion across 
Europe. When it comes to fixed investment, ETNO companies represent over 70% of the total sector 
investment.  They plan to do more, they want to do more. Europe needs them to do more. Investment 
decisions are a result of several factors. Policymakers have a crucial role in making sure 
telecommunications undertakings do not come across barriers to innovating and investing. The Digital 
Single Market Strategy, launched by the Commission in 2015, has the right focus.  But the devil is in 
the detail. Eventually, what will impact investment and innovation decisions are the specific 
amendments to the current rules and procedures that will be adopted at national level to transpose 
the measures that the Commission will put forward. 
 
The amendments to the telecoms regulatory framework must put users at the core and refocus the 
regulation of the sector on essentials such as the competitiveness of retail markets and infrastructure 
competition. A regulation that allows more space for commercial freedom and innovation. Simplicity, 
rather than legal complexity, is what the industry expects. 
 
ETNO hopes that this report will be useful to the Commission and the EU co-legislators when drafting 
and negotiating the reform of the telecoms regulatory framework. 
 
The proposed amendments were drafted by CRIDS under supervision of two expert working groups 
set up by ETNO to build on the expertise acquired by its member companies in the day-to-day 
implementation of the current rules. 
 
The first working group – the 'Digital Infrastructure' Working Group - brings together experts on 
network technologies and access as well as on the implementation of the universal service. The second 
working group – the 'Digital Economy and Consumer' Working Group – consists of experts in the 
broader information society issues, on top of the mere connectivity layer of the digital networks and 
the challenges of the future service regulation.  
 
These working groups will remain available during the whole reform process of the EU regime to assist 
the Commission and its services in the delicate task of re-drafting the rules that will govern our fast 
evolving and increasingly complex industry from 2020 onwards. These rules will have a dramatic 
influence on investment and innovation decisions. and consequently on the state of the art of the 







Annex: Overview of the provisions of the EU Framework 
covered in this study 
 
A. Amendments to the Framework Directive 
 
Current provisions amendments 
Article 1: Scope and aim Not included 
Article 2: Definitions p. 27 eCom services to be deleted 
p. 37 new definition KNI 
  
Article 3: NRAs Not covered 
Article 4: right of appeal (outside the scope of the opinion) 
Article 5: Provision of information Not covered 
Article 6: Consultation and transparency 
mechanism 
Not covered 
Article 7 – 7b: Consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications 
p. 52 
Article 8: policy objectives p. 31 
Article 8a: Strategic planning and 
coordination of radio spectrum policy  
(outside the scope of the opinion) 
Article 9 Not covered 
Article 9a: Review of restrictions on existing 
rights 
(outside the scope of the opinion) 
Article 9b: Transfer or lease of individual 
rights to use radio frequencies 
(outside the scope of the opinion) 
Article 10: Numbering, naming and 
addressing 
p. 71 
Article 11: Rights of way 
Article 12: Co-location 
Article 13: Accounting separation 
Articles 13a and 13b: network security 
Not covered 
Articles 14 Not covered 
Article 15: Not covered 
Article 16 Market analysis procedure p. 40 
New 16a Periodic review of the retail 
markets 
p. 44 
New 16b commitments p. 45 
Article 17: Standardisation Not covered 
Article 18: digital interactive television 
services 
Not covered 
Article 19: Harmonisation (outside the scope of the opinion) 
Article 20: Dispute resolution p. 60 
Article 21: cross-border disputes 
Article 21a: Penalties 
Article 22: Committee 
Article 23: Exchange of information 
Article 24: Publication of information 
(outside the scope of the opinion) 




Articles 26 - 30 Not covered 
ANNEX II joint dominance Not covered 
 
B. Amendments to the Universal Service Directive 
 
Current provisions amendments 
Article 1: Subject-matter and scope p. 64 
Article 2: Definitions p. 65 
Article 3: Availability of universal service p. 90 
Article 4: Provision of access at a fixed 
location and provision of telephone services 
p. 91 
Article 5: Directory enquiry services and 
directories 
p. 91 
Article 6: Public pay telephones and other 
publics voice telephony access points 
p. 92 
Article 7: Measures for disabled end-users P 109 
Article 8: Designation of undertakings p.106 
Article 9: Affordability of tariffs p. 93 
Article 10: Control of expenditure p. 94 
Article 11: Quality of service of designated 
undertakings 
p. 97 
Article 12: Costing p. 107   Delete 
Article 13: Financing p. 107   Delete 
Article 14: Transparency p. 107  Delete 
Article 15: Review of the scope p. 92 
Article 17: Regulatory controls p. 57 
Articles 20: Contracts p. 99 
Articles 21: Transparency and publication of 
information 
p. 101 
Articles 22: Quality of service (net 
neutrality) 
p. 95 
Articles 23: Availability of services p. 67 
Article 23a: Ensuring equivalence in access 
and choice for disabled end-users 
p. 109 
Article 24: Interoperability of consumer 
digital television equipment 
Not covered 
Article 25: Telephone directory enquiry 
services 
p. 83 
Article 26: single European emergency call 
number 
p. 72+75 
Article 27: European telephone access 
codes 
p. 85 
Article 27a: services of social value, p. 86 
Article 28: Harmonised numbers for 
services of social value, including the 
missing children hotline number 
p. 74 
Article 29: Provision of additional facilities p. 75 
Article 30: number portability p. 81 
p. 105 




Articles 32: Additional mandatory services Not covered 
Articles 33: Consultation with interested 
parties 
(outside the scope of the opinion) 
Articles 34: Out-of-court dispute resolution p. 104 
Articles 35 - 40: committee procedures, 
entry into force etc. 
(outside the scope of the opinion) 
Annex I: description of facilities and services 
referred to in article 10 (control of 
expenditure), article 29 (additional facilities) 
and article 30 (facilitating change of 
provider) 
p. 76 
Annex II: information to be published in 
accordance with article 21 
Not covered 
Annex III: quality of service parameters p. 79 
Annex IV: calculating the net cost, if any, of 
universal service obligations 
p. 107  
Annex V: process for reviewing the scope of 
universal service in accordance with article 
15 
p. 107 
Annex VI: interoperability of digital 




C. Amendments to the Access Directive 
 
Current provisions amendments 
Article 1: Scope and aim Not covered 
Article 2: Definitions p. 38 + p. 68 
Article 3: General framework for access and 
interconnection 
Not covered 
Article 4: Rights and obligations for 
undertakings 
p. 69 
Article 5: Powers and responsibilities of the 
NRAs with regard to access and 
interconnection 
p. 70 
Article 6: Conditional access systems and 
other facilities 
Not covered 
Article 8: Imposition, amendment or 
withdrawal of obligations 
p. 46 
Article 9: Obligation of transparency p. 48 
Article 10: Obligation of non-discrimination p. 49 
Article 11: Obligation of accounting 
separation 
p. 50 
Article 12: Obligations of access to, and use 
of, specific network facilities 
p. 51 
Article 13: Price control and cost accounting 
obligations 
Articles 13a and 13b: Functional separation  
p. 54 
 
p. 56 + 57 
Article 14  Not covered 
Article 15 Not covered 




Article 17- 20: Not covered 
Annex I: conditions for access to digital 
television and radio services broadcast to 
viewers and listeners in the community 
Not covered 
Annex II: minimum list of items to be 
included in a reference offer for wholesale 
network infrastructure access, including 
shared or fully unbundled access to the 
local loop at a fixed location to be published 
by notified operators with significant 
market power (SMP) 
Not covered 
 
D. Amendments to the Authorisation Directive 
 
Article 4  Minimum list of rights derived from the 
general authorisation 
p. 69 
New: number portability p. 81 
New: Access to numbers and services p. 74 
New Annex II: DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND 
SERVICES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE XX 
ADDITIONAL FACILITIES 
p. 76 
 
